Deviance and Social Control: Rational Choice Theory

Rational choice theory is an economic model of human decision making which assumes that people are motivated by their own self-interests and, through a process of weighing costs and benefits, work to maximize their gain. While economists would view this gain in monetary and market exchange terms, rational choice theorists might include less tangible outcomes like enhanced reputation, time saved, peer approval, and other possible desirable outcomes. In criminology, rational choice theory is used to understand when crime is profitable and how to decrease criminal action by making its risks too high. Theoretically speaking, if the difficulty in achieving a criminal objective is increased along with the risk of being caught and punished, the criminal will seek out some other means of obtaining money or reward -- maybe even a legal one.

Rational-Choice Theory in Economics

Rational-choice theory developed in the discipline of economics, where it remains the foundational premise for understanding individual human decision making. In the late 1700s, Jeremy Bentham, an English economist, argued that human beings are highly individualistic and surprisingly lazy when it comes to meeting their everyday needs. Given this desire not to work too hard, human beings are usually intent upon maximizing their utility, that is, producing the greatest amount of happiness with the least amount of suffering. According to this theory, two mechanisms govern human behavior: the desire for pleasure and the fear of pain. In order to make optimal utilization decisions, then, the individual must be a reasoning actor who weighs the costs and benefits of particular actions before acting in a manner that achieves the best possible outcome with the least likelihood of pain or failure. Since individuals cannot achieve all of the things they desire, they must choose to pursue specific goals and determine the best way to reach those goals. On the surface, the process by which an individual makes a decision and acts on it may seem like a rational process subject to scientific measurement and analysis. For economists and social scientists eager to have a model to understand human decision-making processes, this basic principle has served a profound purpose. However, in practice, individuals can act with misinformation, disregard obvious failings and flaws in their plans, or act with emotion and haste.

Rational-Choice Theory in Sociology

The application of rational choice in sociology is more formal and tries to statistically quantify human behavior. It argues that people's preferences can be evaluated and prioritized in relation to other options and that individuals seek to maximize the utility of these preferences, though they are subject to various constraints. Each choice is given a numerical value as a possible outcome. In order to maximize utility, for example, a robber will wish to rob the most lucrative business on Main Street. Preference A is the bank that is known to have the most cash on hand. Preference B is the less desirable liquor store. Preference C is the least desirable local coin laundry. Mathematically speaking, because the compelling goal of human behavior is to maximize utility, there is no rational reason for the robber to choose preference C over preference A. Because this is so, the rational-choice model has explanatory and predictive value in understanding the human decision-making processes. If preference C is chosen over preferences A and B, the model takes this into account by arguing that specific constraints affected the actor, such as time, money, access to special equipment, the need for co-conspirators, or the likelihood of getting caught. When these circumstances are taken into consideration, it is possible for preference C to become the rational choice for a robbery.

This idea of special circumstances affecting the outcome of an actor's decision is important, since the economist Adam Smith, Bentham's Scottish contemporary, argued that value is intrinsic or innate to a given object; gold, for example, would always be more valuable than water, he claimed. Bentham and others disagreed, arguing that the value of an object could vary according to circumstances. To a man dying of thirst, for example, a drink of water would have greater value than gold. Rational-choice theorists, then, try to given statistical values to an individual's preferences for predictive purposes. Not surprisingly, since it is premised on the idea that people are motivated by making money and maximizing their financial gain in a deliberative manner, economists can use this model to optimize their own market-driven goals and objectives. By determining the factors that cause a consumer to purchase one car over another, car manufacturers and marketing executives can retool their products or merely modify their advertising to move their car higher up in consumers' preferential priorities. The value of any theoretical framework that could discern human thought processes in decision making, delineate them in detail, predict outcomes, and account for special circumstances that might make this rational process seem irrational is, and has been, incalculable. In essence, rational-choice theory denies the existence of any action that is not rational, deliberate, calculated, and motivated by the pleasure of gain or the fear of pain. Altruism, morality, trust, social connections, social identity, past history, and human goodness have no place in the model unless they enter the equation in a practical, measurable manner.

