Gerd von Rundstedt

German military leader

• Born: December 12, 1875
• Birthplace: Aschersleben, near Magdeburg, Germany
• Died: February 24, 1953
• Place of death: Hannover, West Germany (now in Germany)

Rundstedt, though not an innovator, supported Manstein’s revolutionary strategy, which led to victory over France in 1940. He did not participate in anti-Hitler conspiracies, though he disliked the Nazis and Hitler in particular. Prussian military honor and obedience guided his professional and personal life.

Early Life

Gerd von Rundstedt (gehrt fahn RUHN-stehdt), born Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt, was the son of a Prussian general of old Brandenburg/Prussian nobility, which had provided officers for the Prussian army for centuries. Young Rundstedt became a cadet at age sixteen and was commissioned in the infantry a year later. He served as battalion and regimental adjutant and received further training at the Kriegsakademie, the army’s “graduate school.” In 1907, Rundstedt entered the prestigious General Staff, Germany’s military elite. After serving as company commander, Rundstedt spent World War I in General Staff positions.

Rundstedt advanced rapidly in the postwar Reichswehr. Initially he served as divisional chief of staff and from 1923 to 1927 as commander of an infantry regiment; in 1927, he became major general and commander of the Second Cavalry Division. In 1929, Rundstedt advanced to lieutenant general and in January, 1932, became commander of the Third Division and of the Military District (Wehrkreis) III (Berlin). In October, 1932, three months before Adolf Hitler assumed power, Rundstedt was promoted to general of infantry and became commander of Army Group I (Berlin), one of two Army Groups within the Reichswehr.

Rundstedt had thus reached the highest rank within the Reichswehr. Rundstedt’s unwilling involvement in politics began in July, 1932, when Chancellor Franz von Papen was named federal commissioner for the state of Prussia, in what history has dubbed the “Rape of Prussia”: the transfer of the state’s executive power to the federal chancellor. (This move put Prussia’s police and executive functions under Papen’s authority, a position that Hitler inherited in January, 1933, on becoming chancellor.) As commander of Military District III (Berlin), Rundstedt exercised this executive power, in keeping with constitutional provision.

Life’s Work

Rundstedt advocated modernization of the infantry, in both equipment and training. He called for mechanization and the increase of firepower, being convinced that the tanks’ function was to support the infantry, contrary to views being developed in Germany and elsewhere. Rundstedt, however, did not oppose creation of armored (tank) divisions, as long as that development did not hinder the infantry’s modernization.

Rundstedt had been unhappy with the Weimar Republic’s democratic nature but also quickly developed dislike for the Nazis, the “brown dirt,” as he called them. In 1934, when President Paul von Hindenburg died, Rundstedt, together with the entire army, took a new personal oath to Hitler, a fact that proved to be of great consequence later. His deeply rooted, traditional Prussian sense of honor brought him into conflict with Hitler during the Fritsch Crisis in early 1938, when he protested Werner von Fritsch’s dismissal as the army’s commander in chief. Thereafter, however, he urged his fellow generals to avoid the “rash actions” contemplated by some and await the outcome of legal proceedings. Hitler, who respected Rundstedt’s natural dignity and military ability, promoted him to colonel general in March, 1938. During the Sudeten Crisis of October, 1938, he commanded Army Group IV of Germany’s expanded Wehrmacht. Rundstedt did not involve himself in the incipient conspiracy against Hitler, centered on the army’s former commander in chief, General Ludwig Beck, though he was aware of it. In late October, 1938, Rundstedt accepted retirement, ostensibly at his request, actually as part of a purge that removed a number of senior officers.

