Cruel and unusual punishment and the Supreme Court
The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, ratified in 1791, prohibits "cruel and unusual punishment," a concept derived from the English Bill of Rights of 1688. Its interpretation has primarily been the responsibility of the Supreme Court, leading to a complex and often inconsistent body of case law. The Court has debated whether this prohibition establishes fixed standards or promotes a flexible approach shaped by societal values and evolving interpretations of decency.
Initially, the Court gave little attention to this provision until the 1970s, notably addressing it in cases related to the death penalty. In landmark decisions such as *Furman v. Georgia* (1972), the Court grappled with the notion of capital punishment in relation to the Eighth Amendment, with some justices viewing it as inherently unconstitutional and others emphasizing the importance of context and proportionality. The subsequent case of *Gregg v. Georgia* (1976) clarified that while the amendment forbids torture and excessively painful executions, it does not categorically ban capital punishment.
Furthermore, in non-capital cases, the Court has exhibited mixed rulings on what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Cases like *Rummel v. Estelle* (1980) and *Solem v. Helm* (1983) illustrate the ongoing judicial struggle to define the boundaries of acceptable sentencing. As societal views continue to evolve, the Supreme Court remains engaged in interpreting this challenging and ambiguous constitutional provision.
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Cruel and unusual punishment and the Supreme Court
Description: A key provision of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibiting the most shockingly barbarous punishments and conditions of incarceration.
Significance: Although elusive and elastic, the concept of cruel and unusual punishment has enabled the Supreme Court to adjust criminal punishments according to varying standards of decency and proportionality.
Borrowing from the English Bill of Rights of 1688, the Framers of the U.S. Bill of Rights (1791) included in the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution a prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment.” Like so much else in the Constitution, and particularly in the Bill of Rights, the meaning, scope, and limitations of these figurative words were left to be determined by the Supreme Court. The results have been inconsistent, conflicting, and enigmatic.
The Court has struggled over whether the prohibition sets absolute and immutable standards that persist over time or instead expresses a goal of proportionality that varies depending on the circumstances. Consequently, the body of Court decisions interpreting the prohibition suffers from a lack of cohesion, allowing succeeding justices to fill the words with their own values and sensibilities.
During its first century, the Court paid scant attention to the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. In 1910, the Court held, in Weems v. United States, that the crime of being an accessory to the falsification of a public document could not justify a sentence of twelve to twenty years at hard labor in chains and a permanent deprivation of civil rights.
It was not until the 1970s that the Court dwelt seriously on the prohibition, most prominently in the context of the death penalty. In Furman v. Georgia (1972), a fractured Court, with all nine justices writing separate opinions, struck down capital punishment with a 5-4 vote. Only Justices William J. Brennan, Jr., and Thurgood Marshall found that the death penalty was categorically unconstitutional based on the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, which the two justices construed as a flexible device reflecting “evolving standards of decency” based on public opinion, jury verdicts, and legislative enactments.
However, four years later in Gregg v. Georgia (1976), a plurality of the Court found that the prohibition did not invariably preclude capital punishment but only prohibited torture, gratuitously painful methods of execution, or punishments not officially authorized by law.
In non-capital cases, the Court has sent mixed signals. In Rummel v. Estelle (1980), a 5-4 majority held that sentencing a man to a life sentence for three felonies committed over nine years for crimes totaling $229.11 was not cruel and unusual. However, in Solem v. Helm (1983), again on a 5-4 vote, the Court invalidated a life sentence for a man with prior nonviolent felony convictions, found guilty of passing a hundred-dollar check on a nonexistent account.
Inevitably, the Court will continue to grapple with the dilemma of giving meaning to one of the most opaque provisions in the Bill of Rights.
Bibliography
"Cruel and Unusual Punishment." Cornell Law School, 2022, www.law.cornell.edu/wex/cruel‗and‗unusual‗punishment. Accessed 7 Apr. 2023.
"First Principles: Constitutional Matters: Cruel and Unusual Punishment." US Courts, 2014, www.armfor.uscourts.gov/digest/IB4.htm. Accessed 7 Apr. 2023.