Methodological Individualism

Since rational-choice theory is based on the decision-making processes of the individual, it stems from the theory of methodological individualism, which believes that "the elementary unit of social life is the individual human action. To explain social institutions and social change is to show how they arise as the result of the action and interaction of individuals" (Elster, 1989, p. 13). One flaw in this logic is the attribution of social phenomena to discrete, individual actions committed by individuals who supposedly have no social identity. Similarly, many would argue that the theory is flawed in its assumption that individual behavioral studies can predict aggregate social phenomena. Complicated theories of "social structures, collective decisions, collective behavior, and systems of cultural ideas" are thus made dependent on self-interested individuals (Turner, 2006, p. 497). Through the lens of rational-choice theory, war, peace, environmentalism, and all other social phenomena become solely utilitarian. Additionally, others have noted that once the social system emerges, it redistributes resources and places restraints on individuals' seemingly rational choices and actions. The relationship between the individual and the collective whole described by rational-choice theory is completely disrupted. Nevertheless, rational-choice theory has played a significant role in the social sciences since the late 1960s. As noted below, rational-choice theory has provided criminologists with several mechanisms for predicting crime and devising methods of crime prevention. The model is extremely useful and powerful, and its predictions are frequently accurate.

Applications

Control Theory

Rational-choice theory has a foundational presence in classical criminological control theory, which assumes that people will always act in their own self-interest. According to Rock's (2002) explanation of control theory's underpinnings, "people … seek to commit crime because it is profitable, useful, or enjoyable for them to do so, and … they will almost certainly break the law if they can" (Rock, p. 56). One major problem with rational-choice theory is its central assumption that self-interest or egoism is the driving force of human behavior. No understanding of the role of altruism is possible within this framework. However, rather than discussing theory, control theorists are much more interested in creating practical policy interventions by analyzing the specific factors that deter people from committing crimes. Travis Hirschi (1969), for example, reframed the debate of criminal conduct by shifting the focus away from why people commit crimes to why they do not. Thus, deterrence and deterrence theory also are aspects of rational-choice theory.

Ron Clarke & Crime Reduction

Some of the most practical considerations of fluctuating crime rates have come out of Ron Clarke's (1992) work. As a situational control theorist, Clarke focused on the circumstantial dynamics of a given setting in order to predict criminal activity. He argued that three main factors affect criminal outcomes. The first is the effort needed to commit a given crime. Making a crime more difficult to commit and forcing a criminal to put forth more effort to commit it, Clarke thought, would dissuade the criminal actor. Several techniques could be used to increase the difficulty of committing a crime:

• Target hardening, which involves making sure that the object or person being targeted is better protected. For example, encasing a toy in a large, hard plastic package that is difficult to open would make it more difficult for a thief smuggle the toy out of the store.
• Access control, which entails impeding a criminal's access to a target through fencing, concrete barricades, or other physical objects of deterrence.
• Deflecting offenders, which involves providing other outlets for an undesirable behavior. A building that generally prohibits smoking, for instance, could allow smoking in designated areas.
• Controlling factors, which includes methods of prohibiting or limiting access to undesirable items. Gun control regulations, for example, could be used to prevent violent gun crimes, and a prohibition on minors purchasing spray paint could be used to deter graffiti.

Clarke's second tactic for crime reduction involves increasing the risk of being caught. Mechanisms in this category include screening individuals at national borders, using metal detectors at school entrances, and implementing various forms of surveillance: formal surveillance by police and guards, informal surveillance by employees trained to be alert to crime, and "natural surveillance," such as cutting hedges, installing closed-circuit cameras, and enhancing lighting around the target.

Clarke's third tactic for crime reduction is to make crime less profitable for criminals. Techniques for achieving this include:

• Target removal, which makes the target less accessible to the criminal. Rather than keeping all its cash on hand, for example, a liquor store might, throughout the day, place large sums of cash in a safe that cannot be unlocked by an attendant.
• Property identification, which is the process of making a stolen object identifiable so that it can be returned to its owner, such as by etching serial numbers on it.
• Removing inducements, which involves eliminating factors that might attract crime. Quickly removing graffiti, for instance, can frustrate the satisfaction of the perpetrator and cause future vandals to look elsewhere. Similarly, quickly repairing broken windows can also deter vandals.
• Rule setting, which entails articulating expected behaviors and the consequences of illegal action. Income tax returns and custom declarations, for example, outline the laws governing these forms as well as how violations of these laws are punished.

