Great Kwanto Earthquake

Earthquake

Also known as: The Great Kanto Earthquake, the Great Tokyo Fire

Date: September 1, 1923

Place: Kwanto area (including Tokyo and Yokohama), Japan, with the epicenter in Sagami Bay

Magnitude: 8.3

Result: 143,000 dead

Over the past several centuries a major earthquake has struck the Kwanto District in Japan approximately every seventy years. Early in the twentieth century, seismologist Akitune Imamura, after lengthy studies, discovered that Tokyo was sitting on a seismic gap that would be corrected only when an earthquake of substantial size occurred. He predicted that there would soon be a very strong earthquake in the Kwanto District of Japan, an area that includes Tokyo and the seaport of Yokohama, 17 miles to the south. Imamura further predicted that the quake and consuming fires that would follow would result in over 100,000 casualties. This prediction was well publicized but was dismissed as irresponsible. It was, however, shortly fulfilled.

At one minute before noon on Saturday, September 1, 1923, the quake struck. Its epicenter was in Sagami Bay, 50 miles southeast of Tokyo near the island of Oshima. The initial shaking lasted for about five minutes and was followed shortly thereafter by a tsunami, or a tidal wave, that washed people and houses out to sea. In some of the smaller inlets the tsunami reached heights of up to 40 feet, resulting in many drownings. The tsunami had one advantage, however, in that it extinguished many fires that otherwise would have been uncontrollable.

Immense holes appeared in the streets, and buildings were tilted at strange angles. Tokyo’s largest building, the twelve-story Asakusa Tower, split in two and collapsed. The earthquake knocked out the seismograph at the central weather bureau in Tokyo. The seismograph at Tokyo Imperial University was still functioning, however; it recorded a series of 1,700 earthquakes and aftershocks that struck the Tokyo area over the following three days.

Fires followed the initial quake and in general did more damage than the quake itself. They were caused primarily by overturned charcoal braziers or hibachis that were being used to cook the noonday meal. Since the city was built largely of wood, the fires burned out of control. Gas mains ruptured by the quake and leaking oil from above-ground storage tanks added to the conflagration. A condition called a fire tornado was soon created, with a wind of such velocity that it would lift a person off the ground. These crisscrossed the city and either burned people alive or suffocated them with dense fumes of carbon monoxide. More than 30,000 people were reportedly killed at a single location, a park on the east bank of the Sumida River, when such a fire storm descended on refugees that had gathered there. Fire fighting was greatly hampered because much of the equipment was destroyed or could not be moved because of the rubble that blocked the roads. Water was not available to fight the fire because the water mains were ruptured by the quake. Safe havens were hard to find; bridges and narrow streets became deathtraps as fleeing people could neither go forward nor turn back. Hundreds of people who had attempted to cross one of the large bridges that spanned the Sumida River found themselves trapped and incinerated when walls of fire swept the bridge from both banks.

A party of 200 children on an excursion train trip were buried alive by a falling embankment. Hundreds of people tried to escape in small boats, only to be drowned by waves caused by aftershocks or to be burned to death in burning oil slicks. The liner Empress of Australia was able to save several thousand people by loading them aboard and heading out to sea to ride out the disaster.

The quake devastated a region of 45,000 square miles. In Yokohama, Japan’s chief port, eyewitness accounts tell of the earthquake announcing itself as an underground roar, followed almost immediately by a frantic shaking. Communications were completely destroyed. The city authorities finally succeeded in getting messengers through to the capital begging for help, to little avail since that capital suffered the same plight. A great cultural loss was sustained with the destruction of the Imperial University Library, which contained one of the world’s oldest and greatest collection of rare books, original documents, and priceless art objects.

The typical Japanese house of wood and paper construction was well suited by reason of its flexibility to withstand shaking, but the heavy tile roofs often collapsed, trapping the occupants. For the most part, steel-framed and reinforced concrete buildings remained standing with only moderate damage, but altogether 60 percent of the buildings in Tokyo and 80 percent in Yokohama were flattened by the quake or destroyed by the fires that followed.

The earthquake tested the design of the newly opened 250-room Imperial Hotel, a project of the famous American architectFrank Lloyd Wright. The hotel, financed by the royal family, was meant to be a showpiece. When the earthquake struck, many of Tokyo’s notables were attending a party to mark its opening. Although he was not a seismic engineer, Wright incorporated into his design features that he thought would safeguard his structure from earthquake damage. He ruled out a deep foundation in the alluvial mud upon which the structure was built; he intended that the structure should float like a ship. He was mistaken in this theory, as experience gained in the quake demonstrated that soft earth amplifies the seismic shocks. The solidly constructed buildings in Tokyo with deep foundations withstood the quake better than the central section of the hotel, which sank 2 feet into the ground.