Within less than a year, however, Rundstedt was recalled. Neither he nor his fellow generals opposed war with Poland to recover lost territory (Versailles Treaty, 1919), especially after Hitler’s treaty with Joseph Stalin made war with the Soviets unlikely. The generals, including Rundstedt, however, realized that a Polish war might lead to a wider conflict. During the Polish campaign, Rundstedt commanded Army Group South. His forces cut off the Polish retreat across the Vistula River and played a key role in the capture of Warsaw. Rundstedt vainly urged Hitler not to bombard Warsaw and to extend humane treatment to the civilian population.

Following a brief and unwelcome tenure as commander in chief east (occupation of Poland in cooperation with Germany’s civilian administration of that country), Rundstedt asked for and received reassignment as commander of Army Group A facing France. Rundstedt strongly supported the revised operational plans for the western campaign (following the need to discard the original Schlieffen-like plan). The new plan, developed by General Erich von Manstein, his chief of staff in Poland and on the western front, called for a daring armored thrust through the Ardennes, trapping the Allied field armies in Belgium and northern France. It was on Rundstedt’s advice that Hitler accepted this controversial plan, initially rejected by the army’s high command.

Following the western victory, Rundstedt and eleven others were elevated to field marshals, Rundstedt being the eldest. He was slated to play a major role in Operation Sea Lion, the invasion of Great Britain. Following its cancellation, Rundstedt commanded Army Group South during the invasion of the Soviet Union in June, 1941. His task was to capture the Ukraine and the Caucasus oil fields and to penetrate as far east as Stalingrad to cut off the Soviets’ southern supply route. Army Group South had an inadequate force of 750 tanks, and Rundstedt soon recognized that this task was impossible. When Hitler rejected first his request for additional forces and then his proposal to fall back on a defensive winter line, Rundstedt asked to be replaced. In December, 1941, he retired again, as part of a larger shake-up within the high command.

Despite strong differences in opinion, Hitler again recalled Rundstedt, this time as commander in chief west, to create the “Atlantic Wall.” Rundstedt’s Prussian sense of duty, as well as the natural ambition of military men, caused him to return to active duty again and again, even though he no longer believed in German victory.

Little was done on anti-invasion defenses until the matter became increasingly urgent in 1943. Soon a controversy arose between Rundstedt and his subordinate, General Erwin Rommel. Rommel wanted to place all reserves, especially the armored divisions, in the immediate vicinity of the potential landing sites, while Rundstedt desired to hold the reserves back. Rommel believed that the invasion could only be defeated on the beaches, and Rundstedt, though doubtful that the invaders could be stopped at all, wanted to engage them in a war of movement in the interior. General Heinz Guderian, Germany’s paramount tank expert, as well as Hitler, agreed with Rundstedt. Rundstedt compromised by strengthening the forward units but retaining the armor in strategic reserve. The question of who would control these reserves, Hitler or the field commanders, produced yet another controversy.

Following the invasion and the inability to stop the Allies in Normandy, Rundstedt requested permission to withdraw behind the Seine River. Hitler refused, and, when Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, chief of staff of the high command, telephoned on June 29, 1944, to inquire what could be done in such a desperate situation, Rundstedt responded acidly, “Quit, you idiots! What else do you still want to do?” On July 6, 1944, Rundstedt was retired a third time.

By 1944, a determined military resistance to Hitler had coalesced. Rundstedt was in sympathy but was unwilling to commit himself to the cause, invoking his 1934 Hitler oath. Following the failed plot of July 20, 1944, Rundstedt was once more recalled, to preside over the military “Court of Honor” that had the task of dishonorably discharging the involved officers. Under Rundstedt’s presidency, fifty-five officers were discharged without the opportunity to defend themselves.

In September, 1944, while the German forces in the west were in headlong retreat across northern France, Rundstedt returned as commander in chief west. Hitler’s trust was not misplaced, and Rundstedt halted the rout, temporarily stabilizing the front. The attempt to turn the tide in the unsuccessful Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge) of mid-December, 1944, however, was Hitler’s own plan. Following this campaign, Rundstedt was awarded the Knight’s Cross with Oak Leaf and Swords.

