Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio
Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio was a significant legal case concerning the intersection of film, censorship, and First Amendment rights in the United States. The dispute arose when the Mutual Film Corporation challenged the authority of Ohio and Kansas to review films for moral content before they could be publicly screened. Under the laws of these states, films deemed "sacrilegious, obscene, indecent, or immoral" could be prohibited from public exhibition. The corporation argued that such state censorship infringed on its constitutional right to free expression. Conversely, the states contended that regulating film content was a legitimate function aimed at protecting public morality.
The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of the states, classifying films as profit-driven entertainment rather than a medium for expressing ideas. This ruling established a precedent for state-level censorship of films, enabling various public and private entities, particularly religious groups, to influence what content could be shown in theaters. It wasn't until over three decades later that a different Supreme Court ruling recognized films as vehicles for communication, thus granting them First Amendment protections. The case reflects the ongoing tension between creative expression and societal standards of morality, a debate that continues to resonate in discussions about media regulation today.
Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio
Court: U.S. Supreme Court
Date: February 23, 1915
Significance: This Supreme Court decision—and Mutual Film Corporation v. Kansas, which the Court decided at the same time—upheld the constitutionality of 1913 Ohio and Kansas laws allowing the states to censor films on the grounds that motion picture films were not protected forms of speech under the First Amendment; these decisions opened the door to decades of government censorship of films
At stake in Mutual’s suits against Ohio and Kansas was the right of states to allow public officials to review films for their moral content before permitting them to be shown to the general public. Under Ohio’s and Kansas’ laws, films found to be “sacrilegious, obscene, indecent, or immoral,” or that might “corrupt the morals,” could be banned from being shown in public. In appealing an earlier decision against it to the Supreme Court, the Mutual Film Corporation claimed that state review of films was a violation of “the freedom to say, write or publish whatever one will on any subject.” In defense of their right to act as censors, the states of Ohio and Kansas argued that film censorship was a legitimate exercise of the authority of the state to protect public morality.
In deciding in the states’ favor, the Court reflected for the first time on the question of just what a motion picture was. Possibly influenced by the popular press, which reported on the infant film industry as though it were primarily a source of cheap mass entertainment, the Court determined that films fell into the category of entertainment designed to make a profit. Although films certainly contain ideas, the Court explained, they are not a means of communicating them. With that distinction in mind, the Court decided for Ohio on the grounds that state censorship of films did not violate any personal liberties covered by the First Amendment. Using the same line of reasoning, it also ruled in Kansas’ favor.
Coming at a time when films were new, these decisions had a powerful impact. They made film censorship possible, allowing for state and local governments to control what films were shown in theaters. They also opened up a wide latitude for the censorship of films, which could be banned as “immoral” for many different reasons. The decisions enabled private pressure groups, particularly religious-related organizations such as the Legion of Decency, to bring pressure and influence to bear on the decisions of public censorship boards. It took more than thirty-five years for the Supreme Court, ruling on a case relating to the film The Miracle, to overturn this decision by ruling that films did indeed communicate ideas and thus were entitled to constitutional protection.