Abū Hanīfah

Muslim theologian and legal scholar

• Born: c. 699
• Birthplace: Al-Kūfa (now in Iraq)
• Died: 767
• Place of death: Baghdad (now in Iraq)

Abū Ḥanīfah, celebrated eighth century Muslim jurist and theologian, was the founder of the first of four orthodox schools of Islamic law, the Hanifite. His brilliant use of reason and his gift for systematic thought provided Muslim civilization with a coherent and applicable system of law.

Early Life

Abū Ḥanīfah (ah-bew hahn-EE-fah) was born in the city of Al-Kūfa. Though some traditions assert that he was descended from Persian royalty, the more likely genealogy is Afghan. It seems that his grandfather, Zuta, was brought as a slave from Kabul, Afghanistan, to Al-Kūfa. Zuta came into the possession of the prominent Taym-Allāh ibn Tha՚laba family. For unknown reasons, Zuta was set free. He and his descendants, however, remained clients (mawla) of the Tha՚laba family. Though born into the non-Arab or client class of Muslims in Al-Kūfa, Abū Ḥanīfah was no stranger to wealth. His father, like the Prophet Muḥammad, was a successful merchant.

Abū Ḥanīfah followed in his father's footsteps and won fame as a silk trader and cloth manufacturer. Like Muḥammad, the merchant Abū Ḥanīfah won a reputation for his honesty and generosity. Abū Ḥanīfah endowed scholarships for needy students and shared liberally with the poor.

Economic prosperity enabled Abū Ḥanīfah to turn from business to scholarship. With a sharp wit, a facile tongue, and a logical mind, Abū Ḥanīfah was well fitted for the world of letters. For a while, he pursued the study of theology. His primary interest, nurtured while he was yet a merchant, was the problem of equity, establishing norms for a network of right or just relationships between human beings. As a devout Muslim, Abū Ḥanīfah believed that ethical and legal norms were given by God through divine revelation, the Qur՚ān. On the basis of the Qur՚ān and the Hadith (a compendium of Islamic traditions), theologians, philosophers, and jurists developed rules for just living. Abū Ḥanīfah thus turned his energies to the sacred law (Shariՙa). Living, as he did, in one of the great intellectual centers of the medieval Arab world, he was able to study with a number of noted jurists, including ՙAtŃā (d. c. 732) and Jaՙfar aṣ-SŃādiq (699/700 or 702/703-765), the founder of Shīՙite law (the minority or dissenting tradition in Islam, as opposed to the Sunni, the majority persuasion). For eighteen years, Abū Ḥanīfah worked with one of the most brilliant of all Muslim jurists, Hammad ibn ՙAlī Sulayman.

Abū Ḥanīfah's students remembered their master as a tall, stately man of very impressive appearance. His demeanor was serious. Abū Ḥanīfah had the bearing of a scholar, and an air of piety permeated his every act. He was respected as a man of firm conviction, reasoned conclusions, uncompromising integrity, and determined opinions. Because Abū Ḥanīfah had independent means, he was not in need of royal, private, or religious patronage. His wealth gave him the freedom to exercise his native virtues of fearlessness, independence, and total disregard for the opinions and rewards of the world.

Life's Work

On the death of his mentor, Hammad, in 738, Abū Ḥanīfah emerged as the leading legal thinker in Al-Kūfa and in much of the Muslim world. Because of his personal wealth, he was able to devote himself entirely to teaching and research. Under no necessity to accept either private donations or governmental appointment, Abū Ḥanīfah had complete academic freedom. This financial security and his love of independence may explain, in part, why one of Islam's most eminent jurists never sat on the bench as a kadi (judge). Like the Greek philosopher Plato, who established his own Academy, Abū Ḥanīfah attracted his own students. Relatively free of governmental pressures and of the burdens of a practicing attorney, Abū Ḥanīfah could concentrate on the theoretical foundations of Muslim law.

In his teaching, Abū Ḥanīfah relied heavily on dialectic, lectures, and discussions with his disciples. Like Socrates, he is said to have written little (indeed, nothing survives from his pen). His teachings, however, were copiously recorded by his students, among whom were his son Hammad and his grandson Ismāil (both of whom eventually became distinguished jurists); another disciple included the eminent thinker Abū Yūsuf. Abū Ḥanīfah's principal achievement as a teacher was twofold: He was the founder of the systematic study of Islamic law , and he was also the founder of a particular school of jurisprudence, one named in his honor the Hanifite school.

