Future Global Economic Trends

We all worry about what economic conditions hold in store for us. The answers to our present-day concerns lies in figuring out where we stand in much longer business cycles lasting from five to seven years, fifteen to twenty-five, and forty-five to sixty years. The behavior of each of these cycles is influenced by underlying economic processes. Globalization, sustainable manufacturing, renewable energy, and the knowledge economy are all important trends. To truly appreciate their likely impact, though, we must also know something about Juglar, Kuznets and especially, Kondratieff Cycles.

Keywords Creative Destruction; Enabling-Technology; Globalization; Juglar Cycle; Kitchin Cycle; Kuznets Cycle; Kondratieff Cycle; Socio-Institutional Framework; Sustainable Development; Techno-Economic Subsystem

Global Stratification > Future Global Economic Trends

Overview

Vilfredo Pareto, one of sociology's theorists of note, started out as an economist; his work on economic efficiency and income distribution are prized to this day. Yet, ironically, he felt he could not explain economic matters in purely economic terms and so moved farther afield into sociology. Certainly Karl Marx and Max Weber agreed: both pioneers in the field were well versed in economics too. A society without a functioning economy would soon descend into chaos; an economy without a social infrastructure or legal system would be at best primitive and static.

So when one asks where the global economy is heading, one is also asking what lies in store for the world social order, and by implication, what the qualities of our lives and those of our children and grandchildren will be like. Alas, for all its rarefied equations, modern econoimcs has yet to overcome its age-old nemesis: uncertainty. Reams of raw data and robust econometric analysis yield at best probabilities of X or Y happening in six months to a year. Beyond this point, even the most sophisticated numerically-based computer-forecasting models simply run up against far too many variables and must make far too many assumptions to produce very accurate projections. As huge, complex, and prone to randomness as a global economy is, to expect more is perhaps unrealistic.

Yet, it is in everyone's interest to have a clear sense of what lies ahead economically and socially, farther and farther out along the time-horizon: five, twenty, even fifty years in the future. Fortunately in this respect, economists have identified certain patterns in the mass of historical data available that have some predictive value. The first economist to do this was Joseph Schumpeter, who characterized capitalism as a continual process of creative-destruction. By this, he meant that the sheer dynamism of the marketplace ensured that a steady stream of new technologies would dislodge existing ones. With these innovations come new products, organizational structures, and markets that push existing ones aside.

Schumpeter's work also led him to believe that that there was such a thing as business cycles that progressed through four distinct phases: recovery, prosperity, recession, and depression. Some are fairly short; others longer and a few are very long indeed. The short ones last three to five years, were keyed to the rise and fall in the inventory-levels of consumer-goods manufacturers, and are called Kitchin Cycles (Fels, 1952).

A Juglar Cycle takes seven to eleven years to run its course. The cycle begins with an economic boom, which causes companies to commit capital resources and hire additional workers to meet higher demand. When the boom subsequently goes bust, companies wring this excess capacity out of their operations, postponing planned investments in new equipment and laying off workers (Evans, 2001). National accounts data shows that most industrialized countries periodically go through the highs and lows described in the Kitchin model. As to the Juglar Cycle, there have also been major recessions 1974-75, 1982-83, 1990-92, 2000-01 and one looming in 2008 (O'Hara, 2003).

Every fifteen to twenty-five years, there is a cyclical peak output in the capital equipment sector of the economy that makes the heavy machinery used in the manufacture industrial and durable goods. This depreciates with wear and, because of the high price-tag involved, is one of the first thing firms postpone reordering when the economy turns down. Eventually, however, this pent up demand has to be met; back-orders are fulfilled as new orders are placed when the economy improves, and so the cycle peaks. Economists call this a Kuznets Cycle (Forrester, 1977).

