Iraq after US Withdrawal

Tensions between Shia and Sunni Muslims increased following the December 2011 withdrawal of American troops. Sunni’s anger at Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki boiled over in June 2014 as insurgents led by ISIS overran Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city. Kurds took control of Kirkuk, previewing a possible shattered three-piece future for Iraq. Despite rising oil production, the recovery of the Iraqi economy lagged in 2012 and 2013. Housing, clean water, and electricity remained in short supply due to construction backlogs and endemic corruption. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki evaded his promise to form an inclusive government, filling top positions with loyalists. The only remaining top-level Sunni in the cabinet, Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi, was targeted and his bodyguards arrested in 2012, sparking protests. Violence increased as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, formerly known as Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia) moved in, taking control of cities in the Anbar province. From its stronghold in eastern Syria, ISIS led a 2014 mixed-force attack on Mosul, routing the army. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani called on Shias to unite, and Shia militias resurfaced to defend the country. President Barack Obama announced the United States would send advisers to assist Iraqi armed forces.

Key Figures

  • Haider al-Abadi, Iraq's prime minister 2014-2018.
  • Nuri al-Maliki, defying calls for a more inclusive government, was determined to hold on as prime minister. He ultimately stepped down in August 2014.
  • Moqtada al-Sadr, leader of the single largest Shiite faction, often maneuvered against Maliki.
  • Masoud Barzani, president of the Kurdish Autonomous Region (2005-2017), wrangled with Baghdad over territory and oil rights.
  • Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, head of ISIS until his death in 2019, announced in June 2014 that territories held by ISIS in Iraq and Syria were now united as a caliphate called the Islamic State.
  • Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq's most revered Shia cleric, urged the new parliament in June 2014 to form a government with broad support that would avoid past mistakes—interpreted by many as a rebuke to Maliki. In 2023, he ranked among the top leaders in The Muslim 500: The World's Most Influential Muslims.
  • Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, a member of two top councils in Iran, was Tehran's candidate to succeed the eighty-four-year-old Sistani as grand ayatollah. Died in 2018.

Key Events

  • March 2010—After close elections, Maliki agrees to power-sharing but later blocks the appointment of key ministers.
  • December 2011—Maliki arrests two top Sunni officials as the last American troops leave Iraq.
  • December 2012—Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi's bodyguards are arrested, provoking protests in Sunni provinces.
  • July 2013—The scale of violence peaks with coordinated suicide attacks on the Abu Ghraib and Taji prisons. The year's death toll passes 4,000.
  • April 2014—In parliamentary elections, Maliki's coalition wins 28 percent of the seats, by far the largest bloc.
  • June 2014—ISIS overruns Mosul, scattering Iraqi troops. Kurdish militia takes control of oil-rich Kirkuk.
  • August 2014—President Obama orders limited US airstrikes against militants in Iraq and has food and water delivered to trapped Iraqis.
  • April 2015—US troops are back in Iraq but only in a training capacity to help Iraq's troops prepare to fight against ISIS.
  • June 2015—President Obama authorizes 450 more US troops to be sent to Iraq for training purposes to take place at a base in Anbar province.

Status

In July 2014, the Iraqi army could not mount a counter-offensive to retake Mosul. The army doubled its forces in Baghdad as ISIS advanced toward the capital. The Iraqi parliament struggled to find consensus on a new government. Maliki said he would seek a third term as prime minister, and finalizing a cabinet could take months. Some observers thought that the fall of Mosul may have strengthened Maliki's position by encouraging Shiites to unify under his leadership. However, by August 2014, Maliki had agreed to step down and was replaced by Haider al-Abadi, who immediately promised to restructure the cabinet and the country's political landscape. That same month, President Obama began authorizing aid to Iraq's efforts to counter ISIS's advancement through limited airstrikes aimed at militants in Iraq. As Iraqi forces struggled, Obama sent US troops back into Iraq for the first time since the 2011 withdrawal in April 2015. This initiative focused on further training for the Iraqi forces to effectively fight ISIS, leading to more US troops being sent to the country to administer training by June 2015. The following decade saw continued US military presence in the region.

In the Kurdish autonomous region, President Barzani said his region supported full independence from Iraq.

