START II Treaty Is Signed
The START II Treaty, signed on January 3, 1993, by U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin, aimed to significantly reduce the nuclear arsenals of both nations. This bilateral arms control agreement called for each country to lower its strategic nuclear warhead stockpiles to between 3,000 and 3,500 by 2007, and mandated the elimination of certain types of ground-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). While the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty in 1996, the Russian Duma expressed concerns primarily rooted in economic and strategic issues. Many Russian lawmakers worried that reducing their nuclear stockpile during a period of economic instability could jeopardize national security and military parity with the U.S.
Despite these concerns, supporters within Russia ultimately prevailed, leading to the treaty's ratification on April 14, 2000. They viewed START II as a means to alleviate the financial strain of maintaining an extensive nuclear arsenal and as leverage in future negotiations with the U.S. Additionally, it provided a way for Russia to improve its conventional forces while avoiding a renewed arms race. START II reflected the shifting dynamics of international relations in the post-Cold War era, emphasizing the complexities and challenges of nuclear disarmament.
START II Treaty Is Signed
START II Treaty Is Signed
The second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), was signed on January 3, 1993, by presidents George H. W. Bush of the United States and Boris Yeltsin of Russia. START II was a bilateral arms control treaty aimed at cutting both countries' nuclear arsenals by two-thirds. It stipulated that each country would reduce its strategic nuclear warhead stockpiles to 3,000–3,500 by 2007. It also required all ground-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) to be eliminated as well.
The U.S. Senate ratified START II on January 26, 1996, but the Russian Duma was not as supportive. They had several concerns, the first being economic. Strategic planners in Russia, which was still reeling from the fall of the Communist regime in 1991, felt that the country was in no position to make decisions on its nuclear arsenal in a time of economic uncertainty. They believed that, given Russia's rapidly declining economy, the country would not be able to afford the cost of replacing the multiple warheads with single warheads, and that possessing MIRVed ICBMs was the most economical way for Russia to remain on a level playing field with the U.S. With or without START II, Russia was going to have to reduce its military forces for economic reasons, and maintaining MIRVed ICBMs was their last chance to remain a superpower.
The Duma's second concern was a strategic one. Those who opposed START II felt that Russia's national security would be threatened by the cut in the nuclear stockpile. NATO expansion and the spread of the United States' international presence were seen as direct threats to Russia, and, with the already heavy reductions in Russia's conventional forces, the Duma thought it was the wrong time to agree to further military cuts. The Duma also believed that replenishing its forces, should the treaty fail, would be more difficult for Russia than it would be for the United States. There was also the question of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972. With the U.S. looking to amend the ABM Treaty to allow for missile defense shields to be constructed to defend against rogue states, Russia worried about its future. If Russia signed START II, further reducing its nuclear stockpiles, the United States could truly have the upper hand if it ever put a missile defense shield in place over Europe. Many feared that the United States could possibly use that shield one day against Russia, which neither had such a defensive shield of its own nor could afford to build one. Also, START II dealt with land-based nuclear missiles, not the kinds of sea- or air-launched nuclear missiles that the United States possessed but Russia did not.
Those in favor of START II in Russia eventually prevailed, and the Duma ratified the treaty on April 14, 2000. Supporters of START II saw it as a good way to reduce the cost of maintaining strategic forces, which would have to be done due to the downturn in the Russian economy. It was also viewed as an effective means of forcing the United States to reduce its own nuclear arsenal. The money Russia saved on maintaining strategic forces could then be used to improve its conventional forces, which were in shambles, while still maintaining something of a nuclear defense system. Many Russian strategic missiles were also past, or quickly approaching the end of, their service life and were going to have to be discarded anyway. By signing START II, Russia would not have the financial burden of replacing them. Russia would also have more leverage in thwarting attempts made by the United States to amend the ABM Treaty. Finally, Russia saw START II as a way to stay out of another nuclear arms race with the most powerful country in the world.