Byrd-Hagel Resolution
The Byrd-Hagel Resolution is a significant U.S. Senate resolution passed on July 25, 1997, that articulated the Senate's stance on international climate negotiations, particularly concerning the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It was introduced by Democratic Senator Robert Byrd and Republican Senator Chuck Hagel, receiving unanimous support with a 95-0 vote. The resolution emphasized that the United States should not commit to any binding greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions restrictions unless developing countries, which are seen as major polluters, were also subject to similar commitments. This reflected a broader concern that inconsistent regulations could disadvantage U.S. businesses economically in comparison to those in developing nations.
The resolution arose in the context of the impending Kyoto Protocol, which aimed to create international agreements for reducing emissions. While Byrd viewed the resolution as guiding principles for negotiations, Hagel opposed the Kyoto Protocol, setting the stage for ongoing debates about equity in global climate policy. Despite signing the Kyoto Protocol in 1998, the U.S. never ratified it, with subsequent administrations citing the Byrd-Hagel Resolution as a primary reason for their reluctance. The resolution continues to influence discussions on climate agreements and the responsibilities of industrialized versus developing nations in addressing climate change.
Byrd-Hagel Resolution
Date: Passed July 25, 1997
The Byrd-Hagel Resolution declared the “sense of the Senate” that the United States should not agree to limit its greenhouse gas emissions unless developing nations, including China and India, were also required to limit theirs.
Background
When the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted in May, 1992, it identified major industrialized countries, including the United States, as Annex I parties, and other countries as underdeveloped parties. This division became a long-standing source of controversy, as the United States and other industrialized nations came to resent the fact that they were subject to regulations under the treaty to which the developing nations were not subject.
In 1995, at the First Conference of the Parties(COP-1) in Berlin, the Berlin Mandate was adopted. It called for the creation of a new protocol that would require strict commitments on the part of Annex I parties to limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions but would exempt developing countries from new commitments. This provision increased the dissatisfaction on the part of the United States, particularly in the light of the fact that China, India, and Brazil—all heavy polluters—were among the developing nations that would not face strict regulation.
Through the 1990’s and well into the first decade of the twenty-first century, the United States was the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide (CO2) because of its heavy use of fossil fuels. However, the GHG emissions of the developing country parties was rapidly increasing, and by some estimates they were expected to surpass those of the industrialized nations by 2015.
On July 25, 1997, Senate Resolution 98 was introduced before the 105th Congress. Its cosponsors were Democrat Robert Byrd of West Virginia and Republican Chuck Hagel of Nebraska. What became known as the Byrd-Hagel Resolution provided a chance for the Senate to express its opinion about ongoing international climate negotiations. Agreeing to the resolution by a vote of 95 to 0, the senators declared that the United States should not agree to any binding restrictions on its own GHG emissions if the developing country parties were excluded from such restrictions. Inconsistent restrictions, they asserted, would cause serious harm to the U.S. economy, because companies in developing nations would have an unfair advantage over their U.S. competitors in trade and in wages.
Summary of Provisions
The resolution declared that it was the “sense of the Senate” that the United States should not sign any protocol of the UNFCCC mandating new commitments on the part of Annex I parties without placing limits on the emissions of developing country parties—nor should it sign any protocol that would harm the U.S. economy. In addition, the resolution reiterated the constitutional requirement that any treaty be submitted to the Senate for ratification and called for detailed explanations, including information about financial cost, to support any future climate change agreement.
Significance for Climate Change
The vote on the Byrd-Hagel Resolution occurred when the Kyoto Protocol was nearly written but not yet finalized. The fact that the resolution was put forward by bipartisan cosponsors and that it passed unanimously seemed to indicate a strong consensus within the Senate. However, Byrd stated later that he had intended the resolution only to provide broad guidelines for negotiators and that he thought the Kyoto Protocol was a sensible compromise document. Hagel, on the other hand, opposed the Kyoto Protocol and continued to work against any agreement that went against the specifics of the resolution.
On December 11, 1997, less than five months after the passage of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted at the Third Conference of the Parties (COP-3). The United States signed the treaty in 1998 but did not ratify it. During the Bill Clinton administration, which ended in 2001, the White House did not send the Kyoto Protocol to the Senate for ratification. The George W. Bush administration stated formally that it would not support the treaty, citing the Byrd-Hagel Resolution as evidence that the U.S. economy would be unfairly harmed by any agreement that did not include restrictions on developing nations, particularly China. By the end of the Bush administration, the United States had neither ratified nor officially withdrawn from the treaty. The language and the arguments of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution continued to inform negotiations and resolutions through Bush’s two terms as president.
Bibliography
Lisowski, Michael. “Playing the Two-Level Game: U.S. President Bush’s Decision to Repudiate the Kyoto Protocol.” Environmental Politics 11, no. 14 (Winter, 2002): 101-119. Describes how President George W. Bush invoked the Byrd-Hagel Resolution as part of his rationale for rejecting the Kyoto Protocol.
Rabe, Barry George. Statehouse and Greenhouse: The Emerging Politics of American Climate Change Policy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004. Examines the shortcomings of federal regulations regarding climate change and the emergence of sensible state-level policies.
Schneider, Stephen Henry, Armin Rosencranz, and John O. Niles. Climate Change Policy: A Survey. Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2002. Textbook surveying in accessible language the scientific, economic, and policy contexts of the global warming debate.
Victor, David G. Climate Change: Debating America’s Policy Options. New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2004. Analysis of three approaches to climate change policy, with an appendix containing transcripts of the Senate debate over the Byrd-Hagel Resolution.