Analysis: CIA Memo on National Liberation Front Methods
The analysis of the methods used by the National Liberation Front (NLF) during the Vietnam War reveals a complex interplay between revolutionary tactics and the socio-political landscape of South Vietnam. The NLF, also known as the Viet Cong, sought to gain popular support among the South Vietnamese people by addressing their grievances against the repressive regime of Ngo Dinh Diem. This included initiatives such as land reform, education, and healthcare, which were strategically designed to improve living conditions and win the hearts and minds of the populace.
Despite these efforts, the United States, fearing the spread of communism, misinterpreted the situation as a direct communist threat rather than a civil conflict rooted in local discontent. This misreading led to increased American military involvement in support of the Diem government, which ultimately contributed to the escalation of the conflict. The dynamics of the NLF's operations highlighted not only their commitment to armed liberation but also their ability to present themselves as protectors of the people against a government they viewed as unjust.
The analysis indicates that the U.S. response to the NLF's grassroots strategies was heavily influenced by Cold War ideologies, leading to policies that often overlooked the nuances of Vietnamese culture and the realities on the ground, thereby complicating the pursuit of peace in the region.
Analysis: CIA Memo on National Liberation Front Methods
Date: November 29, 1963
Author: John A. McCone
Genre: memorandum
Summary Overview
One of the largest blunders made by American war planners in the years leading up the war in Vietnam was a near complete lack of understanding of not only Vietnamese culture, but also the deep resentment of the South Vietnamese government among the population. By late 1963, southern Vietnamese revolutionaries had already been for years working in towns and villages across the south to win popular support for their cause to put down the repressive regime of Ngo Dinh Diem. But fearful of the spread of communism, the United States took a position against the majority of the population in support of the Diem regime. In fact, one could argue that by entering what was essentially a civil war, the United States helped hasten the fall of the south to communism. In a memo commissioned by John A. McCone, then director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), for delivery to Dean Rusk, the secretary of state under both Kennedy and Johnson, American intelligence officers outlined the various methods used by the National Liberation Front (NLF) to ingratiate themselves to the South Vietnamese people. The document stands as a detailed analysis of all the NLF was doing to improve the lives of the people of the south, and serves to demonstrate the eagerness with which American officials sought to link southern revolutionaries to an international communist conspiracy.
Defining Moment
The strategy of “containment” as developed by American officials at the end of World War II, held that through the careful use of military force the spread of communism could be limited as not to overwhelm any single region. It was this idea that led to American intervention in the Korean Conflict, ultimately resulting in the creation of two distinct Koreas: a communist north and democratic south. After the French withdraw from Vietnam, the same approach was used in that country. Although neither north nor south wanted division, the Western powers meeting in Geneva separated the two along the seventeenth parallel. Vietnam, however, was very different from Korea. The weak, and often repressive regime of Ngo Dinh Diem in the south, standing in contrast to the popular and well-supported communist revolutionary movement of Ho Chi Minh in the north, instilled first resentment and then open revolt. What was in fact a civil and, in part, sectarian war in the south the West came to interpret as an attempted communist coup directed by the Soviet Union and China.
As the violence escalated, southern activists consolidated the various communist and noncommunist anti-Diem forces operating in the south into a single paramilitary force that came to be known as the National Liberation Front, or Viet Cong. These various groups, having operated across the south since the 1940s, had pushed through massive land reforms, seizing farmland from wealthy landlords and redistributing it to the poor. In 1960, the Diem government, in a move it hoped would weaken the Viet Cong, brought back landlords to the farms and villages, often violently ejecting people from land that they had farmed for over a decade. To make matters worse, these landlords then demanded the poor, and now landless farmers, to pay back rent for the years of use. Seeing an opportunity, Ho Chi Minh began to support southern guerrilla fighters and sent North Vietnamese forces into Laos to create supply routes into the south.
With the election of John F. Kennedy, the United States, still badly misunderstanding the realities on the ground, further tied itself to the Diem regime. Vice President Lyndon Johnson even went so far as to declare Diem “the Winston Churchill of Asia.” Among Diem's chief American supporters was John A. McCone, appointed director of the Central Intelligence Agency after the ousting of Allen W. Dulles following the Bay of Pigs. McCone believed, wrongly, that the Viet Cong had been agents of northern communists since the end of World War II and advocated for immediate American military involvement in support of the repressive Diem regime. When Diem was finally overthrown in early November of 1963, McCone bitterly objected to American support for the coup. He continued to advocate for greater American involvement, and although the information he and the CIA provided the Johnson administration did eventually lead to full American military intervention, McCone grew increasingly frustrated over what he considered a weak and feckless response to the communist takeover of Southeast Asia.
Author Biography
John Alexander McCone was born in California in 1902. Heir to an iron fortune, McCone attended the University of California at Berkeley, where he received a degree in mechanical engineering. Rising in private industry, he became an executive vice president at Consolidated Steel Corporation and, as a leading industrialist, served as an advisor for the Atomic Energy Commission. As his profile rose, McCone became ever more involved with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), until ultimately he was named as director following the resignation of Allen W. Dulles following the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961. A proponent of the use of force during the Cuban Missile Crisis, McCone was the mastermind behind numerous covert plots while director of the CIA, including the overthrow of several democratically elected governments. Opposed to the 1963 plot to overthrow Ngo Dinh Diem, McCone became increasingly disillusioned by the Johnson administration's involvement in Vietnam, until he finally resigned as director in 1965. McCone died in 1991.
Document Analysis
The memo, titled “Viet Cong Quasi-Governmental Activities,” is laid out into thirteen points, documenting the various ways in which forces of the National Liberation Front are trying to win the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese people. From the beginning, the memo makes clear that the strategy of the NLF is one of “armed liberation,” harking back to Mao Tse-Tung and Ho Chi Minh, the leaders of China and North Vietnam, respectively. These are communist tactics, at work since the 1940s, meant to win the support of South Vietnam's population, and take control of the region. The authority of the Viet Cong is limited, as in many regions where the NLF does not have complete control, communist forces can only conduct “hit and run” attacks.
Much of the intelligence, the memo continues, derives from captured Viet Minh documents, which outline efforts to improve the quality of life for the population, including education, medical care, and infrastructure. The Viet Cong are careful to treat the populace well in order to win them to their side. This is all done for propaganda purposes, by improving conditions for the peasantry of South Vietnam, the Viet Cong hope to turn the people against their government. As an example, the memo cites the NLF land reform program in which, the memo charges, middle-class farmers were forced to give their land to the poor. Perhaps aware that the evidence of such allegations is weak, the writer concedes that some modification to the policy must have occurred as many middle-class farmers have remained on their land and there appears to be little evidence of collectivization.
Food distribution, seed collecting, and sanitation improvements have all been implemented to turn the population. The Viet Cong has even set up schools to educate the poor, but, the writer assures their audience, the numbers of this programs success are surely exaggerated and used, it assumes, to spread communist propaganda. The writer does admit that many tribes in the region have been allowed autonomy, but this too, the writer assures their audience, is part of the same communist strategy. Most alarmingly, the Viet Cong appear to be setting up defenses and training the population in combat. The result is that the population now, mistakenly, considers the Viet Cong their protectors and cooperates with them in their efforts.
Bibliography and Additional Reading
Herring, George. America's Longest War. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996. Print.
McNamara, Robert & Brian VanDeMark. In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1995. Print.
VanDeMark, Brian. Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Print.