New York Times Co. v. Sullivan

Date: March 9, 1964

Citation: 376 U.S. 254

Issue: Libel

Significance: The Supreme Court redefined freedom of the press by requiring that someone wishing to recover damages from a newspaper for a false story had to show that the newspaper had actual malice or a reckless disregard for the truth.

The New York Times printed an advertisement appealing for funds for civil rights organizations that included technically false statements about Montgomery, Alabama, police commissioner Sullivan. The Supreme Court was asked to rule on a half-million dollar civil damage award to the Sullivan. There was no showing that the Times had any actual malice or reckless disregard for the truth in printing the statements. The most that could be alleged was that the Times was negligent.

The Court’s unanimous decision in favor of the newspaper gave vastly greater protection to the news media from libel suits resulting from the publication of factual errors. In his opinion for the Court, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., pointed out that allowing the damage award from the Alabama courts would provoke greater fear than criminal prosecution. Sullivan could show no monetary loss, but the newspaper would face a loss one thousand times greater than the maximum fine under Alabama criminal statutes. Because double jeopardy protection does not exist in civil litigation, other awards could be levied against the newspaper for the same advertisement. Fear of successive monetary losses would stifle the press, Brennan argued. The Court prohibited public officials from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to their official conduct unless they proved that the statement was made with actual malice that is, with knowledge it was false or with a reckless disregard for whether it was false or not.

As a result, it became extraordinarily difficult for public officials to ever win a damage suit against a newspaper or television station, no matter how false or defamatory the statements against them were. The same situation also confronts those people who are defined as “public figures.” A public figure, for purposes of defamation law, is a person who “thrusts himself into a public controversy in order to affect its outcome.” An otherwise little-known person unwillingly caught up in a matter of public interest is not a public official and thus need prove only negligence (not actual malice) to prevail against a defamer, according to Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Association (1979). “Public figure” is a more vague term than “public official,” and for that reason, the Court has had to deal with a large number of libel suits involving people who believe they are ordinary citizens but whom the newspapers claim are public figures. Generally speaking, a public figure would be a movie star, a sports hero, or some other well-known person who had been mentioned in the press before a controversy arose. Presumably, the laws of libel apply to any ordinary citizen who is libeled or defamed by a newspaper, and private people are able to recover damages from newspapers or magazines.

Times v. Sullivan in the News

In February 2019 Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas stated in a concurring opinion in Katherine Mae McKee v. William H. Cosby, Jr., a sexual assault case against comedian Bill Cosby, that the Court should reconsider Times v. Sullivan. Thomas agreed with an appeals court decision that McKee was a public figure and therefore burdened with proving that Cosby's lawyers had intentionally or recklessly made false statements. Furthermore, he stated that in his opinion, the First Amendment did not limit a state's authority to protect its citizens and leaders from reputational harm.

In July 2021, the Supreme Court decided not to take on Berisha v. Lawson, a libel case filed by Shkelzen Berisha a former Albanian prime minister's son against the author and publisher of a 2015 book Arms and the Dudes. In Thomas's dissent, he reiterated his 2019 opinion that the Supreme Court should revisit Times v. Sullivan. Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch also dissented and called for the Court to revisit the case. He noted in his dissent that although the doctrine of actual malice may have been justified in 1964 when there were fewer reliable news sources, in 2021 the precedent was being a used by twenty-four-hour cable news and online media outlets to publish "falsehoods by means and on a scale previously unimaginable."

In August 2021, Mike Lindell, chief executive officer of MyPillow, asked a federal district court judge to dismiss a defamation lawsuit brought against him by Dominion Voting Systems; when the judge declined to dismiss the case, Lindell's lawyers asked the judge to allow an appeal. Dominion had sued Lindell for implicating it in false allegations of voter fraud during the 2020 presidential election. In making the case for dismissal, lawyers argued that because Dominion had government contracts during the election, it should be considered a government entity as defined by Times v. Sullivan, and therefore should have the burden of proving "actual malice." Lindell's lawyers went on to argue that Dominion did not prove that Lindell spoke with "actual malice," and thus Dominion's case should be dismissed.

Bibliography

Atkins Stohr, Kimberly, and Stefano Kotsonis. "The Case For Rethinking American Libel Law." WBUR, 12 July 2021, www.wbur.org/onpoint/2021/07/12/rethinking-times-v-sullivan-supreme-court. Accessed 3 Sept. 2021.

Liptak, Adam. "Justice Clarence Thomas Calls for Reconsideration of Landmark Libel Ruling." The New York Times, 19 Feb. 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/02/19/us/politics/clarence-thomas-first-amendment-libel.html. Accessed 3 Sept. 2021.

Slisco, Aila. "Mike Lindell Asks Federal Appeals Court to Help End Dominion Voting Defamation Lawsuit." Newsweek, 25 Aug. 2021, www.newsweek.com/mike-lindell-asks-federal-appeals-court-help-end-dominion-voting-defamation-lawsuit-1623159. Accessed 3 Sept. 2021.