Fugitives from justice and the Supreme Court
Fugitives from justice are individuals who evade legal processes by fleeing from the jurisdiction in which they are charged with a crime. The U.S. Constitution mandates, through Article IV, Section 2, that states must extradite fugitives to ensure they face justice. The Supreme Court historically upheld this requirement until the 1861 case of Kentucky v. Dennison, where it ruled that states had the discretion to refuse extradition, particularly in cases involving politically sensitive matters. This decision marked a significant shift, allowing state governors to protect certain fugitives, including those accused of aiding in the escape of enslaved individuals.
However, in 1987, the Supreme Court revisited this issue in Puerto Rico v. Branstad, overturning the precedent set by Dennison. The Court determined that state governors do not have the discretion to refuse extradition, emphasizing the importance of judicial oversight in such matters. This ruling reestablished a more uniform approach to extradition, limiting the ability of state executives to shield fugitives based on perceived injustices in their home jurisdictions. The evolution of these legal interpretations reflects ongoing tensions between state rights and federal judicial authority, particularly in cases that touch on sensitive social and political issues.
Subject Terms
Fugitives from justice and the Supreme Court
Description: Defendants who escape trial by fleeing the jurisdiction of state courts.
Significance: Although considered vital to ensuring the maintenance of justice, the extradition of fugitives is not always assured. The Supreme Court’s stance on the issue changed over time to favor extradition.
Article IV, section 2, of the U.S. Constitution requires the extradition of fugitives to face justice, a requirement that the Supreme Court upheld in the early years of the republic. In Kentucky v. Dennison (1861), however, the Court reversed itself. It denied a writ of mandamus to the state of Kentucky to force William Dennison, the governor of Ohio, to extradite a free African American named Willis Lago accused of aiding in the escape of slaves. The Court argued that it had no power to compel a state governor to extradite a fugitive under his or her protection.
Dennison remained the Court’s position until 1987, when in Puerto Rico v. Branstad, the Court overturned Dennison and ruled that state executives had no discretionary powers over the judiciary process of criminal extradition. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico successfully forced a writ of mandamus against Terry Branstad, the governor of Iowa, who sought to shield Ronald Calder from a perceived unfair murder trial in Puerto Rico. Branstad ended a trend that started with Dennison of state governors refusing to extradite fugitives charged with politically sensitive crimes.