Biological warfare diagnosis
Biological warfare diagnosis refers to the identification and analysis of disease-causing agents that may be used as weapons in conflicts. The significance of this field lies in the potential devastation that biological agents, such as viruses and bacteria, can cause to humans, animals, and ecosystems. Unlike chemical warfare, biological weapons can be particularly insidious and challenging to detect, prompting concerns among global leaders about their use, often viewed as more threatening than nuclear weapons.
To effectively combat biological threats, numerous countries have developed advanced techniques and protocols for detection and diagnosis. This includes initiatives led by agencies like the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which focus on early identification of biological agents and response strategies. In addition, forensic analysis plays a crucial role in addressing bioterrorism, helping to document evidence and analyze pathogens in a manner suitable for legal proceedings.
Given advancements in bioengineering, the possibility exists for the creation of highly infectious agents, increasing the urgency for robust detection mechanisms. Collaborative efforts among healthcare professionals, law enforcement, and scientific communities are essential to minimize casualties and ensure a coordinated response to biological threats.
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Subject Terms
Biological warfare diagnosis
Definition: Determination of the specific nature of disease-producing agents used as weapons.
Significance: The use of deadly organisms as weapons is perhaps more feared than chemical warfare because biotoxins have the potential of wreaking havoc on plants, animals, and humans. Detailed genomic determinations of these agents are critical parts of forensic analyses for the detection, diagnosis, and prosecution of biocrimes, bioterrorism, and biological warfare.
A large number of infectious organisms exist in nature, and many of them can be pathogenic (disease-causing) to humans. Microbiologists have developed bioengineering tools to increase the numbers and virulence of these organisms. Because biological weapons could cause catastrophic harm to a nation’s population and economy, some political and military leaders have confessed that they fear the use of biological weapons more than the use of nuclear weapons. This anxiety has led several countries to develop techniques for detecting the use and diagnosing the nature of biological weapons in order to assist in the medical treatment of victims as well as in the prosecution of those who use these weapons.
The ideal agent of biological warfare is easy and cheap to produce, aerosolizable for effective delivery, and highly infectious for rapid person-to-person transmission. Although microbiologists have not yet developed the perfect biological weapon, they have discovered ways of manufacturing microorganisms that have the potential for creating mass casualties. For example, the following microbes have been developed into biological weapons: Bacillus anthracis, the bacterium that causes anthrax; Variola major, the virus that causes smallpox; Yersinia pestis, the bacterium that causes pneumonic (or bubonic) plague; Francisella tularensis, the bacterium that causes tularemia; and viruses that cause hemorrhagic fevers. Because of the secrecy surrounding research on potential biological weapons, specific examples of new, highly virulent strains of naturally occurring organisms or artificial pathogens are hard to come by.
Detection and Diagnosis
By the early twenty-first century, more than 140 nations had signed and ratified the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, which prohibits the development, manufacture, and stockpiling of bacteriological weapons. Although this treaty did lead some countries to destroy their stockpiles of biological weapons, the advent of modern bioengineering made several of the convention’s provisions obsolete.
After an exercise simulating a germ attack on Denver in 2000 revealed weaknesses in state and federal responses to such a threat, and particularly after the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, the U.S. government developed new organizations to deal with the assessment of and reaction to threats of biological warfare. The Department of Homeland Security established the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center to help Americans anticipate, prevent, respond to, and recover from biological attack (previous countermeasures had been erroneously based on models for chemical warfare).
Because of the necessity of medical involvement in diagnostics and forensics, the National Response Plan developed in 2004 focused on the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services as the primary agency to deal with bioterrorist events. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention developed the Laboratory Response Network to detect and diagnose biological agents. Also, because biological attacks cause more fatalities the longer they remain undetected, the U.S. government established BioWatch, a network of air samplers around metropolitan areas, and BioShield, a program designed to accelerate medical countermeasures against biological hazards. The information gathered from these and other organizations and programs is also intended to be used by experts at the National Bioforensic Analysis Center to discover the sources of any biological agents used in attacks.
Forensic Analysis
A bioterrorist attack creates problems not only for early and rapid detection and diagnosis but also for forensic analysis. To deal with such problems, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) established the Scientific Working Group for Microbial Genetics and Forensics in 2002 to facilitate the identification of any organism used in a biocrime or bioterrorist attack.
Because the diagnostic requirements of microbial forensics are much more stringent than those of public health, experts at the location of a biological attack and in laboratories have to document sample collection with great care and perform detailed genomic analyses of the biological agent while maintaining a clear chain of custody for all evidence to be used in future legal proceedings. Advanced technologies, such as miniaturized immunoassay devices that can collect data in the area of an attack, have improved the chances for convictions of the attackers, but the cooperation of medical professionals, military personnel, law-enforcement officials, and forensic scientists is necessary to minimize deaths immediately after an attack as well as in the later identification and conviction of those responsible for it.
Bibliography
Clinics in Laboratory Medicine 26 (June, 2006). Special issue titled “Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism” includes articles that examine the laboratory and forensic aspects of deadly biological agents.
Croddy, Eric A., with Clarisa Perez-Armendariz and John Hart. Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen. New York: Copernicus Books, 2002. Detailed overview for the layperson includes sections on the nature, history, detection, and control of biological weapons.
Dudley, William, ed. Biological Warfare: Opposing Viewpoints. Farmington Hills, Miss.: Greenhaven Press, 2004. Collection discusses differences of opinion among scientists and other experts on how to understand, prepare for, and prevent biological warfare.
Lederberg, Joshua, ed. Biological Weapons: Limiting the Threat. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999. Compendium of historical and technical essays includes information on the detection of biological agents and responses to biological attack. Intended for both doctors and students.
Mauroni, Al. Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Reference Handbook. 2d ed. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 2007. Addresses the history of chemical and biological weaponry and presents information on experts and related organizations as well as case studies.