In-Depth Description

During the first year after the withdrawal of American troops, oil production in Iraq surpassed three million barrels per day, compared to two million in 2002, and was on track to reach six million by 2020. Beyond the oil sector, progress was inconsistent. Most Iraqis continued to receive only sporadic service from water and power utilities, and the housing shortage remained acute. The National Development Plan (2010-2014), which called for projects to create 3.4 million non-oil jobs, became mired in its backlog of unfinished work. Corruption had a paralyzing effect on development. On a 100-point anti-corruption scale developed by the International Monetary Fund, Iraq was rated a five.

Maliki Consolidates Power

The 2010 parliamentary election shaped the political situation in Iraq in 2012-2013. Nuri al-Maliki, seeking a second term as prime minister, led the State of Law coalition, appealing to Iraq's Shia majority. However, the Shia vote was split when Moqtada al-Sadr, whose following was primarily poor, working-class Iraqis, ran a separate slate of candidates under the banner of the Iraqi National Alliance (INA). Consequently, a third party called Iraqiya—a coalition of Sunnis and secular Shia leaders—won two more seats than Maliki's State of Law. To remain as prime minister, Maliki accepted the Erbil Agreement, mediated by President Jalal Talabani.

Under the agreement, the ministers of defense and the interior had to be from parties other than Maliki's. He got around the requirement by objecting to every candidate and filling the posts with acting ministers, who did not have to be confirmed by Iraq's parliament, the Council of Representatives (COR). The COR had the power to remove Maliki from office by a vote of no confidence but did not take this action, according to analysts, because of a sense of futility. No one wanted a return to the governmental paralysis that lasted eight months after the 2010 election.

As American troops withdrew in December 2011, Maliki had two of Iraqiya's top Sunni leaders placed under house arrest—Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi and Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi—while their bodyguards were interrogated and tortured. Hashemi fled the country. Charges against Issawi were dropped.

Tension between Baghdad and Iraqi Kurdistan

In 2012, tensions ratcheted up significantly between the national government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The northern part of Iraq has functioned as an autonomous region since the 1990s when the West imposed a no-fly zone on the regime of Saddam Hussein. Since then, the North has benefited from greater security, social unity, and economic development compared to the rest of Iraq. Issues between the KRG and Baghdad involve territorial claims and management of oil resources. The KRG wants control of oil produced in its territory, while Baghdad fears Iraqi Kurdistan is edging toward complete independence. Under the current arrangement, Baghdad manages oil revenue, and local authorities manage production. The two sides pressure each other, with Baghdad occasionally withholding payments and the KRG retaliating with production cuts.

In August 2012, Baghdad organized a new unit of security forces, the Tigris Operational Command, which massed troops near Kirkuk, which Kurds feel should be part of their region. The KRG sent its forces to the area, and by November, there had been several clashes with shots fired. Maliki and KRG President Masoud Barzani exchanged threats of further action but agreed to a pullback at the urging of President Jalal Talabani.

The potential for new disputes over sovereignty arose in July 2013, when Barzani threatened to send KRG troops into Syria—across a national border—to protect Kurdish refugees. The prospect of KRG forces holding territory in northern Syria would have raised alarm throughout the Mideast about Kurdish nationalist ambitions.

Return of Sunni Insurgency

President Talabani, a stabilizing force in Iraqi politics, suffered a stroke on December 18, 2012. The next day, security forces again moved against Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi, arresting his bodyguards. Protests broke out in Baghdad and the Sunni provinces of Anbar, Salahuddin, and Nineveh and continued into the new year. In February, 100,000 protesters blocked roads to Fallujah and Ramadi. By May 2013, the protests became anti-government attacks, which spread to Shia areas, with insurgent bombings averaging one per day.

The bulk of the bomb attacks—at security checkpoints, public gatherings, and Shia mosques—were the work of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, formerly Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia). Driven out of Iraq by the Sunni Awakening in 2007, the group made a robust comeback behind Sunni discontent in 2013. In July, ISIS staged simultaneous attacks on Abu Ghraib and the Taji prisons near Baghdad, using a dozen suicide bombers to free 500 prisoners. During the second half of 2013, casualties from terror attacks rose to a level not seen since 2008—more than 7,000 by the end of the year.