The hotel did survive, however, and Wright’s other safeguards proved to be quite effective. They included reinforced and tapered walls and separation joints that isolated parts of the structure. The use of a light copper roof prevented collapse, which had entombed so many Japanese in their homes with heavy tile roofs. Rather than embedding utility pipes and conduit in concrete, as was the practice, Wright had them laid in a trench or hung in the open so that they would flex and rattle but not break in any seismic occurrence. Fortuitously, the hotel was designed with a large reflecting pool in front. This served as a firefighting reservoir that protected the hotel from the fires that raged following the quake when water was unavailable from the municipal system. The hotel stood until 1968, when the land upon which it rested became too valuable to accommodate it.

Aftermath. Aftershocks continued to shake the region following the quake. A soaking rain followed on the third day, which helped extinguish the fires that were still raging. Food shortages were rampant, and riots broke out, but there was no looting and little profiteering. Members of the Korean community were attacked as rumors accused them of setting fires and poisoning the wells. Several hundred were killed by vigilantes before the authorities could reestablish order.

A week after the quake 25,000 people were still living in the open. The prince regent, who later became Emperor Hirohito, tried by his presence to calm the terrorized citizens. He led relief operations and ordered the gates of the Imperial Palace opened to refugees. Many of the refugees returned to their homes looking for loved ones. Messages seeking missing family members were posted on public buildings, and collection centers for stray children were set up around the city. One of the biggest problems was disposing of dead bodies, many of which lay undiscovered in the rubble. Usually when located they would be piled up and cremated. The Sumida River was full of bloated and discolored corpses.

Within forty-eight hours of the earthquake, ships of the U.S. Pacific fleet arrived in Japanese ports, laden with water, food, and medicine. The American Red Cross set a goal of $5 million for relief supplies. Japan’s low foreign debt and good credit rating made funds for rebuilding readily available. The most immediate effect on the economy was unemployment. An estimated 9,000 factories were destroyed. Massive reconstruction operations somewhat alleviated the unemployment problem, but the drain on the Japanese economy was ruinous. Foreign exchange dwindled, leading to a tight monetary policy that stifled growth.

A master plan for reconstruction was formulated under the leadership of the new home minister, Shimpei Goto. Narrow streets were to be replaced with broad avenues that would provide better access in and out of the area in a future quake and also act as firebreaks. Flammable wooden structures were to be banned in favor of fireproof structures limited in height. Before these plans could be implemented, however, those rendered homeless by the quake went to work rebuilding their houses in the old manner, resulting in the flammable and congested neighborhoods reappearing. Despite the threat of future earthquake damage, high-rise buildings, refineries, and chemical plants have been built on soft reclaimed land beside Tokyo Bay. Even a nuclear power station has been constructed at Shizuoka, about 100 miles from the center of Tokyo.

Plans and Forecasts. Seismologists were of one mind that there would be a major earthquake in Tokyo or adjoining areas in the early twenty-first century. They cited as the most likely area the heavily industrialized Tokai region down the coast from Tokyo, which had not experienced a great quake since December 24, 1854. Studies indicate that tectonic forces have accumulated, and strains of these forces have deformed the adjacent land, indicating that the breaking points are inevitable. Following a historical pattern, this may be triggered by a sizable quake near Odawara, which is located a few miles south of Yokohama. The Japanese government designated this area for intensive civil defense measures. When a quake strikes, Tokyo will receive considerable damage but the industrial heartland in the Shizuoka prefecture will be devastated both by the quake and the tsunami that will follow.

Another place of concern is directly under Tokyo itself, where a choka-gata (“directly below”) quake is likely to strike. A quake of this type struck in 1988, but because it was 55 miles under the surface, there was little damage.

Japan is the world leader in planning for earthquake survival. Disaster teams are trained and at the ready; stores of food, water, and blankets are on hand. Clearly marked evacuation routes have been laid out and reinforced against quake damage. An extensive public education campaign has instructed the population as to what to do in the event of a quake. Earthquake drills in schools and places of employment are a usual practice. Lines of apartment complexes are strung out to act as firebreaks in the event of a major conflagration among the crowded wooden houses behind them. The Tokyo fire department has detailed emergency plans to deal with a quake. Because a major quake will rupture water mains, it is likely that water will not be available from hydrants to fight the inevitable fires, so earthquake-resistant fire cisterns and underground water storage areas have been constructed. Measures have been taken to deliver water from the sea and streams for firefighting use.

On a national level, if unusual seismic activity is detected, six members of the Earthquake Assessment Committee are contacted immediately. They then analyze data and decide whether or not to advise the prime minister to warn the nation that a major earthquake is imminent.

Bibliography

Davison, Charles. The Japanese Earthquake of 1923. London: T. Murby, 1931.

Hadfield, Peter. Sixty Seconds That Will Change the World: The Coming Tokyo Earthquake. Boston: Charles E. Tuttle, 1991.

Hammer, Joshua. Yokohama Burning: The Deadly 1923 Earthquake and Fire That Helped Forge the Path to World War II. New York: Free Press, 2006.

Poole, Otis Manchester. The Death of Old Yokohama in the Great Japanese Earthquake of September 1, 1923. London: Allen & Unwin, 1968.