Air Force, U.S.

Identifcation Branch of the U.S. military responsible for most air operations

Date Became an autonomous organization in 1947

As the military impact of air power increased during the early decades of the twentieth century, advocates within the U.S. Army pressed their claim for an independent Air Force. The Army Air Forces, after demonstrating its usefulness during World War II, received its wish to become autonomous in 1947. The new United States Air Force became a major factor in the emerging Cold War with the Soviet Union.

The U.S. Air Force evolved out of several organizations established during World War I. The U.S. Army reorganized its air assets (created as the Signal Corps) into the U.S. Army Air Service during the war, reflecting the offensive role that aircraft could play. The Air Service remained a subordinate service until 1926, when Congress permitted the creation of the U.S. Army Air Corps. With recognition that air power could do more than simply support ground combat, the Army Air Corps earned elevation in status. Air power remained under the control of a subordinate branch of the army, however, until the threat of World War II forced reorganization.

First Steps Toward Autonomy

With World War II looming, the army changed the status of the Air Corps to reflect the growing influence of air power. Observing the impact of air power on the war in Europe and in Asia, the War Department elevated the Air Corps to a service equal to the Army and Navy in June, 1941, when the Air Corps became the United States Army Air Forces (AAF). Although still nominally part of the U.S. Army, the AAF had a large degree of autonomy. Officers of the Air Corps answered to senior commanders in their respective operating areas, but the AAF, commanded by General Henry Arnold, reported only to the Army chief of staff. Freed from the restraints of supporting land forces, the AAF had full control of its own personnel, planning, and equipment. Its only obligation was to conduct operations directed by the senior political leadership; beyond that requirement, the AAF developed as it saw fit. As war loomed, the Army Air Forces grew rapidly. In 1940, the Air Corps had about 50,000 personnel; by the outbreak of war in December, 1941, the AAF had more than 150,000 members.

Although occasionally restrained and redirected by the chief of staff, the AAF directed its own operations during World War II, independently of the Army and Navy. Having developed the tactic of strategic bombing during the prewar years, the AAF engaged in massive bombing operations, with mixed results. In Europe, the AAF joined with Great Britain to conduct around-the-clock bombing of German targets. The bombing was not always accurate, and the bombers suffered significant losses of aircraft and personnel. The AAF could not employ bombing against Japan until the capture of the Marianas Islands in the summer of 1944 put that country within reach of the new long-range B-29 Superfortress bomber. Even then, conditions forced the AAF to switch from high-altitude precision bombing to low-level area bombing with incendiary bombs, which caused massive civilian casualties. The AAF also conducted the first atomic bombings, on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in August, 1945. These two atomic explosions effectively brought the war to an end.

The AAF operated fleets of fighter planes, notably the long-range P-51 Mustang and P-47 Thunderbolt, capable of escorting bombers into hostile airspace. It also operated a wide array of light (A-20 and A-26) and medium bombers (B-25 and B-26) to provide tactical support for ground forces, as well as a large training establishment and transport service.

Staking Its Claim for Independence

Based upon the AAF’s performance during World War II, many air power enthusiasts and officers within the AAF believed they had proven themselves worthy of a separate and fully independent branch of the U.S. military. Great Britain had organized an independent air force, the Royal Air Force (RAF), during World War I, and the AAF pressed for independence along the lines of the RAF. As evidence of the potency of air power, the AAF conducted the Strategic Bombing Survey, a series of studies that sought to determine the impact of strategic bombing upon enemy forces, industry, and morale. Although the Strategic Bombing Survey revealed some shortcomings, the report generally was favorable (critics would say biased) regarding the effectiveness of strategic bombing, a task that only air power could achieve. The AAF also claimed that it was the only military service capable of delivering nuclear weapons at the time, and that the specialized nature of that task required a separate branch of the military to ensure that atomic bombs were used properly and effectively.