In December 2013 and January 2014, ISIS fighters joined tribal militias and drove government forces out of Ramadi and Fallujah, the two largest cities in Anbar province. The Iraqi army soon took back Ramadi, but ISIS was entrenched in parts of Fallujah and towns throughout Anbar province.

ISIS Takes Mosul Previously thought to have 2,000 to 4,000 fighters in Iraq, ISIS descended on Mosul with a force two to three times that size—built up from ISIS units in Syria. The June 10, 2014 attack overwhelmed security forces around the city as soldiers fled or surrendered en masse. ISIS forces continued their advance, taking Tikrit to the south on June 11, Tal Afar to the west on June 16, and parts of Baquba on June 17—just thirty-eight miles northeast of Baghdad. With Mosul secured, the insurgents captured the oil refinery at nearby Baiji (ISIS also controls and draws revenue from oil production facilities in eastern Syria). The group issued a new charter for the government of Mosul, suggesting that ISIS intended to make the city its stronghold in Iraq, a counterpart to Raqqa in Syria.

While ISIS was taking Mosul in the north, Sunni militants in Anbar province advanced along the Euphrates River, taking Haditha, Hit, and other cities. In the Anbar offensive, ISIS had support from other Sunni insurgent groups, including former military from the regime of Saddam Hussein. Secular nationalist militias under the General Military Council for Iraq's Revolutionaries (GMC) were active in Fallujah and Ramadi. The Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI)—which demobilized after the departure of American forces in 2011 but took up arms again in 2014—may have contributed fighters in Salahuddin and Diyala provinces, north and east of Baghdad.

As Mosul fell and government forces fled, Kurdish troops took over the northern city of Kirkuk and its nearby oilfields. The KRG will not willingly give up Kirkuk even if the government in Baghdad retakes Mosul. Kurds regard Kirkuk as a Kurdish city, and its oil resources will raise KRG production to one million barrels per day—considered a threshold for the economic viability of an independent Kurdistan.

Aftermath in Baghdad and Washington Through July 2014, the Iraqi army could not organize a counterattack. About sixty of its 243 battalions were not available for duty. The army concentrated available forces around Baghdad while the air force carried out jet strikes to disrupt militants advancing to surround the capital. In Baghdad, Shia militias came forward in answer to a call by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to defend the nation against insurgents.

On June 20, 2014, Sistani urged the Council of Representatives (COR)—stymied by factionalism since the April 30 elections—to form a government with broad support. Prime Minister Maliki rejected suggestions by the United States (US) and others that he step aside in favor of a unity government that included Sunni and Kurdish cabinet ministers. He said a broad coalition would thwart the people's will, who had made the State of Law the largest voting bloc in the COR. Maliki asked the COR for emergency powers, but there was no immediate action on the measure. In early July, the COR elected a new president of Iraq and a new house speaker, filling these positions with a Kurd, Fouad Massoum, and a Sunni, Salim al-Jabouri. According to the pattern followed since 2003, the prime minister would be a Shia. Maliki announced in July he would run for a third term as prime minister, but by August 2014, Maliki had stepped down and was replaced by Haider al-Abadi.

Responding to the collapse of Iraqi defense forces in June 2014, President Obama announced the US would send 300 military advisers to Iraq. Their role would be to support US policy objectives—preventing the establishment of a haven for terrorists—by identifying needs and solutions for Iraq's armed forces. He added that the US stood ready to take precisely targeted action as required by emerging circumstances. US troops would not be sent to Iraq as combat forces. The White House also said the US would communicate with Iran but would not participate in joint operations with Iran against insurgents.

Despite efforts by the United States, its allies, and friendly Iraqi forces through the 2010s and early to mid-2020s, ISIS remained a significant threat in the nation. The US maintained a small military presence in Iraq continuously to prevent a complete government overthrow. However, some speculated the forces' presence was primarily intended to deter Iran from moving weapons across Iraq and Syria. The US military presence in Iraq also ensured support for US forces in Syria in the mid-2020s.

Bibliography

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Hamasaeed, Sarhang, and Garrett Nada. "Iraq Timeline: Since the 2003 War." The United States Institute of Peace, 29 May 2020, www.usip.org/iraq-timeline-2003-war. Accessed 10 Oct. 2023.

Katzman, Kenneth, et al. "Iraq Crisis and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service Report, 20 June 2014, p. 17. search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=97142583&site=ehost-live

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