Hostage Crisis at Algeria's In Amenas Gas Field January 2013
The hostage crisis at Algeria's In Amenas gas field in January 2013 was a significant and tragic event that unfolded over several days, highlighting the complex interconnections of regional terrorism and international intervention. On January 16, 2013, jihadists, reportedly led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, attacked the gas facility, taking hostages and linking their actions to France's military intervention in Mali against Islamist groups. The militants, armed and coordinated, swiftly overran the compound, capturing nearly 700 workers, including many foreigners.
The Algerian military responded within hours, adhering to a strict no-negotiation policy with terrorists. In confrontations on January 17 and 19, the military's tactics led to a heavy civilian toll, resulting in the deaths of 38 hostages and most of the attackers. The crisis prompted international scrutiny of Algeria's counterterrorism approach, rooted in its historical context of civil war and colonial legacy. The In Amenas incident underscored the regional instability in North Africa, driven by interconnected jihadist movements and the challenges posed by foreign military interventions, making it a pivotal moment in the ongoing struggle against terrorism in the area.
Hostage Crisis at Algeria's In Amenas Gas Field January 2013
Jihadists took hostages at the In Amenas gas field in Algeria and connected their actions to French intervention in Mali, underscoring the interdependence of events across North Africa. Algerian army tactics in retaking the gas field left 38 hostages dead, causing many to question Algeria's role in regional counterterrorism.
Algeria earned its reputation as the strongest country in North Africa on counterterrorism issues by fighting a bloody civil war in the 1990s and driving insurgents toward the Sahara, where they did little harm and were relatively contained. However, Algerian jihadists continued farther south, gaining strength and later supporting an Islamist takeover in northern Mali. When France intervened in Mali, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, an Algerian jihadist based in Goa, dispatched a commando team to the In Amenas gas field. It is not clear whether the raid was a suicide mission, although the jihadists tried to destroy the site with a spectacular explosion. All but three of the jihadists and most of their non-Muslim hostages died as a direct result of attacks by the Algerian army.
Date: January 16 to 19, 2013.
Place: Near the town of In Amenas, 800 miles south of Algiers, 35 miles from the Libyan border.
Key Events
1991-1999: Algeria's military-led government suppresses Islamist parties, drives militants south.
March-June 2012: In northern Mali, Islamists seize territory with support from Algerian jihadists.
January 11, 2013: France intervenes in Mali when Islamist forces begin to advance farther south.
January 16, 2013: Jihadists storm the In Amenas gas facility and round up hostages.
January 17, 2013: Algerian army attacks the housing area when hostages are loaded into trucks.
January 19, 2013: Algerian army attacks the gas-processing area, killing the last few jihadists.
Key Figure
Mokhtar Belmokhtar is the leader of Al Mulathameen, the group responsible for the In Amenas raid. Until October 2011, Belmokhtar was a commander in Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) but split from that group to form his own organization, sometimes called the Signed in Blood Brigade.
Born in Ghardaia, Algeria in 1972, Belmokhtar went to Afghanistan in 1993 for jihadist training. He served as a liaison to Al Qaeda during the Algerian government's 1990s crackdown. In the 2000s, he moved south and raised money for AQIM by smuggling cigarettes, which earned him the nickname of Mr. Marlboro, and by kidnapping employees of foreign companies for ransom. A power struggle--involving a rival commander, the more ideological Abdelhamid Abu Zeid--led to Belmokhtar's departure from AQIM and the founding of Al Mulathameen. Belmokhtar then formed an alliance with the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, which was prominent in the Islamist occupation of Goa, Mali. He did not participate in the raid at In Amenas.
In-Depth Overview
Situation in Algeria and Mali
Algerian policy toward radical Islamist groups has been shaped by its colonial past and a recent civil war. As a former colony of France, Algeria is suspicious of European intentions and consistently opposes intervention in Africa by outside powers. Internally, Algeria pursued a hard line against insurgents from 1991 onward, when a military takeover of the government set off a campaign of repression that took as many as 200,000 lives. National elections resumed in 1999, but the military remained in charge. By the early 2000s, insurgents were active only in the desert south. In particular, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), reorganized as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2006, began operating across national borders in the Sahara and the Sahel, raising millions of dollars through kidnapping, drug trafficking, and smuggling. In 2010, Algeria set up a regional counterterrorism intelligence center in Tamanrasset in cooperation with Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Insurgent attacks began making news again in Algeria in 2011, enabled by cash from AQIM activities in the south.
Northern Mali came under Islamist control in the spring of 2012, when a successful Tuareg rebellion was co-opted by Islamist groups--notably, Ansar Dine--with support from AQIM. International concern about a new refuge for terrorists led to a United Nations Security Council resolution in December 2012 authorizing an African multi-national force to help Mali regain control of its northern provinces. Algeria opposed the intervention; it was in secret talks with Ansar Dine. However, Ansar Dine joined other Islamist forces in a January 2013 advance to the central city of Konna, uncomfortably close to the Malian capital. Responding to an appeal from Mali's president, Dioncounda Traore, France sent air and ground forces to liberate Konna and northern Mali. Five days later, Mokhtar Belmokhtar's Signed in Blood Brigade broke through the gate at the gas field near In Amenas, Algeria. The stated reason for the attack was that French jets had been allowed to use Algerian airspace. However, the attack had been in planning for months.
