Iran in Africa

Iran maintains a diplomatic presence in more than 30 African countries. By establishing trade relations and development projects, Iran gains allies, avoids strategic encirclement, and provides cover for agents trained to launch terror attacks.

In the 1980s, the newly founded Islamic Republic of Iran began a policy of seeking cooperative relationships in the developing world. This policy accelerated in Africa in 2005 and continued through the next two decades as various Iranian officials traveled the continent to promote Iran. These individuals portrayed Iran as a generous trade partner and opponent of colonialist powers. Iran acquired new markets for oil exports and sources for mineral imports, including uranium. Secretly, Iran became an arms supplier to insurgencies and built networks of agents in Muslim countries, notably in West Africa, where Hezbollah is its proxy in Lebanese communities. Pragmatic relationships with non-Shia and non-Muslim nations along the Red Sea give Iran strategic options beyond the Persian Gulf.

Key Events

• 2008: Iran signed a deal with Eritrea for agricultural, mining, and industrial development, then began using the Red Sea port of Assab for naval operations.
• 2009: Iran sent ministers on 20 visits to African countries to expand diplomatic and trade ties. In the same year, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps convoys carrying weapons for Hamas across the Sudanese desert are attacked by Israeli jets.
• 2010: Iran hosted a summit for political and business leaders from 40 African countries in September. In October, Nigeria seized a cargo of arms and ammunition smuggled in from Iran.
• 2011: Iran made a five-year deal with Zimbabwe for access to uranium in defiance of United Nations sanctions.
• 2012: Iran denied charges by Kenya that two Iranians caught with military-type RDX explosives were members of the Quds Force.
• 2013: Iran denied charges by Nigeria that Shiite cleric Abdullahi Mustapha Berende was trained in Iran to carry out attacks against Israeli and U.S. targets in Lagos.
• 2024: Iran continued to pursue a policy of obtaining access to African agriculture, minerals, and military basing in exchange for weaponry.
• 2024: Both the U.S. and Israel launched air attacks against Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen.
• 2024: The military junta in Niger ended cooperation with the United States after American officials alleged its cooperation with Iran to obtain Nigerian uranium.

Status

Iran's return on investment in Africa has fallen short in some respects. Nine African countries serving on the Security Council between 2006 and 2010 each supported the four rounds of sanctions against Iran for its nuclear program. While Iran has obtained uranium from African countries, the opening of two low-production mines in Iran's Yazd province in early 2013 suggested supplies were becoming scarce.

Arrests and weapons seizures by African security services attested to continuing efforts by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps to destabilize unfriendly regimes, position agents for terrorist attacks, and counteract the considerable presence of Israeli secret services on the continent. An Israeli listening post in northern Eritrea kept tabs on visits by Iranian naval vessels to Eritrea's southern port of Assab.

In other regards, in the 2020s, Iran pursued a policy and cooperation that netted positive results. This strategy attempted to offset crippling U.S. sanctions first administered by the U.S. Presidential administration of Donald Trump (2017-2021). Iran's efforts at cooperation focused on countries such as Sudan, South Africa, Niger, and Yemen.

In-Depth Description

In the 1980s, Iran's policy of building relationships in Africa intensified in the early 2000s under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and yielded tangible progress on various fronts. The auto manufacturer Iran Khodro built a production plant in Senegal in 2007. Under a development agreement with Kenya, Iran built three outpatient clinics in Nairobi. Despite sanctions by the United Nations (U.N.) and the United States (U.S.), Iran has maintained cordial relations with countries on the African side of the Red Sea, even when the African governments were hostile to one another. Iranian promises to invest in joint energy, agriculture, industry, and social welfare projects throughout sub-Saharan Africa received favorable attention. This occurred despite occasional embarrassments relating to clandestine activities of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), whose mission includes:

• Supporting Iran-minded revolutionaries.
• Opposing Israeli operations.
• Establishing capabilities to carry out terrorist attacks against U.S. and Western targets.

Strategic Presence in East Africa

In Sudan, when Omar al-Bashir's Islamist regime seized power in 1989, Iran offered weapons, oil, and 2,000 military advisers. In 1993, when the U.S. labeled Sudan a state sponsor of terror, Iran increased its military aid to include armored vehicles, artillery, and radar equipment. In 2008, as reported in the Sudanese newspaper Rai al-Shaab, Iran began using the Yarmouk military complex near Khartoum to manufacture rockets and ammunition for Hamas and Houthi insurgents in Yemen and other client organizations in Africa. Reportedly, Israel launched three air strikes in 2009 against IRGC convoys carrying weapons for Hamas across Sudan and bombed the Yarmouk facility in October 2012.

In the 2020s, the Arabian peninsula became a persistent flash point as Iranian-backed Houthi rebels began to employ Iranian missiles and other weaponry to threaten international shipping. In addition, Houthi rebels attacked Israel with drones and cited the Israeli military offensive, which followed the October 7, 2023 Hams attacks in Gaza, as its justification. In 2024, both the United States and Israel launched air attacks on Houthi rebel positions and ships.

In neighboring Eritrea, Iran saw an opportunity in 2008 when the U.S. favored Ethiopia during a border dispute. Iran promised to invest in agricultural and industrial projects, and soon afterward, Iranian destroyers and submarines began to dock at Assab, ostensibly on patrol against pirates along the coast of Somalia. Iran denied establishing a military base but deployed long-range missiles to defend the oil refinery at Assab, which sits on the 20-mile-wide strait of Bab el Mandeb, the gateway to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. By gaining a foothold in East Africa, Iran significantly increased its opportunities to exert influence in the region, both openly and covertly. From the point of view of Saudi Arabia, its main adversary in the area, Iran escaped containment in the Persian Gulf and established a presence to its west and east.

