Analysis: Ambassador Lodge on the Worsening Situation
The analysis of the situation in South Vietnam during the early 1960s highlights Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.'s concerns about the escalating American involvement in the conflict and the deteriorating effectiveness of the South Vietnamese government led by President Ngo Dinh Diem. Lodge, newly appointed and candid in his assessments, reported that despite significant financial and military investment from the United States, the government's policies were alienating a large portion of the population, particularly the Buddhist majority. He emphasized the urgency for a change in leadership, suggesting that the current government's actions were counterproductive to American efforts to combat the communist insurgency led by the Viet Cong.
Lodge's perspective reflects the challenges faced by the United States in balancing support for an allied government while recognizing its failures. He warned that continued inaction could further empower the communists and lead to greater instability within South Vietnam. In his view, significant political change was necessary to align U.S. objectives with the interests and sentiments of the South Vietnamese people, advocating for a public stance that would signal a withdrawal of support for Diem without jeopardizing the welfare of the citizens. This analysis sheds light on the complexities of U.S. foreign policy decisions during a critical period in the Vietnam War.
Analysis: Ambassador Lodge on the Worsening Situation
Date: September 11, 1963
Author: Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
Genre: Report
Summary Overview
One month into his appointment as ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. sent another assessment of the situation there to President Kennedy, via the secretary of state. American involvement in Vietnam had been escalating during the past few years. Almost 15,000 military advisers were in the country, some of whom were participating in battles. The United States was putting more than a million dollars a day into supporting South Vietnam's government. Lodge wanted officials in Washington to know that these efforts were failing to produce positive results. Essentially, he called for a change in government, as President Ngo Dinh Diem had undertaken policies that were totally alienating the general population of South Vietnam. Most of the reports that were being sent to Washington from Vietnam were very optimistic because the authors did not want to seem to be failing. Lodge, who had just arrived and had been a political rival of Kennedy, had no qualms about being totally honest with him.
Defining Moment
In 1960, the communist forces in South Vietnam, known as the Viet Cong, organized across the country with help from North Vietnam. They became a more effective military force and were able to confront the forces of South Vietnam. Shortly after that, the ever-multiplying American military advisers, who previously were just advisers, began to take an active role on the battlefield. This greatly increased the investment that the United States was making in that country, in addition to the skyrocketing monetary costs of economic assistance. At the same time this pressure was being applied by the communists, President Diem was alienating 70 to 80 percent of South Vietnam's population, or those identifying as Buddhist. Diem and most of his close advisers were Catholic, and their policies were mainly directed toward the 20 to 30 percent of the population that was Catholic. This created discontent, which the communists could use to support their cause. Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, was in charge of security and had no compassion when dealing with average citizens. He viewed anyone who was not fully behind Diem as a communist, even though most were just disenchanted citizens. Most believed that if Diem continued these policies and his support of his brother, not only would his government fall, but South Vietnam would fall as well. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., was among those with this belief. This spurred him to write to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in order that the president and his cabinet might take the appropriate action.
Lodge made clear in this report that he understood the culture of ‘yes men.’ Having twice lost elections to Kennedy and being a Republican, Lodge understood that Kennedy had appointed him to the position because of the Lodge's experience at the United Nations. Kennedy wanted someone who would be honest about a situation that was becoming very tenuous. Although because of his own death, Kennedy ultimately did not make the decision to greatly expand the American commitment, and it was clear to him that very soon a decision would have to be made regarding American involvement in the struggle. From other documents, it is clear that Kennedy had lost faith in Diem, and this report by Lodge would have strengthened that view.
Author Biography
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (1902–1985) was born into an influential family in Massachusetts. After graduating from Harvard and working at a newspaper, he began his political career in 1933, winning election to the Massachusetts legislature. In 1936, he was elected to the US Senate, serving from 1937 to 1944 and 1947 to 1953. After having served one tour of duty in World War II, he had to choose between being in the army or the Senate. In 1944, he resigned from the Senate to undertake a second tour, winning several medals for distinguished service. Re-elected to the Senate, he helped convince Dwight Eisenhower to run for president and focused on Eisenhower's campaign, which resulted in Lodge losing his Senate seat to John F. Kennedy. He then served as ambassador to the United Nations until 1960, when he was the Republican vice-presidential candidate. He served as ambassador to South Vietnam and, later, to West Germany. His final position was as the US representative to the Vatican, from which he retired in 1977.
Document Analysis
Ambassador Lodge gets to the point quickly in his report to the secretary of state. The South Vietnamese government is declining in its ability to do anything positive. The dire situation cannot be rectified by the current government. A new government is needed and until then, the United States should figure out how to cut its foreign aid without hurting the people or the war effort; it is that simple and yet that complex. The United States had propped up the Diem government for eight years and, therefore, was closely identified with it. Officials in Washington needed to figure out how to meet this challenge: how could they support Vietnamese anticommunist efforts without supporting the government that had undertaken those actions. If Diem could fire his brother, Lodge thought, there might be hope for a substantial change within the current government. However, he does not believe that this is a real possibility. Lodge gives descriptive examples and an analysis of the deteriorating situation to help the Washington officials understand what he has come to know since his arrival in Vietnam the previous month.
Lodge calls for quick action to resolve the situation. As he states toward the end of the report, waiting and watching means that the United States will have to continue to prop up a failed government against the will of virtually all of the people in South Vietnam. Continued demonstrations against the government will play into the hands of the communists, and waiting will allow Diem to not only repress any demonstrators, but to imprison or kill anyone loyal to South Vietnam who might be seen as a threat to the regime. Inaction means losing potential allies when a new government is formed and having less influence with whomever becomes the new ruler. Lodge understands that it is essential for the United States to be able to work with the new government, if the anticommunist efforts are to succeed and the people of South Vietnam are to have any hope of a better life.
Lodge knew that Diem was not a true supporter of democracy, so that a change in government likely meant a coup. He comments that the “ship of state here is slowly sinking.” As a result, what is needed is the United States to cooperate with the right people—“to force drastic change in government.” He believes that the United States needs to take a very public stance showing its lack of support for Diem. Cutting aid and removing American dependents are both things that Lodge expects would have a “startling effect” on Diem, on the population of South Vietnam, and on observers around the world. He does not want America's withdrawal of support for the government to hurt the people, or to make America “hated all over the world.” But change is necessary. This needs to be communicated to those who might undertake the change, without hurting the programs in South Vietnam in which the United States has become involved.
Bibliography and Additional Reading
Blair, Anne E. Lodge in Vietnam: A Patriot Abroad. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995. Print.
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr. As It Was: An Inside View of Politics and Power in the ‘50s and ‘60s. New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1976. Print.
Logevall, Fredrik. Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. Print.
Miller, Edward. Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2013. Print.
“Vietnam, Diem, the Buddhist Crisis.” JFK in History. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, 2015. Web. <http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/Vietnam-Diem-and-the-Buddhist-Crisis.aspx>.