Jihadists Attack the Gas Field
On January 16, 2013, the first sign of trouble at the In Amenas gas field came at 5:40 a.m. Militants stopped two buses that were taking employees to the airport. They killed two passengers who tried to resist--a British security employee and an Algerian guard who activated the site's alarm system. The militants then crashed the facility gate, traveling in nine Toyota trucks painted to look like vehicles of Sonatrach, the Algerian firm that operates the gas field with BP and Norway's Statoil. The militants drove to the housing area for Europeans and other employees, showing a detailed knowledge of the maze-like facility. They rounded up European, American, and Japanese hostages, forcing several to wear belts of Semtex explosive. Muslim workers were told they would not be harmed. Scores of workers, including several Europeans, avoided capture by hiding in crawl spaces and obscure work areas. A separate team of militants drove to the gasworks, about 2.5 miles from the housing area. Altogether, there were almost 700 people trapped inside the compound, surrounded by two fences and miles of open desert.
The attackers included 32 men in two teams, armed with automatic weapons, grenade launchers, heavy machine guns, and mortars. Three were explosives experts; two spoke fluent English. The overall commander was Taher Ben Cheneb, a veteran of past Belmokhtar operations and leader of the Movement of Islamic Youth in the South. The team that occupied the gasworks, led by Abdul Rahman al-Nigeri, had gathered in Niger the night before. They joined up with the other team, which held the housing area, in a lawless part of southern Libya used for jihadist training camps. This second group was led by Abou al Barra, once a member of the GSPC, the predecessor of AQIM. The militants came from Tunisia, Niger, Mali, France, Egypt, and Canada. The fighters from Egypt may have been members of Ansar al-Sharia, the group accused of the September 2012 attack on the American consulate in Benghazi. Two of the militants carried Canadian passports; one of them was called Chedad, a common surname in Morocco. All but three of the jihadists died in attacks by the Algerian army on January 17 and 19.
Army Attacks the Jihadists
The Algerian army arrived within hours of the initial attack. The next morning, January 17, 2013, they observed hostages being loaded into five trucks with explosives. The hostages were about to be moved--to Mali, according to Algerian Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal, or, in later reports, to the gasworks, where five mortars were positioned to destroy the In Amenas facility in a giant fireball. To prevent the jihadists from moving out, the Algerian army commander sent in helicopters and troops. In the jihadist truck convoy, all the militants and all but one of the hostages were killed during the air attack. In the housing area, several hostages were executed by gunshot to the head or by explosion. Fires broke out, leaving bodies burned beyond recognition. Hundreds of captives fled in the confusion, and many escaped from hiding places, including several Europeans dressed as Muslim workers.
The home governments of the hostages, especially the United States and United Kingdom, were advised of the crisis by BP and asked Algeria to use restraint in dealing with the jihadists, in order to minimize loss of life. Algeria insisted on its policy of crushing insurgents. It would not negotiate with terrorists.
On January 18, 2013, only the industrial area remained in the jihadists' control. They still had seven hostages and were trying to restart the gasworks. Natural gas will not explode unless it is under pressure, maintained by electrical pumps. The power had been cut at the beginning of the raid. An attempt to blow up a pipeline failed, and the militants set fire to the gasworks control tower.
The next morning, January 19, 2013, Algerian troops attacked the gasworks, killing 11 militants. The seven hostages had already been executed. A handful of people hiding in the industrial area escaped. Parts of the gasworks were booby trapped by the jihadists, delaying the process of clearing the facility. The final toll of casualties was 38, including people from eight foreign countries and one Algerian. Ten of the dead were Japanese. Of the militants, 29 were killed and three taken alive.
Bibliography
Arieff, Alexis. Algeria: Current Issues. Congressional Research Service Report. January 18, 2012. 21 p. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=71427431&site=ehost-live
Lounnas, Djallil. "Al-Qa�da au Maghreb islamique et la crise malienne." S�curit� Globale 20 (Summer 2012) p. 43-58. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=79819177&site=ehost-live
Algeria. Country Report. Political Risk Yearbook. August 2012. 49 p. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=84733272&site=ehost-live
Algeria. International Country Risk Guide Annual. 2012. 14 p. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=83242278&site=ehost-live
Blanche, Ed. "A Maghrebi Tinderbox." Middle East 432 (May 2012) p. 14-19. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=76122241&site=ehost-live
Cristiani, Dario. "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's Operational Revival in Northern Algeria." Terrorism Monitor 9:36 (September 22, 2011) p. 6-7. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=67028908&site=ehost-live