On March 9, 1945, following the American crossing of the Rhine River at Remagen, as the Third Reich and its Wehrmacht were in their final death throes, Hitler dismissed Rundstedt a fourth and final time. On May 2, 1945, Rundstedt became a prisoner of war. The British intended to try him for war crimes. Those proceedings, however, were halted because of Rundstedt’s ill health, and he was released in May, 1949. It is doubtful that Rundstedt was guilty of war crimes. Rundstedt died of a heart ailment in February, 1953, in Hannover.

Significance

Gerd von Rundstedt was the product of a Prussian aristocratic upbringing and thorough General Staff training. His personal dignity, undisputable ability, and scrupulous devotion to duty and honor as he saw them saved him from the bitter personal criticism that Hitler heaped on other aristocratic officers. Though Rundstedt repeatedly faced Hitler early in the war and though he had a great disdain for Nazi ideology, he never forced a showdown but simply offered, or accepted, his resignation when he could no longer take responsibility for proposed actions. In July, 1944, when Rundstedt was dismissed, he told Rommel that he “was grateful not to have to experience the coming catastrophe in a position of leadership.” At the Nürnberg Trial he explained that “we did our duty because Hitler had legally been made Chancellor by Hindenburg, and because, after his death, he appeared as the Führer on the basis of the [Hindenburg’s] testament.”

Rundstedt was a thoroughly competent military leader, though not an innovator, and is certainly counted among the war’s most capable generals. General Dwight D. Eisenhower considered him the most capable German general, though that judgment might be questioned. Eisenhower never faced Manstein, Rundstedt’s erstwhile chief of staff, who may well deserve that accolade. Rundstedt was always determined not to become a “political general,” yet his acceptance of, and tacit support for, Hitler, and his resignation from uncomfortable positions were in fact indirect support. His unwillingness to become involved in the 1938 and 1944 conspiracies constituted setbacks to these efforts precisely because his colleagues respected him. In the final analysis one cannot escape the feeling that Rundstedt was either the epitome of the honorable Prussian officer in the best sense or “an accomplished cynic, the Talleyrand of Hitler’s [generals]”; maybe he was a bit of both.

Bibliography

Brett-Smith, Richard. Hitler’s Generals. London: Osprey, 1976. A comprehensive treatment. Rundstedt is discussed under “The Old Guard,” and there are substantial references to him throughout. Includes maps, appendixes, a glossary, a bibliography, and an index.

Dziewanowski, M. K. War at Any Price: World War II in Europe, 1939-1945. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1987. A college-level textbook that put Rundstedt and the campaigns he was involved in into an overall framework. The author integrated military and nonmilitary developments and placed all in the broader global setting of the war. Excellent for general reading. Includes an extensive bibliography.

Horne, Alistair. To Lose a Battle: France 1940. New York: Little, Brown, 1969. An extensive discussion of the background to the war, military resistance to Hitler, and war plans. Considerable discussion of the Manstein plan, armored tactics, and Rundstedt’s involvement in the western campaign. The book includes an extensive bibliography.

Jennys, David. “German Commanders Disagreed on How Best to Defend Occupied France in 1944.” World War II 15, no. 1 (May, 2000): 8. Describes how Rundstedt and Erwin Rommel disagreed about how to defend occupied France and how they eventually resolved their difference.

Liddell Hart, B. H. The German Generals Talk. New York: William Morrow, 1948. Rundstedt is discussed in the chapter “’The Old Guard’ Rundstedt,” with extensive references throughout. Includes an index and a table of the German High Command.

Mellenthin, F. W. von. German Generals of World War II: As I Saw Them. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1977. Mellenthin served in various theaters as a German General Staff officer. The book contains separate chapters on fourteen generals, though not on Rundstedt, since Mellenthin was not directly associated with him. The book, however, contains extensive references to Rundstedt and provides an excellent discussion of command decisions in World War II.