Routine-Activities Theory

Another offshoot of rational-choice theory is routine-activities theory. This, too, is an environmental criminal theory, rather than one that focuses on the nature of the individual. Routine-activities theory holds that in order for a crime to occur, three elements must be present:

• A suitable target (person, place, or thing).
• A lack of suitable guardians, such as owners, law enforcement personnel, neighbors, or security cameras. Some of these guardians are intentional, like law enforcement; others, such as neighbors, are more informal.
• A motivated offender.

As Rock (2002) described the theory, "crime was taken to be embedded in the very architecture of everyday life" (p. 61). Out of this theoretical framework came the crime triangle, also called the problem analysis triangle (PAT). The crime itself is the center of the triangle; the three sides are labeled "offender," "target/ victim," and "place." Superimposed over this is another triangle that names interventions. "Manager" is over "place," "guardian" is over "target/victim," and "handler" is over "offender." This framework is used to describe both the elements necessary to create criminal situations and those necessary to prevent and respond to criminal situations.

While routine-activity theory is useful in crime prevention and deterrence analysis, many criminologists and sociologists fault it for failing to look at the social causes of crime.

Viewpoints

In the past, rational-choice theory has been criticized for its lack of measurable, empirical analysis to prove its efficacy. Through game theory and experimental economics, however, extensive documentation now demonstrates its usefulness as a tool to analyze and predict human behavior. It continues to receive criticism within the social sciences, however, because of the difficulty of mathematically quantifying and analyzing human behavior in real-life settings.

Not all social-control theorists explain criminal conduct in situational terms. Hirschi (1969), for example, argued that "delinquent acts result when the individual's bond to society is weak or broken" (p. 16). Four aspects of social relationships caused the individual to obey the law, according to Hirschi. "Attachment reflected a person's sensitivity to the opinions of others; commitment flowed from an investment of time, energy, and reputation in conformity; involvement stemmed from engrossment in conventional activity; and belief mirrored a person's conviction that he or she should obey legal rules" (Rock, p. 57). Given that all four of these factors involve strong social links, in contrast to rational-choice theory, it is possible under Hirschi's theory for an individual to choose to not commit a crime, even if it would be easy and rewarding. Later in his career, Hirschi (1990) looked to lack of impulse control as a basis for criminal conduct. Lacking the ability to delay gratification and attracted to the immediate, powerful, exciting realities of criminal conduct, criminals under this analysis were opportunistic, deceitful actors with no relationship with or regard for their victims. By focusing on forms of control over individual behavior as they relate to criminal activity, Hirschi and similar theorists ignored numerous traditional criminological questions relating to class, ethnicity, gender, environment, personality, and social systems.

Deterrence Theory

Given that rational-choice theorists believe pleasure and pain govern individual behavior, it is not surprising that their perspectives on crime control include these two dimensions in what is known as deterrence theory. This theoretical perspective argues that the threat of punishment or the promise of a reward should motivate individuals to modify their behavior just as much as actual punishments or rewards. In order for these threats to be effective, however, there has to be a strong likelihood of being caught, along with severe and swift punishment. Otherwise, the deterrent would be too weak to modify action. In the public-policy realm, deterrence theory has led to "use a gun, go to jail" laws and other mandatory sentencing requirements. It has also led to the public posting of criminal consequences, such as signs in stores stating that shoplifters will be prosecuted and radio announcements informing the public that drunk-driving crackdowns will occur during certain holidays. The assumption of deterrence theory in these instances is that, because of the threat of being caught, for every person arrested and swiftly prosecuted, dozens of others will have been deterred from committing the crime in the first place.

Under deterrence theory, it follows that jurisdictions that have enacted the death penalty should see lower homicide rates than those that have not, since the threat of punishment by death should be the ultimate deterrent. However, Tittle (1995) found that this is not the case. A study reported on by Bonner and Fessenden (2000) showed that when US states enact the death penalty, their homicides rates increase. Many researchers have concluded that the death penalty has a brutalization effect on individuals, causing them to devalue human life (King, 1978). Additionally, those who commit murder may go on to eliminate witnesses in an effort to avoid capital punishment. Bonner and Fessenden (2000) also mention the disproportionate representation of African American men on death row and its implications of racism.