As a jurist, Abū Ḥanīfah employed a variety of sources. He was able to draw on his own rich experience as a merchant, a man of practical affairs. Reflected in his thought are his extensive travels in the Muslim world. As one familiar with the many levels of a complex and sophisticated society, Abū Ḥanīfah could discuss conditions of places as varied as the royal court, the slave market, and the business bazaar. In his formal legal work, Abū Ḥanīfah, as an orthodox Muslim, accepted two primary sources for Islamic law: the divine revelation, written in the Holy Qur՚ān and given by God through the Prophet Muḥammad, and the human tradition, reported in the Hadith, the sayings passed down by the Muslim community from the time of Muḥammad. The relationship of Qur՚ān and Hadith was similar to that of Torah and Talmud in Judaism, for God spoke in the Qur՚ān to human conscience and in the Hadith to human intelligence. Abū Ḥanīfah, however, recognized the need for interpretation of these given authorities; for that reason, he was inclined to accept other authorities. Perhaps these were in a very real sense “secondary” to the primary sources, but since Muslim survival required interpretation and adaptation, the supplementary means became crucial in his thinking. Abū Ḥanīfah allowed personal interpretation on the part of the jurist. As the one closest to the case, the judge had to trust his own intelligence and instincts, experience and evaluation. Believing all truths to be ultimately related (a corollary of the belief that God is one), Abū Ḥanīfah also permitted argument by analogy and reasoning from the known to the unknown (by means of comparison and contrast). As a legal thinker, Abū Ḥanīfah also permitted the notion of consensus, the consideration of the majority opinion of the Muslim world. Some dispute later arose regarding how Abū Ḥanīfah intended such a consensus to be determined: Was it the majority opinion of the jurists, the educated classes, or the masses of Islam? Apparently, Abū Ḥanīfah was envisioning an implicit agreement among the intellectual elite of Islam, both past and present.

The major problem that Abū Ḥanīfah faced as a jurist was the growing complexity and confusion of Islamic law in his generation. For a century and a half, Islamic law had developed unsystematically, without clear direction or a discernment of underlying fundamental principles. Individual lawyers and judges had argued on the basis of specific situations and particular cases; the result was that conflicting verdicts were being offered in various parts of the Muslim world. Amid this cacophony of variant opinions, it was often impossible to arrive at either fundamental principles or clear lines of direction for the law in the future. Abū Ḥanīfah's great contribution one that was revolutionary in its implications was to approach the law not situationally but systematically. Many jurists had looked at particulars; Abū Ḥanīfah determined to find principles. Sifting through the vast legal writings of his time, Abū Ḥanīfah sought universal norms and standards that would be applicable regardless of time or place. By reviewing the problems that had previously been faced by Muslim jurists, Abū Ḥanīfah also tried to anticipate which cases might arise next and to speculate as to the proper approach to be followed.

In his work as a legal theoretician, Abū Ḥanīfah evolved several main principles. First, the law was to be studied systematically rather than situationally, rationally rather than empirically, abstractly rather than concretely. The purpose of such a study was to locate, beneath the welter of contradictory decisions and traditions, the unifying principles of Islamic justice. Second, at all times, Abū Ḥanīfah looked for the way of moderation or the via media between extreme positions; like the legal sage of ancient China, Confucius, Abū Ḥanīfah held to the philosophy of the Golden Mean.

Third, Abū Ḥanīfah permitted the use of natural law, the findings of reason based on the physical and social sciences; this approach, as ancient as the Greek philosopher Aristotle, allowed material not covered in the Qur՚ān or the Hadith to be employed in court. God, Abū Ḥanīfah believed, was the author of two books: nature, as the Creator, and the Qur՚ān, as the Revealer. Fourth, Abū Ḥanīfah put a balanced emphasis on various tests of truth. One was coherence, or internal logic, another was consistency with other known truths, and a final was consequence, or the implications of an action or decision.

Finally, as a rationalist, Abū Ḥanīfah trusted the role and rule of reason in all matters not resolved by the Qur՚ān or the Hadith. In this respect, he was similar to the emperor Justinian I, the systematizer of Roman law, and to Aristotle, the father of Greek philosophy and science. For Abū Ḥanīfah, the law was not simply a matter of external relationships between persons but also an issue of internal integrity (within the mind of the judge).

The work of Abū Ḥanīfah within his lifetime was recognized as superior to that of his contemporaries in four respects. First, he made the law wider than had been the case in existing codes; it became not only more broadly based but also more universally applicable. Second, Abū Ḥanīfah made the law deeper, firmly grounding it in the judge's reason and experience and the Muslim intellectual community's interpretation of Scripture, tradition, and nature. Third, Abū Ḥanīfah made the law higher: No longer accidental and incidental, it had become intensely cerebral, theoretical, refined, and technical. Finally, the law had become narrower, for it now rested on universal moral principles, applied through a rigorous process of reasoning.

Because of his brilliant intellect, Abū Ḥanīfah also influenced the development of Muslim theology. As a philosophical theologian, Abū Ḥanīfah inclined toward a movement in his time that was named Murji՚ism. This tendency emphasized the universal community of Islam, upholding the unity of the fellowship (umma) against divisive or sectarian movements. It focused on the confessional character of Islam as opposed to moralistic definitions; Islam was envisioned as the public confession of certain cardinal doctrines (God, revelation, prophecy) rather than a society composed of ethically perfect persons. Moreover, the community was seen as inclusive: If a person professes the true faith, actions and even moral failures cannot sever a person from the Muslim nation. In these respects, Abū Ḥanīfah was an advocate of Muslim ecumenism and inclusivism.

