INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) v. Cardoza-Fonseca was a 1987 legal case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS). The case revolved around the standards that claimants had to meet to successfully claim asylum in the United States. It involved INS and Luz Maria Cardoza-Fonseca, a Nicaraguan national who faced deportation from the United States on the grounds that she had overstayed her visa.

Legal scholars and immigration officials consider the case to be significant because it created opportunities for more liberal interpretations of the definitions of “refugee” and “asylum,” as the terms are used in the Refugee Act of 1980. The case also had important implications for future interpretations of “political opinions” and specific “social groups,” as they apply to refugees and asylum-seekers fleeing persecution in their countries of origin. Analysts additionally note that the SCOTUS ruling in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca had the potential to create a legal framework for the subjective and discretionary interpretation of the established international legal standards used to assess the legitimacy of a refugee or an asylum claim.

Background

In 1979, thirty-eight-year-old Luz Maria Cardoza-Fonseca entered the United States on a non-immigrant visitors’ visa. After overstaying her visa, Cardoza-Fonseca was identified by INS authorities and subjected to deportation proceedings. Seeking to remain in the United States, Cardoza-Fonseca sought legal recourse under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. Cardoza-Fonseca specifically cited sections 208(a) and 243(h) in building her legal case.

Under section 208(a), Cardoza-Fonseca had a mechanism for arguing that she could qualify for asylum by demonstrating what the Immigration and Nationality Act defined as a “well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Section 243(h) offered a path for Cardoza-Fonseca to remain in the United States legally by showing that she faced a “clear probability of persecution” if she were returned to her native Nicaragua. With respect to these two sections, Cardoza-Fonseca claimed that her brother had been the victim of torture perpetrated by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), a political party that had led the overthrow of Nicaraguan president Anastasio Somoza in 1979. Cardoza-Fonseca stated that her brother had been targeted because of his political support for Somoza and argued that she had a reasonable fear for her physical safety if she were to return to Nicaragua.

On March 12, 1980, the US House of Representatives and the US Senate passed the Refugee Act. The legislation provided resettlement opportunities to recognized refugees physically present in the United States. The act offered Cardoza-Fonseca additional grounds on which to argue that she was entitled to legal protections available under US federal law.

An immigration judge was not persuaded by Cardoza-Fonseca’s arguments during a hearing held in December 1981 on the grounds that Cardoza-Fonseca did not produce adequate evidence to support her claims. Her asylum application was denied. Cardoza-Fonseca turned to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), but the BIA upheld the immigration judge’s original ruling. She then appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which overturned the initial ruling on technicalities. However, the Court of Appeals’ ruling left the legal legitimacy of Cardoza-Fonseca’s asylum claim unresolved, prompting SCOTUS to take the case in October 1986.

Overview

INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca was the second case related to the Refugee Act of 1980 to reach SCOTUS. The first, INS v. Stevic, found that foreign nationals seeking protection in the United States were required to show that it was “more likely than not” that they would face persecution or other threats in the proposed destination country to avoid deportation. Legal analysts note that SCOTUS deliberately avoided establishing acceptable standards of proof in asylum cases with its ruling in INS v. Stevic. The eventual ruling in the INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca case functioned to provide important legal insights into the standard-of-proof question for courts to consider in future cases.

As in INS v. Stevic, SCOTUS first turned to the text of the Refugee Act of 1980 for directional guidance. Notably, the Refugee Act contained asylum provisions that had forced amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act. Under the new standards, immigration officials could no longer exercise discretion of judgment with respect to asylum claims. If an asylum claim was deemed legitimate under accepted standards of proof, the United States was legally obligated to resettle the foreign national making the claim.

SCOTUS issued its ruling in the case of INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca on March 9, 1987. The court found that different standards of proof applied to sections 208(a) and 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The ruling, which was reached by a 6–3 margin, meant that for a foreign national to successfully claim asylum, they needed only to show a “well-founded fear” of harm or persecution. Notably, the “well-founded fear” finding removed the “more likely than not” standard that SCOTUS established in its INS v. Stevic ruling.

Associate Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the majority opinion in the case, noting that the interpretation of the Refugee Act reached in the case of INS v. Stevic had been flawed and did not reflect the intended spirit of the legislation. Finding the “clear probability of persecution” standard to be too strict, Stevens also stated the Court’s belief that more compassionate standards should apply to asylum-seekers, and asylum-seekers should only be required to illustrate a reasonable fear of persecution to qualify for the withholding of deportation.

Associate Justice Lewis Franklin Powell, Jr. wrote the dissenting opinion. He was joined in his dissent by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Associate Justice Byron White. The dissenting justices shared a belief that the same standards should apply to the withholding of asylum and the acceptance of an asylum claim. Powell also stated that in his opinion, the BIA had applied a more lenient standard in ordering Cardoza-Fonseca’s deportation, and the BIA’s original ruling should have been upheld. Cardoza-Fonseca was ultimately permitted to remain in the United States.

Bibliography

“1987: INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca.” Library of Congress, guides.loc.gov/latinx-civil-rights/ins-v-cardoza-fonseca. Accessed 19 June 2023.

Helton, Arthur C. “INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca: The Decision and Its Implications.” Review of Law and Social Change, vol. 16, no. 35 (1987–1988): pp. 35–54.

“Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stevic.” Oyez, www.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-973. Accessed 19 June 2023.

“INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca.” Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School, www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ins‗v.‗cardoza-fonseca. Accessed 19 June 2023.

Jones, J. “INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca: Inching Toward a Determinable Standard of Proof in Political Asylum Cases.” Denver Journal of International Law & Policy, vol. 16, no. 1 (Jan. 1987): pp. 161–176.

Leigh, Monroe. “Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca.” American Journal of International Law, vol. 81, no. 3 (July 1987): pp. 654–656.

“Luz Marina Cardoza-Fonseca, Petitioner, v. US Immigration and Naturalization Service, Respondent. Francisca Rosa Arguello-salguera, Petitioner v. Immigration and Naturalization Service Respondent, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985)." Justia, 2023, law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/767/1448/39796/. Accessed 19 June 2023.

Rood, Margaret A. “Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stevic: The Alien Facing Potential Persecution and the Clear Probability Standard for Relief from Deportation under Immigration and Naturalization Act Section 243(h).” North Carolina Journal of International Law, vol. 10, no. 1 (Winter 1985): pp. 275–284.