Qāytbāy

Sultan of the Mamlūk Dynasty (r. 1468-1496)

  • Born: 1414
  • Birthplace: Circassia (now in Russia)
  • Died: August 8, 1496
  • Place of death: Cairo, Egypt

Qāytbāy, a military leader, diplomat, and prolific builder who considered architectural grandeur politically expedient, was the last powerful sultan of the Mamlūk Dynasty in Egypt.

Early Life

Qāytbāy (KAYT-bay) was born among the Circassian peoples of what is today southern Russia. Like all Mamlūks, his parents sold him as a mamlūk (slave-soldier) for service in Egypt. He arrived in 1435, and because of his expertise with lance and bow, was purchased by Sultan al-Ashrāf Barsbay to become a royal mamlūk. The next sultan, Jaqmaq, promoted Qāytbāy to the elite of elites, the khassaki, or bodyguards. By the mid-1450’s, he attained the highest rank, the so-called emir of one thousand.

A notable feature of Qāytbāy’s formative years was his steadfast loyalty. This was a rare commodity in Mamlūk politics, which were notorious for cabals, cliques, betrayal, and in-fighting. Indeed, after going through three sultans in the 1460’s, his fellow emirs saw Qāytbāy as a modelkhushdash (companion) and the ideal ruler. On January 31, 1468, he was proclaimed the forty-first Mamlūk sultan.

Life’s Work

Arab historian Ibn Iyas, Qāytbāy’s contemporary, wrote that “Although tainted by greed,” Qāytbāy “was the noblest of the Circassian rulers, their finest.” Reputation, personality, political skills, and charisma all played a part in this record. Indeed, one could argue it was exceptional because challenges faced him from the start.

Qāytbāy ruled an empire in decline. A hallmark of his reign was a decline in revenue juxtaposed with increased expenses. Although Qāytbāy was adroit at finding new sources of cash, the empire’s economy had almost collapsed, and it failed to revive even with his attempts to improve trade relations with entrepreneur states such as Venice or Genoa. Money problems beset his regime every year and sometimes created disastrous consequences during war time.

All mamlūks, from lowly cadet through the highest emir, expected lavish compensation for their martial skills. When expectations did not meet reality, riots and revolutions occurred frequently. Qāytbāy faced continual disorders in Cairo, even among his own royal soldiers, as angry mamlūks robbed merchants, murdered government officials, and sometimes staged miniature wars over protection rackets and other extralegal activities.

Qāytbāy contributed to the financial dilemma. His power and longevity were based on building up a retinue of royal mamlūks. Qāytbāy purchased nearly eight thousand during his long reign, the largest number of any fifteenth century sultan. These men represented a tremendous outlay of cash, and once purchased, their expense continued with training, arming, and support.

Another drain on Qāytbāy’s hard-pressed treasury was a public works program that included mosques, fountains, caravansaries, fortresses, and a magnificent mausoleum. Like previous sultans, Qāytbāy believed architecture served as a statement to his subjects and foreigners that he was powerful and wealthy. Qāytbāy left eighty-five significant structures in Syria, Palestine, Mecca, Alexandria, and Cairo.

Many of these buildings reflected Qāytbāy’s pious support for Islam. Others were more mundane but very necessary, such as his forts at Rosetta and Alexandria (built over the site of the ancient Pharos lighthouse). They were necessary because Mamlūk coastal possessions were subject to continual raids by Christian corsairs (pirates), which interrupted the Asia-Europe spice trade, for which Egypt was a nexus until the Portuguese discovered an alternative route around Africa in the 1490’s.

Pirate raids hurt the economy, but rebellion presented an even greater threat. Syria had been part of the Mamlūk realm for more than two hundred years. Important for strategic and economic reasons, sultans worked hard to keep Syria under their domination. Mamlūk Syria’s defenses included a string of vassal states along the frontier. These dominated mountain passes that funneled north-south traffic from Anatolia to Syria.

By the 1470’s, regional powers like the Ottoman Turks and Aq-Quyunlu (White Sheep) Confederation sought ways to take over these buffer states. A good example was Dulkadir, where a member of the local royal family was encouraged by Ottoman agents to end his fealty to Qāytbāy. Between 1466 and 1472, three expeditions left Cairo to crush the rebel leader. Although the rebel was a good general, his several victories over larger Mamlūk forces occurred partly because of the Mamlūks’ poor discipline and leadership endemic problems for the late Mamlūk armed forces. Finally, Qāytbāy’s companion and dawadar (chancellor) Yashbak min Mahdi, was sent with a large army, which defeated the rebel leader in 1472.