Apparently, Abū Ḥanīfah tried to avoid political involvement. His century was a time of dynastic upheaval in the Muslim world. There was a growing difference of opinion as to whether the Muslim community should be led by a direct descendant of the Prophet Muḥammad (the opinion of the Shīՙites, or partisans of ՙAli, Muḥammad's son-in-law) or by a caliph, a successor chosen from among the majority party (the Sunnis) in Islam. Two rival caliphates came into existence, the Umayyads (after 750 exiled to Spain) and the ՙAbbāsids (established in Baghdad). It seems likely that Abū Ḥanīfah had contempt for both the Umayyads and the ՙAbbāsids. In spite of his attempted neutrality, he was arrested and imprisoned. The circumstances surrounding his death are not clear. One account insists that the ՙAbbāsid caliph al-Manṣūr (or possibly the Umayyad governor of Al-Kūfa) asked Abū Ḥanīfah to accept appointment as a judge; on his refusal, the jurist was flogged and imprisoned. Another version contends that Abū Ḥanīfah's family sympathized with the followers of ՙAlī (a tradition states that“ՙAlī blessed his father and his descendants”). In any case, it is known that Abū Ḥanīfah died in Baghdad in 767, either while still in prison or shortly after his release. His tomb, surmounted by a lovely dome erected by admirers in 1066, is still a shrine for pilgrims.

Significance

Islamic law, along with that of the Romans and the Anglo-Saxons, is one of the great systems of human jurisprudence. The Hanifite school founded by Abū Ḥanīfah was the earliest, and became the most widespread, of the four schools of orthodox (Sunni) Islamic law. An appealing system of justice, it has been influential in India, Pakistan, Turkey, China, Central Asia, and much of the Arab world. With a concern for equity as the chief goal of law, it has given judges latitude to exercise private opinion (ra՚y) and to draw on natural law. Regarded as the most liberal or tolerant of the Islamic legal systems, it stands in opposition to the position of the Hanbalite school (the more fundamentalist persuasion, represented by the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia, who accept only the Qur՚ān and the Hadith as sources of Muslim law). It is also a more moderate system than the other two schools of Islamic law the Malikite (prevailing in parts of North Africa) and the Shafite (influential in Egypt, Indonesia, and sections of Africa). As the pathfinder of Muslim law, Abū Ḥanīfah ranks as one of the great jurists of Arab civilization and one of the major legal philosophers of the entire human community.

Bibliography

Boer, T. J. de. The History of Philosophy in Islam. Translated by Edward R. Jones. 1903. Reprint. Richmond, Surrey, England: Curzon Press, 1994. This is a standard though older survey that is still useful for placing Abū Ḥanīfah in context. Bibliography, index.

Coulson, Noel J. A History of Islamic Law. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1964. A helpful survey of Muslim legal thinking, part of Islamic studies series. Includes a bibliography.

Edge, Ian, ed. Islamic Law and Legal Theory. New York: New York University Press, 1996. Presents a chapter on Abū Ḥanīfah, a “champion of liberalism and tolerance in Islam.” Also includes a chapter with sources on Islamic legal theory published in English. Bibliography, index.

Fyzee, Asaf A. A. Outlines of Muḥammadan Law. 4th ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. In spite of the obsolete word “Muḥammadan” in its title, this volume is useful as a comprehensive study of Islamic jurisprudence. Bibliography, index.

Schacht, Joseph. An Introduction to Islamic Law. 1964. Reprint. New York: Clarendon Press, 1982. This volume provides a critical analysis of Islamic legal concepts and precepts. Because of its approach, some Muslims have found it offensive. Extensive bibliography, index.

Schacht, Joseph. The Origins of Muḥammadan Jurisprudence. 1950. Reprint. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1975. This is a thoughtful study by a Western scholar who has edited and translated numerous works on Islamic law. Includes a bibliography.

Watt, W. Montgomery. Islamic Philosophy and Theology: An Extended Survey. 2d ed. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995. A brilliant study by one of the most celebrated of Occidental authorities, this work places Abū Ḥanīfah within the mainstream of Muslim thought. Bibliography, index.

Watt, W. Montgomery. Islamic Political Thought: The Basic Concepts. 1968. Reprint. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998. In this book, the noted British scholar introduces the fundamental principles of Muslim political thought in terms understandable to Western readers. Bibliography, index.

Wensinck, Arent Jan. The Muslim Creed: Its Genesis and Historical Development. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1932. Though an older work, this text is still a useful survey of the evolution of the complex of Muslim theology-philosophy-law.

Williams, John Alden, ed. Islam. New York: George Braziller, 1961. This readily accessible anthology is helpful for the beginning student of Muslim thought and life. Includes a bibliography.