Fiasco in West Africa

In October 2010, officials in Lagos, Nigeria, discovered a 240-ton shipment of weapons aboard a freighter that had just come from Bandar-Abbas, Iran. Documentation for the cargo, which included small arms, ammunition, grenades, mortars, and rockets, described it as construction materials. Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki flew from Iran with new documentation to show that the shipment to Nigeria had been a mistake. The ultimate destination for the weapons was Gambia. Gambia denied any knowledge of the affair and immediately broke off relations with Iran, fearing retaliation by Senegal. Gambia had been accused in the past of supporting a separatist group in southern Senegal, the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance. Senegal broke off diplomatic relations with Iran in February 2011 despite strong ties with Senegal's President Abdoulaye Wade. Wade made six trips to Iran between 2003 and 2009. Iran was also close with Gambia's President Yahya Jammeh, who came to power in a 1994 coup. Nigeria sentenced IRGC member Azim Aghajani to five years in prison for weapons smuggling, while his overseer Sayyed Akbar Tabatabaei, commander of the Quds Force in Africa, escaped with diplomatic immunity.

As a result of the 2010 incident in Nigeria, experts were able to identify Iran as the source of unmarked ammunition used in conflicts throughout Africa. In some cases, the ammunition was a standard issue for government forces, notably in Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, and Sudan. Corrupt officials may have sold some of the ammunition, which then made its way to insurgent groups. Shipping containers and documentation never identified the manufacturer. Still, the cartridges were recognizable by their materials and imprints of machining, according to a 2013 report by the United Kingdom firm Conflict Armament Research.

Quest for Uranium

Iran's efforts to obtain uranium from various sources in Africa have been mixed. In 2005, Tanzania confiscated a quantity of uranium brought overland from the Democratic Republic of Congo for shipment to Iran. In 2009, Iran struck a deal with Somali insurgents, exchanging weapons for access to areas under their control that have uranium deposits. In 2011, officials in Zimbabwe confirmed the revolutionary government had agreed to trade access to its uranium reserves for Iranian oil.

During a three-country trip to West Africa in 2013, Ahmadinejad stopped in uranium-rich Niger, raising concern among Western observers. Niger, however, has strong ties to France, and the official results of the visit related only to diplomatic visas and cooperation on health care. Iran claims it has enough uranium to meet its needs. However, the 2013 opening of two mines of marginal value in central Iran suggested supplies were in short supply.

In 2024, access to Nigerian uranium continued to be an objective of the Iranian government. Iran scored a diplomatic victory when the military government of Niger ended counterterrorism cooperation with the U.S. This followed allegations by American officials of Nigerian collaboration with Iran that provided uranium.

Terrorist Operations

Iran has recruited and trained agents throughout Africa, building a widespread capability to strike at Israel and the U.S. through relatively vulnerable targets. In October 2003, Israel disrupted Iranian-backed plans for kidnapping Israelis in the Horn of Africa region. In 2012, police in Kenya arrested two Iranians who stored military-type explosives at a golf course in Nairobi, a supply meant to be used by a terrorist network against government offices, public gatherings, and British, Israeli, and U.S. facilities.

In West Africa, Iran uses Hezbollah to connect with Shia communities of the Lebanese diaspora (Ivory Coast has 100,000 Lebanese, Senegal 20,000). Investigation of a plane crash in Benin in December 2003 revealed Hezbollah officials onboard were carrying $2 million in donations collected in the region. Hezbollah operatives are active in the diamond trade in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In May 2013, police in Kano, Nigeria, discovered a cache of weapons linked to Hezbollah, including 17 AK-47s, two submachine guns, and 76 grenades. In northern Nigeria, Hezbollah finances the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), a Shia rival to Boko Haram with an estimated one million followers.

The case of Abdullahi Mustapha Berende, a Shiite cleric arrested by Nigeria's State Security Service (SSS) in February 2013, provides an example of Iranian methods of recruiting and deploying agents. Berende was flagged as a prospect in 2006 as a student at Imam Khomeini University in Qazvin, Iran. During a second trip to Iran for advanced studies in 2011, Berende was given training in weapons and explosives. His handlers flew him to Dubai in April 2012 and instructed him to move to the southern city of Lagos. Berende formed a cell with two followers, who observed potential targets such as U.S. and Israeli government offices, cultural centers, and businesses. The group reportedly had a list of Nigerians designated for assassination. Berende's controllers chose Lagos as his base of operations so that he could keep track of the Israeli intelligence presence there.

In July 2023, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi conducted his first tour of the African continent by visiting the countries of Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. This marked the first such event by an Iranian president since 2011. Raisi's visit demonstrated a continuation of Iran's outreach to African countries and leaders. In addition, Iran has continued this "charm offensive" in efforts to dampen the support of countries that appear disposed to cooperation or even diplomatic recognition of Israel. These events are also beneficial to Iran as it tried to promote its religious Shia doctrines. Iran likewise uses such trips to promote new venturessuch as selling military equipment such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Iranian UAVs have increased in demand, as demonstrated by their utility in the conflict in Ukraine.

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