The Long-Wave Cycle

A Kondratieff Cycle or Long-Wave Cycle lasts forty-five to sixty years. That's about how long it takes, proponents say, for the impact of a ground-breaking new technology to work its way fully through an economy. The steam engine, for example, made industrial manufacturing cost effective: the weaving machine it powered jump-started mass automation. Likewise, the blast furnace produced the steel rails that trains loaded with passengers and cargo traveled on, and the dynamo-generator that produced the electricity that lit cities they traveled through and pushed sound through telephone lines over equally long distances. The train was later overtaken by the combustion-engine car whose manufacture brought about assembly-line production (Patomäki, 2005).

A Kondratieff Cycle (K-cycle) begins its ascent when the following conditions arise: creativity, technical ingenuity, entrepreneurship, the necessary capital to finance the required plant and equipment, skilled workers, a sufficient supply of energy and raw materials, and up-to-date information on scientific, industrial and market developments (De Greene, 1988). What's most important about the resulting innovation is the drastically lower cost structure it introduces that the entire techno-economic subsystem eventually shares. Virtually everything is affected one way or another: what raw materials are used, how manufacturing processes worked, and the scale and pace of mechanization and automation in general. These developments, in turn, alter the division of labor and force a redesign of the corporate organizational structure to capitalize on new ways of creating and delivering value. All of these changes will be dedicated to stimulating demand for new types of goods being produced, occasioning changes in patterns of consumption (Rennstich, 2002).

Forrester believed a Kondratieff Cycle's uniqueness lay in the fact that a series of technologies came along in quick succession that enervate a given industry. In the transportation industry for example, railroads replaced canal-barges, trucks replaced railroads. Energy was produced first by burning wood, then coal, then oil (Baqir, 1981). A Long-Wave Cycle starts at an economic low-point, usually a depression or major recession during which time capital plant continues obsolescing and new plant construction remains close to non-extent.

However, a deteriorating industrial infrastructure must be replaced at some point. When that finally happens, there are at least two decades of new inventions entrepreneurs can turn to. As the new technologies become known and investors come to believe in their potential, employment rises and consumer consumption with it, encouraging even greater investment.

At this point, the "lock-in" effect is already beginning to take hold; tinkering with the dominant technologies continues, but the goal is now incremental — not radical improvement. Too much is riding, essentially, on the existing techno-infrastructure at this point. Any advance that does not "fit" the existing techno-economic regime is effectively side-tracked. The cresting wave of change carries banks, corporations, labor unions, and others with it. At a certain point, though, its momentum falters: overcapacity and declining marginal productivity begin to take their toll. Investment plateaus and the long slide towards recession and depression begin all over again (Forrester, 1977).

All this does not, however, occur in a vacuum. The techno-economic subsystem functions within a broader socio-political system. Markets value and spontaneously reward efficiency and innovation; politico-cultural institutions by contrast value and steadfastly preserve the status quo. The innate conservatism of the latter favors incremental change at best, the natural brashness of the former favors the opposite. In normal times, a tense but workable process of give and take exists between the two (Oözçelik & Özveren, 2006).

But times are far from normal at the beginning or end of a Kondratieff Cycle. Prolonged economic downturns aggravate existing social inequalities and political grievances. A long-wave depression signals "a breakdown in the complementarity between the dynamics of the economic subsystem and the related dynamics of the socio- institutional framework. It is, in the same movement, the painful and conflict-ridden process through which a dynamic harmony is reestablished among the different spheres of the total system" (Perez, 1983, p. 1). The crisis will persist until the social-political structure realigns itself to better accommodate the new techno-economic forces at work and recovery can commence.

Further Insights

So where does the modern global economy sit on the Kondratieff Cycle? Are we in the ascendant, peaking, headed downwards, close to hitting bottom? To answer this important question, we must first establish the untapped potential of the two great enabling technologies of our day: micro-electronics and bio-technology. Both in a sense are the fundamental building-blocks for the current techno-economic regime in the sense that both can vastly improve the productivity of a host of related and unrelated technologies (Tylecote, 1992). The question here is whether either one of these enabling-technology is near to peaking. In other words, is either approaching its physical limits or can these be addressed cost-efficiently and its usefulness extended into the future? The steam engine remained a vital enabling-technology for some seventy or so years, the combustion engine some ninety plus years and counting.