Twelve years later, Dulkadir again figured in Qāytbāy’s foreign policy, when Ottoman sultan Bayezid II attempted to supplant Mamlūk authority. Mamlūk-Ottoman relations had turned sour since a 1481 succession crisis between Bayezid and his brother Cem (or Jem). Cem lost a short war and fled south with a considerable entourage. Qāytbāy sheltered Cem for a year but did little to halt efforts to build an army of Turkish dissidents. After Cem’s second effort to overthrow Bayezid failed, the Ottoman sultan viewed Qāytbāy as an enemy.

In 1483, Ottoman intrigue detached Dulkadir’s new ruler from his Mamlūk suzerain. After spending so much blood and treasure to fight the rebel leader, Qāytbāy was unwilling to accept this fait accompli and opted for war. Beginning in 1485, Ottoman and Mamlūk forces fought for six years along their Syrian borders. Although Mamlūk soldiers won most of the battles, the cost of these campaigns ruined the treasury. Thus, in 1491, Qāytbāy was satisfied with peace and a return to the status quo.

The war’s conclusion did little to alter the precarious state of Mamlūk finances. Inflation, spurred by a debased currency, competed with Mamlūk riots to shut down much of Cairo’s once-vibrant markets. During the 1490’s, Qāytbāy kept some control over his fellow Mamlūks by allowing them to loot what remained of the civilian economy through extraordinary taxes and outright theft. Although this allowed a semblance of power, it bankrupted the state, divorced most Egyptians from any sense of regime loyalty, and placed future sultans in a perilous position.

In addition, a virulent plague hit Egypt in 1492. This was a particular problem for Mamlūks, who, unaccustomed to Egypt’s climate, food, and water, were more susceptible to disease than native-born Egyptians. It was not unusual for death rates to approach 33 percent among the soldier immigrants. The outbreak of 1492 killed only thousands, but these included many royal mamlūks and some of Qāytbāy’s senior advisers. These losses increased tensions as outsiders saw the opportunity for a new sultan and a new mamlūk force.

Although the plague passed over Qāytbāy, his age and general health were major political factors. Every time he was ill, rumors of his impending demise created cabals poised for revolution. This happened in 1477 and 1486. In the latter case, Qāytbāy ordered his doctors to put off their resetting of his badly fractured leg so he would have time to write personal letters to Syrian governors about his good health. No amount of letter writing could disguise his age, and Qāytbāy’s authority waned in the 1490’s. Indeed, rival factions were already fighting in his Cairo palace, when Qāytbāy, racked by dysentery, died on August 8, 1496.

Significance

Qāytbāy was the last great Mamlūk sultan. His reign was memorable for defeating local rebels and Ottoman armies who attempted to seize vital Anatolian buffer states. He was a patron of the arts who also supported scholars and the construction of many public building projects.

Egypt’s one-pound banknote provides perhaps the best image, however, of Qāytbāy’s place in history. It features his mausoleum in Cairo’s “city of the dead,” an appropriate rendering, as the sultan’s wars and buildings bankrupted the nation and led to its collapse and destruction in 1517.

Bibliography

Har-El, Shai. Struggle for Domination in the Middle East: The Ottoman-Mamlūk War, 1485-91. Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 1995. The best authority on the most important conflict during Qāytbāy’s reign.

Hattox, Ralph S. “Qāytbāy’s Diplomatic Dilemma Concerning the Flight of Cem Sultan (1481-82).” Mamlūk Studies Review 6 (2002): 177-190. Good details on the first major dispute between Ottoman and Mamlūk leaders.

Petry, Carl F. Protectors or Praetorians? The Last Mamlūk Sultans and Egypt’s Waning As a Great Power. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. Examines the many problems of the Mamlūk state during the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries. Petry is a leading authority on Qāytbāy.

Petry, Carl F. Twilight of Majesty: The Reigns of Mamlūk Sultans al-Ashrāf Qāytbāy and Qansuh al-Ghawri in Egypt. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993. A fine, authoritative biography of Qāytbāy.