Wang Anshi

Chinese statesman and writer

• Born: 1021
• Birthplace: Linchuan, China
• Died: 1086
• Place of death: Chianning (now Nanjing), China

A writer and statesman during the Northern Song Dynasty, Wang Anshi introduced sweeping reforms in government, affecting particularly the state financial system and the bureaucracy.

Early Life

Wang Anshi (wahng ahn-shih) was born in south-central China in an area noted as a center of tea producers and merchants. His family first prospered in farming, although on a small scale, but later generations produced scholars, several holding the jinshi, or doctorate, degree. Wang’s father was a minor official who served in a variety of local government posts. His family thus instilled in Wang traditional Confucian values of education and of government service.

In 1042, Wang earned a doctorate, and for the next eighteen years, he served in local government posts. His experience, especially a year spent as a district magistrate, gave him insight into the conditions of the poor in the countryside and of the workers in the growing urban centers. His experience with incompetent bureaucrats led him, in 1058, to present to Emperor Renzong (Jen-tsung; 1022-1063) a memorial, the basis of his later reform proposals. In it, Wang showed how a well-trained, well-controlled bureaucracy could serve as the chief tool in bringing about a Confucian moral society.

Wang urged, among other things, that the emperor give highest consideration to the character and ability of candidates for government office. Further, he suggested “a prolonged period of probation as the best method of testing the appointees.” Wang, as chief justice of the circuit for one year, noted the scarcity of competent government employees and saw the need for securing capable officials. It was a theme he would repeat following his appointment to the court a few years later. No action was taken on his ideas at the time, but Wang’s reputation as a scholar grew, and after 1060, he was called to the capital, where he served in a number of minor posts that brought him access to the emperor.

Life’s Work

In 1067, Wang Anshi became governor of Nanjing, from where the new emperor, Shenzong (Shen-tsung; r. 1068-1085), summoned him to court in early 1069. Wang was made second privy councillor, with responsibility for general administration. The emperor supported Wang’s reform measures, which began to be implemented in 1069. Opposition built to the reforms, but the emperor reaffirmed Wang by appointing him first privy councillor in 1071, adding to Wang’s prestige and power.

At the time Wang rose to eminence, the Song Dynasty (Sung; 960-1279) was experiencing heavy financial strains as a result of an enlarged military budget and the increase of great estates with their tax-evading landowners. Government income had fallen substantially by 1065. Northern barbarian tribes were a constant threat, and a sizable professional army to contain them proved very costly. The military alone accounted for close to 80 percent of the government revenue.

Along with financial distress, the dynasty, having become more centralized than at any previous time, suffered from the inertia of an inflexible bureaucracy. Officials were often divided over policies, and factionalism prevented easy resolutions. Most bureaucrats were traditionalists whose positions were threatened by Wang’s reforms. Scholar-statesmen such as Ouyang Xiu (Ou-yang Hsiu; 1007-1072), Sima Guang (Ssu-ma Kuang; 1019-1086), and Han Wei (1017-1098) led the antireform forces, leading to Wang’s resignation, briefly, in 1074.

Wang’s reforms, known as the New Policies, covered several areas, all of them aiming at the creation or restoration of a Confucian moral society. Wang cast his reforms with continuity as well as change in mind. He argued that change was necessary because “the present system of administration is not in accordance with the principles and ideas of the ancient rulers.” He was, therefore, advocating a return to the principles of a golden age. The reforms were intended to shape the behavior of the people and the bureaucracy, bringing about fundamental changes in political and social institutions.

The New Policies’ areas were planning of state finance, state financing for farmers, state revenue and maintenance (for example, transportation and distribution of tribute items, a graduated cash tax, collective police duties, an equitable land tax), national defense, currency reform, trade expansion, and education and civil service (establishment of more prefectural schools, training in specialized fields such as law or military science, and emphasis on problem solving in the examination system). The majority of these New Policies tried to deal realistically with the problems of tax burden and state finance. However, their success would depend on a competent bureaucracy.

The core of Wang’s reforms was an improved bureaucracy. He advised the emperor to “search for and make use of the talented men who are capable of reviving the regulatory system of the ancient kings” before attempting to establish the regulatory systems for the country. The Song Dynasty paid great respect to scholar-officials, some of whom were exempt from taxes and service to the state. Many scholars, however, especially those not stationed in the capital, received low pay and few privileges; morale therefore was low. Wang increased their salaries in the hope of raising morale and lessening corruption. Idealistic himself, Wang maintained high standards and demanded them of other scholar-officials as well. His criticism of what he considered an ill-prepared and impractical bureaucracy brought heated rejoinders, while his thinking on state finance was an additional irritation to many conventional Confucians, who held a laissez-faire philosophy in the areas of business and industry.