If aspects of deterrence theory sound like B. F. Skinner's work on animal behavior from the 1940s, the similarity is intentional. Skinner's theories on conditioning behavior -- reinforcing certain behaviors through rewards and punishments -- mirrored Bentham's economic beliefs from the 1700s. In one of his experiments, Skinner used a system of rewards to train pigeons to play a version of ping-pong. Homans (1961) and other proponents of rational-choice theory believed that conditioning mechanisms could be applied to humans as well as pigeons, even if the natures of the rewards were more diverse for people. Respect, freedom, money, approval, and material objects might all be used to motivate humans, but the process of motivation itself was the same as it was with the pigeons. The strength of the reinforcement is not as easy to quantify, but its utility, or value to the individual, remains central to the analysis. Homans also argued that if individuals are not engaging in a profitable exchange, they might withdraw from an interaction or refuse to engage in subsequent interactions. This observation brought in the concept of mutual profitability, which states that a social interaction can only be sustained if all participants find it profitable. Thus, in addition to competition and exploitation, the concept of cooperation is prevalent in rational-choice theory.

Social-Exchange Theory & Game Theory

Thus far, we have focused on the individual in this discussion of rational-choice theory. Exchange theory is similar to rational-choice theory, but instead of focusing purely on the individual, it also considers the individual or entities with which the individual interacts. It is economic exchange when goods or services are being negotiated. It is social exchange when other intangible, yet valued, behaviors are negotiated, such as respect, antipathy, tolerance, love, or approval. In both instances, the reward or desired outcome can have both monetary and non-monetary value. Negotiating for peace, for example, can reduce monetary expenditures on war and also provide a more stable and safe living environment for citizens. Self-interest governed by pain and pleasure remains the motivating force, but now concepts of cooperation, competition, and exploitation enter the discussion. The players act with strategic intent to achieve their goals under uncertain conditions by exerting their perceived optimal choices. These same principles apply in game theory, which is another dimension of rational-choice theory. The cast of characters in game theory can include two individuals, two corporations, two countries, or any other number of players.

It is important to remember that social-exchange theory and game theory can make some rather unrealistic assumptions. The first assumption is that actors have all of the information necessary to make a rational choice regarding their self-interests. Second, the theories assume that every actor has the mental and psychological ability to effectively weigh each choice against the others. Third, the actor is assumed to be aware of every possible choice that pertains to the exchange or interaction and how it relates to the actor's self-interest. Certainly, theorists do not actually assume all of the above, but they rely on these assumptions as if they were true in every analysis as a means of predicting behavior. Of course, one consistent outcome has been that people and entities act in ways that deviate from their best self-interests, but that, too, is accounted for in the various models. When it was found that the death penalty does not serve as the ultimate deterrent of crime, theorists looked for reasons to explain this apparently non-rational outcome.

Free Riders

One issue constantly present in the development of rational-choice theory is the concept of the free rider. Free riders are individuals who exert little or no energy to realize their self-interests, relying instead on society for support. Later in his own life's work, Bentham worried that social welfare programs that provided handouts and assistance to the poor would appeal to the innate laziness of the human actor and deter the poor from seeking gainful employment. The reliance on public assistance as a rational choice for subsistence remains an ongoing debate in society centuries later.

Conclusion

Rational-choice theory is the dominant theoretical framework for the analysis of individual human behavior in the field of economics, and it has a strong following in the social sciences as well. It offers a simple, quantifiable evaluation of human behavior and, more importantly, offers significant predictive value. By understanding how people select their morning cereal, for example, manufacturers and marketing experts can modify their product or their advertising to augment sales. Criminologists can predict high-crime situations and deter such action through specific interventions or severe, effective punishments. On a larger, societal level, though, rational-choice theory arguably has severe limitations. Why people might join together to act collectively is difficult to explain within this theoretical structure, as are altruism, social norms, trust, and other related but intangible forces that have some place in individual motivation. How and why individuals might subvert their own self-interests for the collective good are enduring challenges to the rational-choice theoretical framework.