Tangible examples of the dynamism of micro-electronic-driven techno-economic subsystems are everywhere to be found: the cell phones in our pocket, the computers on our desktops, the GPS navigational systems in our cars, etc. The microchip's exponential growth in capacity in the last thirty years has been nothing short of spectacular. Every few years, though, dire warnings surface from Silicon Valley that say it is impossible to miniaturize the individual circuits in a microprocessor chip any further without fatally compromising its structural integrity. Then, a rare new substance is discovered that does the trick. But what happens to the Information Economy when the substrate material can no longer be improved upon and the capacity of the Integrated Circuit Chip finally maxes out? And how close are we to that fateful day?

Bio-technology has a less visible societal imprint but ranks on an equal par with micro-electronics as enabling-technology of the highest order. Genetic engineering also made its first strides forward in the 1970s. Here, slivers of Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) known to produce specific inheritable traits in future generations are excised and inserted into a gene of a different organism, creating a purpose-built hybrid designed to perform a very specific task. The 1990s saw the mapping of the Human Genome. Its industrial footprint appears at first glance to be somewhat smaller than micro-electronics' encompassing: agriculture, pharmaceuticals and medicine, chemical manufacturing, waste management and pollution control. But fast-forward to the year 2050, and it becomes abundantly clear that these very industries will matter the most.

Unprecedented Problems Facing the World

By 2050, there will be an estimated 9.2 billion people in the world to feed—up from 6.6 billion in the year 2000. In the Global North, approximately one out of three people in 2050 will be 60 or older, up from one out of five in 2000. One out of five in the Global South will be 60 or over in 2050. Moreover, chronic shortages of water will be a fact of life for some two-thirds of the world's populace. Salinization of remaining water tables by then will have spread to approximately 50% of the earth's arable land. It will also drastically affect crop yields unless ultra-resistant strains of genetically-engineered grains, cereals, soybeans, vegetables, are farmed industrially (Cetron & Davies, 2008, p. 37).

By 2050, the environmental downside of humankind’s reliance on this oil and other fossil fuels will be abundantly clear. Scientists now think there's a 90% probability of the earth's average annual temperature rising anywhere from three to nine degrees Centigrade in the next one hundred years. It has been estimated that the blanket of carbon dioxide warming the globe will not shrink to pre-industrial levels for some two hundred years after the last fossil-fuel emission escaped into the atmosphere (Cetron & Davies, 2008).

Globalization

The end to tariffs and other legal encumbrances to interstate trade is an idea that was first voiced in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It finally found favor and, critically, the backing of nations-states only toward the end of the twentieth century. Globalization would not have progressed as swiftly or as extensively were it not for fleets of specially-designed container-ships that can transport goods cheaply to port-railheads where the cargo is offloaded in situ to trains and trucks. This in turn occasioned the wholesale shift of the consumer- and durable- goods manufacturing-base from the Global North to the Global South where production costs and wages are much lower. Orders, delivery-schedules and the other bric-a-brac of commerce are now sent electronically in real-time via a high-speed telecommunications infrastructure that compresses time and space into one virtual world (Moreira, 2004).

Globalization may be the great equalizer, transferring wealth from the rich north to the poor, south. That at least is the optimistic view put forth by globalization's most ardent supporters who see in it the spread not only of prosperity but also of democratic forms of government and, possibly, a mechanism with which to ward off global warming. Not everyone shares their unbridled optimism. Skeptics see it as a form of neo-colonialism where the developed world is simply ridding themselves of the environmental and social ills of industrialized capitalism by exporting them lock, stock and barrel to the poor countries of the world that are much less equipped to ameliorate them. Others doubt whether the Global South will prosper equally as much as the Global North; still others look at the reluctance of rich regional trading blocks like the EU and NAFTA and the emerging industrial powers of the twenty-first century (China and India) to share their economic hegemony with the Global South (Byrne & Glover, 2002).