Wang believed that the state could increase revenue by increasing productivity, primacy being given to agricultural productivity. He attacked the production of luxury goods, and extravagance in general. He reminded the emperor that “the good ruler maintains an economical standard in public life, extravagance being recognized as a great evil” and urged punishment for those producing articles of luxury. Wang wanted to force workers back into the fields so that “as more land is brought under cultivation, there will be no lack of food.” To this end, Wang introduced state farming loans to rescue farmers from moneylenders, thereby enabling the farmers to keep their land. He also favored heavier taxation on merchants than on farmers.

Wang wanted the government to restrain and limit the powerful monopolizing families and to use its authority vigorously to aid the poor. He did not advocate revolution, the overthrow of the gentry and large landlords; rather, he feared that a peasant uprising would occur if poverty were not alleviated. Yet such reforms as remission of corvée (compulsory labor), a graduated land tax, and cheaper credit alienated large landowners, moneylenders, and merchants. They joined forces with conservative bureaucrats to condemn Wang and his program, forcing his resignation in 1074.

Although Wang returned to court in early 1075, his position was considerably weaker than before. The emperor was less open to his counsel, and previous supporters turned against him. Wang retired permanently in 1076. His reforms continued in effect until the death of Emperor Shenzong in 1085. Thereafter, they were gradually rescinded, although a brief revival of his system occurred between 1093 and 1125.

Significance

Many historians, assessing Wang’s reforms, view him as a champion of small or middle landowners and small businesses. At the least, his efforts showed an interest in the broader sectors of society. In the long run, however, these efforts failed. A principal cause of this failure was Wang’s inability to develop a dedicated and trustworthy official corps. Additionally, his opponents, in and out of government, succeeded in portraying him as a radical and not truly Confucian at all. Sima Guang, leader of the opposition until his death in 1086, accused Wang of being self-satisfied and opinionated and of setting his own ambition above the nation’s interests; he added that Wang was impractical as well.

Wang did, however, have his defenders. Several decades after Wang’s death, a Confucian philosopher, Liu Xiongshan (Liu Hsiang-shan; 1113-1192), praised him as a man of “heroic mould and will.” He attributed the failure of the New Policies to the intransigence of both Wang and his opponents, each side failing to make the necessary compromises. Certainly, Wang lacked sufficient tact to win over the traditionalists. At times, he was more theoretical than practical in political matters. Nevertheless, the New Policies did improve the financial situation for a time, and, as some twentieth century historians hold, perhaps Wang’s reforms, as much as any other factor, enabled the Song Dynasty to last another half century after his death.

Several of Wang’s reforms, such as the militia organization the baojia system and the graduated land tax, would be revived by later dynasties. His measures were not without defect. Still, as the centuries passed, aspects of them gained more approval, and Wang’s reputation rose accordingly.

Major Rulers of the Northern Song Dynasty, 960-1126

Reign

• Ruler

960-976

• Taizu (Zhao Kuangyin)

976-997

• Taizong

998-1022

• Zhenzong

1022-1063

• Renzong

1064-1067

• Yingzong

1068-1085

• Shenzong

1086-1101

• Zhezong

1101-1125

• Huizong

1125-1126

• Qinzong

Bibliography

De Bary, William Theodore, Irene Bloom, and Wing-tsit Chan, comps. Sources of Chinese Tradition. 2d ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999-2000. Contains translations of documents by and about Wang Anshi and his New Policies. Brief essays in each section. Several documents cover aspects of Song society in general, giving a good framework for Wang’s reforms. Index.

Fairbank, John King, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig. East Asia: Tradition and Transformation. Rev. ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989. Chapter 6 is most pertinent. Contains an overall analysis of the Song Dynasty with a brief but good summary of Wang Anshi’s reforms. Index, maps, and illustrations.

Hymes, Robert P., and Conrad Schirokauer, eds. Ordering the World: Approaches to State and Society in Sung Dynasty China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. A collection of papers on the state and society in China during the Sung Dynasty. Bibliography and index.

Lee, Thomas H. C. Government Education and Examinations in Sung China. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985. An analysis of the civil service examinations and bureaucracy systems of the Song Dynasty. Index.

Liu, James T. C. Reform in Sung China: Wang An-shih (1021-1086) and His New Policies. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959. A careful analysis of the reform program of Wang Anshi with reference to the philosophical differences between Wang and his antagonist Sima Guang.

Meskill, John Thomas. Wang An-shih: Practical Reformer? 1963. Reprint. Boston: Heath, 1967. A study of Wang Anshi and his reform program.

Roberts, J. A. G. A Concise History of China. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003. Contains a chapter on the Song and Yuan Dynasties with a section on Wang Anshi’s reforms.