Politics also supported the drive for an independent air force. On the domestic front, Congress was eager to cut defense spending after World War II ended, and the AAF made an appealing claim that an independent air force could reduce the numbers of Army and Navy personnel needed to defend the country from distant enemies. On the international front, the growing Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union meant that atomic weapons might be used against America’s communist enemies in the near future. After President Harry S. Truman initiated his Truman Doctrine in a speech to Congress on March 12, 1947, committing the United States to containing the expansion of communism, the flexibility of air power as a Cold War weapon argued forcefully toward giving the AAF the freedom it sought. As part of the National Security Act of 1947, Congress created the fully independent United States Air Force (USAF) on equal standing with the Army and Navy, with all three services under the political authority of the secretary of defense, a newly created position.

Initial Obstacles of the USAF

The new USAF faced a series of issues during the late 1940’s. The USAF’s first clash with the Soviet Union came during the Berlin airlift (1948-1949). Soviet forces, in an attempt to force the capitalist powers out of occupied Berlin, cut the city off from the outside world. Instead of resorting to force, President Truman ordered a massive airlift of supplies into the city. For a year, the USAF and Allied air forces kept Berlin supplied, although the mission seriously taxed the USAF’s transport capabilities.

The USAF also faced internal rivalries. With nuclear weapons dominating future war plans, the USAF received the majority of the limited postwar defense spending, forcing the reduction of Army and Navy units and the cancellation of several projects. The Navy, for example, had its first supercarrier, the USS United States, canceled to fund USAF expansion. The Army and Navy fought for budget funds by creating nuclear delivery systems of their own and by protecting their control over their own air assets (helicopters for the Army and aircraft carriers for the Navy).

The USAF also had to deal with technology issues. The USAF found it difficult to acquire aircraft because of the rapid evolution of aircraft technology. Jet engines became available at the end of World War II, rendering the USAF’s fleets of propeller-driven aircraft obsolete. Other wartime breakthroughs, such as in electronics, radar, and radical aircraft configurations, meant that aircraft might become obsolete within a few years of their construction and purchase.

The USAF also had problems creating a jet bomber that could deliver atomic bombs effectively. The massive B-36 Peacemaker, which dwarfed all wartime aircraft, needed a mix of six piston engines and four jet engines to get into the air. Although the aircraft had global range, its top speed of barely 400 miles per hour made it vulnerable to jet fighters.

Impact

The USAF continued to be a major element of American defense. Throughout the Cold War and into the twenty-first century, air power remained one of the deciding factors of nearly every military campaign. The ability to strike targets at long distances without involving large numbers of ground troops added flexibility to military operations. This flexibility required large numbers of diverse aircraft, but the USAF adapted to changing combat conditions.

Although originally organized to wage nuclear war, the USAF has taken on additional missions since the 1940’s. Its tactical aircraft still support U.S. ground operations, its fighter planes maintain control of vital airspace, and its transport aircraft supply U.S. forces around the world. When ballistic missile systems became the primary means of delivering nuclear weapons during the 1960’s, the USAF operated these new systems as replacements for nuclear-capable bombers. When the Space Age began, the USAF became responsible for monitoring U.S. defense interests in orbit as well.

Bibliography

Boyne, Walter G. Beyond the Wild Blue: A History of the United States Air Force, 1947-1997. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2007. Written by a career Air Force officer, the book is a good general history, although with a somewhat partisan slant.

Cherny, Andrei. The Candy Bombers: The Untold Story of the Berlin Airlift and America’s Finest Hour. New York: Putnam’s, 2008. An account of the USAF’s efforts to keep the Berlin crisis from escalating and of how dropping candy to Berlin children became a major public relations victory over the Soviets.

Coffey, Thomas M. Hap: The Story of the U.S. Air Force and the Man Who Built It, General Henry A. “Hap” Arnold. New York: Viking, 1982. A biography of the leading proponent of an independent Air Force, who led American air power in the European theater during World War II.

MacIssac, David. Strategic Bombing in World War II: The Story of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. New York: Garland, 1976. A well-researched account of the AAF’s study of the effectiveness of strategic bombing as justification for an independent air force.

Perret, Geoffrey. Winged Victory: The Army Air Forces in World War II. New York: Random House, 1993. A broad history of U.S. air operations in World War II, with comparisons of the application of air power in the European and Pacific theaters.