Viewpoints

But what exactly will be globalization's impact on output and trade decades into the future? Forecasters from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have looked at two possible scenarios over the course of a Kuznets Cycle extending out to 2025. The first of these assumes the current pace of globalization will continue and predicts an annual growth rate of 4.25% in global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 2006 through 2015 and a lower rate of 3.75% from 2016 through 2025 as productivity slows. The non-OCED economies share of this will rise from 2005's 40% to 60% by 2025 as more manufacturing capacity comes on stream in the Global South. This in turn will cause the non-OCED economies' share of total global trade to grow from the 2005 figure of 33% to around 50% in 2050.

Globalization, however, could proceed at a more moderate pace if economic growth in the Global North slows, in which case worldwide growth in output, trade and capital flows will too. The OCED forecaster's second scenario proceeds on this assumption and predicts that the knock-on effect in non-OCED economies from a 0.25% decrease in the OCED's per annum GDP growth rate would be a 0.5% decrease in theirs. World trade as a share of global GDP consequently could fall as much as 30% over the forecast period. Then again, some of the assumptions underpinning this forecasts may not be borne out by subsequent events, nor does the model based on them factor in the unexpected. To be fair, though, who knows beforehand when something totally unexpected happens? (Hervé, Koske, Pain, & Sédillot, 2007).

Conclusion

As to what happens beyond 2025, no one can say with much certainty. The value of an economic model like the Kondratieff Cycle lies in its attempt to identify underlying causes and trigger events to very complex macroeconomic phenomena set far into the future. Supporters and detractors alike readily admit that it is a speculative exercise — an exercise, though, that looks long and hard at centuries of past economic growth and decline and abstracted from these historical inquiries a common precipitating factor underlying them all: the fact that man is a tool-making animal. All our material progress as a species stems entirely from this impulse, the use of language, the ability to act in concert to achieve a common end, to invest time and energy in a focused way for a specific purpose, and, of course, our sheer inventiveness. Clearly biotechnology has tremendous potential to cure illness and to feed the world's people. Clearly, too, micro-electronics will continue to be an enabling technology if no other reason that the powerful software applications and artificial intelligence it now supports.

Terms & Concepts

Creative Destruction: A term coined by Economist Joseph Schumpeter to describe the Capitalist system's dynamism, a consequence of continual investments in new technologies, These in turn occasion next-generation products, firms and markets that replace existing ones.

Globalization: The worldwide integration of markets and national economies through the elimination of tariffs and other legal barriers to free trade augmented by cost-effective ocean-going and air transport and extensive communications networks.

Enabling Technology: A key technical innovation with broad applicability to a variety of industries; its greatest virtue is the lower cost structure that industries enjoy by its implementation.

Juglar Cycle: Seven to eleven year cycle of macroeconomic expansion-contraction tied to undercapacity and overcapacity in meeting market demand that directly affects levels of investment in new consumer- and durable goods- production equipment and workforce

Kitchin Cycle: Three to five year macroeconomic cycle keyed to the rise and fall in consumer-goods manufacturers' inventory-levels.

Kondratieff Cycle: A forty-five to sixty year period of economic growth and decline triggered by the dissemination of a cluster of new enabling-technologies.

Kuznets Cycle: Fifteen to twenty five years boom and bust macroeconomic economic cycle related to fluctuating demand for capital equipment used in heavy manufacturing and construction.

Socio-Institutional Framework: The broader social, political and cultural context in which economic activity takes place.

Sustainable Development: The idea that economic growth should not lessen the overall capital endowment — physical, structural, technological, social, human, etc. — bequeathed from one generation to another.

Techno-Economic Subsystem; The productive capacity, investment and financial return along with the consumer, labor and capital good markets created by the introduction of a new enabling-technologies across different industries.

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Suggested Reading

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