Terms & Concepts

Access Control: Intentionally making it difficult for a criminal to gain entry to or to approach places that are desirable for criminal purposes.

Deflecting Offenders: Forcing potential offenders to redirect their undesirable attention and actions into an alternative outlet.

Exploitation: The practice of taking selfish or unfair advantage of a person or situation, usually for personal gain.

Impulse Control: The ability to exert authority over one's sudden desires, urges, or inclinations.

Methodological Individualism: The belief that the elementary unit of social life is the individual human action, and criminological and sociological research should seek to explain social institutions and social change in relation to the individual human action.

Target Hardening: Providing better protection for a person or an object in order to deter crime.

Target Removal: Eliminating the object of criminal desire in order to reduce criminal behavior.

Bibliography

Bonner, R., & Fessenden, F. (2000, September 22). Absence of executions: A special report: States with no death penalty share lower homicide rates. New York Times. Retrieved November 7, 2013, from http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/22/us/absence-executions-special-report-states-with-no-death-penalty-share-lower.html

Clarke, R. (1992). Situational crime prevention. New York: Harrow & Heston.

Elster, J. (1989). Nuts and bolts for the social sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gottfredson, M. & Hirschi, T. (1990). A general theory of crime. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Hirschi, T. (1969). Causes of delinquency. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Homans, B. (1961). Social behavior: Its elementary forms. London: Routledge.

King, D. R. (1978). The brutalization effect: Execution publicity and the incidence of homicide in South Carolina. Social Forces, 57(2), 683-687. Retrieved November 7, 2013, from EBSCO Online Database SocINDEX with Full Text. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=5285650&site=ehost-live

Maimon, D., Antonaccio, O., & French, M. T. (2012). Severe sanctions, easy choice? Investigating the role of school sanctions in preventing adolescent violent offending. Criminology, 50(2), 495-524. Retrieved November 7, 2013, from EBSCO Online Database SocINDEX with Full Text. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=74043092&site=ehost-live

Manzo, G. (2013). Is rational choice theory still a rational choice of theory? A response to Opp. Social Science Information, 52(3), 361-382. Retrieved November 7, 2013, from EBSCO Online Database SocINDEX with Full Text. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=89566128&site=ehost-live

Nagin, D. (1990). Prisons and alternatives to incarceration. In D. Ebley, (Ed.). Leading Pennsylvania into the 21st century. PA: Commonwealth Foundation.

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Sutherland, E. (1947). Principles of criminology (4th ed.). Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott.

Tittle, C. (1995). Control balance: Toward a general theory of deviance. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Turner, J. (2006). Rational choice theory. In B. Turner (Ed.), The Cambridge dictionary of sociology. London: Cambridge University Press.

Warren, M., & Hindelang, M. (1979). Current explanations of offender behavior. In H. Toch (Ed.), Psychology of crime and criminal justice. (pp. 166-182). Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.

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Suggested Reading

Allingham, M. (2002). Choice theory: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Archer, M., & Tritter, J. (Eds.), (2001). Rational choice theory: Resisting colonization. London: Routledge.

Clarke, R., & Felson, M. (Eds.), (2004). Routine activity and rational choice: Advances in criminological theory -- Volume 5. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.

Green, D., & Shapiro, I. (1996). Pathologies of rational choice theory: A critique of applications in political science. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Hastie, R., Dawes, R. (2001). Rational choice in an uncertain world: The psychology of judgement and decision-making. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Lilly, J., Cullen, F., & Ball, R. (2007). Criminology Theory: Context and Consequences. (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Ritzer, G. (Ed.), (2007). Classical sociological theory. (5th ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

Ritzer, G., & Goodman, D. (2007). Sociological theory. (6th ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

Sato, Y. (2006). Intentional social change: A rational choice theory. Victoria, Australia: Trans Pacific.

Stinchcombe, A. (1987). Constructing social theories. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Van Gelder, J. (2013). Beyond rational choice: The hot/cool perspective of criminal decision making. Psychology, Crime & Law, 19(9), 745-763. Retrieved November 7, 2013, from EBSCO Online Database SocINDEX with Full Text. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=90289645&site=ehost-live