U.S. invasion of Panama censorship controversy
The U.S. invasion of Panama in December 1989, aimed at capturing General Manuel Noriega, sparked a significant censorship controversy. Relations between the U.S. and Panama had soured due to Noriega's authoritarian regime and his involvement in various criminal activities, despite past support from the CIA. The invasion was framed by the U.S. government as a necessary action for national security, particularly concerning the Panama Canal's safety.
However, the operation faced criticism due to civilian casualties and local protests, complicating the narrative of liberation presented by the American media. Interestingly, unlike the later Persian Gulf War, there was minimal government oversight of news coverage during the Panama invasion, leading to a generally supportive portrayal in the press. Some reports suggest that the new Panamanian government attempted to control negative press after the invasion, aiming to suppress dissenting views about U.S. involvement. Overall, the complexities of the invasion, combined with the media's response and the aftermath's political dynamics, highlight the multifaceted nature of censorship and public perception in wartime contexts.
U.S. invasion of Panama censorship controversy
Date: December 20, 1989-January 6, 1990
Place: Panama
Significance: This military conflict contrasts with the earlier U.S. invasion of Grenada and the later Persian Gulf War in being an example of a U.S. military operation in which relatively little press censorship was enforced
The generally amicable relations between the United States and Panama began to falter after Panamanian general Manuel Noriega came to power in Panama in 1987. Despite his history of involvement in drug trafficking, gun running, and money laundering, Noriega had been receiving support from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as a friendly resource in Panama. However, relations between the two countries deteriorated rapidly after Noriega arranged the ouster of Panama’s president Eric Delvalle and annulled the subsequent election of Guillermo Endara. Washington continued to distance itself from Noriega as both Panamanian domestic unrest and international opprobrium rose against Noriega. The growing instability in Panama raised American concern about the security of the Panama Canal, which was vital to international shipping. On December 20, 1976, President George Bush ordered U.S. troops into Panama with the ostensible purpose of seizing Noriega on drug-smuggling charges. After a two-week effort, which included Noriega’s temporary sanctuary in the Vatican’s local embassy building, American officials seized Noriega and took him to the United States to stand trial on drug-trafficking charges.
Several aspects of the invasion held the potential for embarrassing the U.S. government—not least of which was Washington’s earlier support for Noriega. Moreover, the military operation itself had a number of embarrassing problems, including civilian deaths, and there were instances of Panamanian civilians protesting the American effort to “liberate” them. Despite these problems, the American news media were unusually supportive of the invasion, portraying it in a positive light—even in comparison with the media’s coverage of the following year’s Persian Gulf War. More significantly, there was little official effort to restrict or manage news coverage of the Panama invasion. The “press pool” system that would be used in reporting on the later Gulf War was not utilized in the Panama operation. American reporters and photographers were present at the invitation of the invasion force and had relatively free access to cover events. American press coverage might therefore have been partly a product of self-censorship.
Although the U.S. government did not overtly hinder media access, there is some evidence that the Endara government—which the U.S. military returned to power after removing Noriega—worked to limit public negative portrayals of the military intervention by its American benefactors. Also, Noriega’s numerous moral and political faults may have made portraying the invasion as a morality play almost irresistible. Finally, the relative swiftness of Noriega’s defeat provided little time for antiwar sentiment to materialize.