Analysis: Conversation between Presidents Nixon and Thiêu
The conversation between Presidents Richard Nixon and Nguyen Van Thiêu marked a pivotal moment in U.S.-Vietnam relations during the Vietnam War. Taking place on Midway Atoll in 1969, their meeting followed a significant shift in American policy toward Vietnam, particularly after the Tet Offensive and growing domestic opposition to the war. This dialogue aimed to clarify the implications of U.S. troop withdrawals for the South Vietnamese government and its sovereignty, as Nixon introduced the concept of "Vietnamization," which sought to transition military responsibilities to South Vietnam while still providing U.S. support.
During their discussion, both leaders emphasized the importance of presenting a united front to reassure one another of their alliance amidst concerns about the U.S. withdrawal potentially leading to South Vietnam's instability. Thiêu expressed his desire for a collaborative approach to ensure South Vietnamese military and political capabilities would be sufficient for self-defense. The meeting underscored the complexities of U.S. foreign policy at the time, which balanced domestic pressures with international commitments, as well as Thiêu's anxieties stemming from historical U.S. actions that had previously undermined Vietnamese leadership. Overall, this conversation illustrates the intricate dynamics of governance and diplomacy during a crucial period in Vietnam's history.
Analysis: Conversation between Presidents Nixon and Thiêu
Date: June 8, 1969
Author(s): Richard M. Nixon; Nguyen Van Thiêu; Henry Kissinger; Nguyen Phu Duc
Genre: discussion; meeting minutes
Summary Overview
Midway Atoll was the scene for two very important moments in United States history. It served as the location for both an important US naval victory in World War II over the Japanese in 1942 and also as the setting for the first official meeting between President Nixon and President Thiêu of South Vietnam in 1969. This memorandum reports the discussion between Nixon and Thiêu from the American perspective. In this conversation, Nixon and Thiêu discussed a radical change in US policy toward Vietnam since the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which gave the president authority to use whatever means he deemed necessary for the security of Southeast Asia. The United States would begin “phased withdrawals” of armed forces, but still provide support to South Vietnam through funds and advisors. Nixon subsequently called this process “Vietnamization.” The United States thus appeared to be faithful in promoting security in South Vietnam and in honoring domestic voices calling for the end of foreign military engagement.
Defining Moment
Support for the Vietnam War in the United States began to dramatically decrease in 1968 as no ostensible progress had been made in checking the advance of the North Vietnamese. At the start of the year, the North Vietnamese violated the truce to launch a surprise campaign, known as the Tet Offensive, which targeted military and civilian centers in South Vietnam. Both sides suffered tremendous casualties; the Tet Offensive also created thousands of new South Vietnamese refugees and crippled infrastructure. Faith in President Lyndon Johnson's leadership was another casualty of the Tet Offensive. Recognizing that his supporters had vanished, Johnson declined to run for reelection at the end of March.
Richard Nixon urged a more subtle approach to Vietnam in his 1968 presidential campaign, one that he hoped would satisfy both proponents and opponents of the war. In order to become president and enact his plan, Nixon needed the South Vietnamese to refrain from any hasty agreements in the peace talks. In speeches, Nixon painted the Democratic opponent Hubert Humphrey, the current vice president under Johnson, as sabotaging American interests by favoring compromise with the communists in North Vietnam. In reality, Nixon used Kissinger as his foreign envoy and Anna Chennault, a Chinese American citizen-diplomat, to convince President Thiêu in Saigon to delay the peace talks. A Nixon presidency, Thiêu was told, would result in a better bargain for South Vietnam.
Nixon's gambit paid off: in November 1968, President Thiêu announced that he opposed negotiations and the cessation of bombings over North Vietnam. Shortly thereafter, Nixon won the presidential election. However, President Thiêu and his government were left with some anxieties. Thiêu was uneasy because the United States had already abandoned his predecessor, Ngo Dinh Diem, to a coup (and assassination) in 1964. The South Vietnamese government questioned, too, how much US military intelligence knew about the Tet Offensive before it began; divided US advice concerning negotiations from both American political parties during an election year increased their insecurities. This memorandum records how presidents Nixon and Thiêu confirmed their alliance to the world in their first official meeting at Midway.
Author Biography
Richard M. Nixon won the United States presidency in 1968 on the promise that he had a plan to end the Vietnam War. As National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger worked with the president on this plan. The two men spent the next four years publically and privately working on an end to the conflict in a way that preserved US credibility. Kissinger eventually received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973 for his work in creating the Paris Peace Accords, although the provisions of this agreement had little effect in creating lasting peace. Nixon was credited with drawing down US participation in the war at the same time that he ramped up bombing and seemingly prolonged the war.
Nguyen Van Thiêu attended school in France before returning to Vietnam. Once there, he served briefly in the predominantly communist Viet Minh. Thiêu switched his allegiance to the French-backed army, continued to serve once the French withdrew, and eventually was part of a military junta in 1963 that overthrew President Ngo Dinh Diem. In 1967, Thiêu won the election to become the president of the Republic of Vietnam despite widespread claims of election rigging. Allegations of corruption and complacency tarnished Thiêu's tenure as president. Shortly before the fall of Saigon, Thiêu fled to Britain. Nguyen Phu Duc was the special assistant to the president in South Vietnam; he participated in many of the tense peace talks with Kissinger.
Document Analysis
The purpose of the meeting between the President Nixon and President Thiêu on Midway Island was to clarify what US de-escalation meant for South Vietnamese self-determination. After all, Nixon won the presidency by promising the American public that he would shift from the old policy of bombardment in Vietnam. What did this mean for the safety of President Thiêu's government? Soon after the conversation that this memorandum records, Nixon and Thiêu released a joint communiqué that announced American troop withdrawals publicly. Written from the US perspective, this memorandum verifies the communiqué released following the meeting that stated the United States and South Vietnam were still united. The United States would support South Vietnamese military and political decisions, but would not be chiefly responsible for them, a policy also known as the Nixon Doctrine.
The meeting begins with both sides assuring the other that they have similar interests and ought to present a united front. Nixon first tells Thiêu “self-determination is not only in the Vietnamese interest, but in the American interest as well.” Thiêu ought not heed reports claiming that there were differences between their administrations. Nixon's success at home is connected to Thiêu's survival: “U.S. domestic situation is a weapon in the war.” In turn, Thiêu assures Nixon that he “understood the difficulties of the President with a large army abroad” and he is aware that the US is not trying to replace South Vietnamese sovereignty with its own agenda.
Although both presidents reassured one another of their support, this memorandum also shows that Thiêu was hopeful that Vietnamization was not simply US abandonment. Military control, in Thiêu's perspective, had to support political control. South Vietnam needed to make progress in order to facilitate US withdrawal, and Thiêu could not affirm yet that his country was able to defend itself alone. The progress of the South Vietnamese army and the withdrawal of US forces needed to happen on a schedule that both countries agreed upon. The success of Vietnamization relied on this cooperation, yet Thiêu already shows that he has a difference of opinion with General Creighton Abrams, US commander of military operations in Vietnam. Thiêu wanted to focus on regional and popular forces in the country side rather than regular combat troops so he could “extend administrative control over 100% of the population.”
The US and South Vietnam also needed to agree on free elections. When Nixon questions Thiêu about elections, the South Vietnamese president quickly assures him that a free state needs political competition. Thiêu reiterates, however, that success will come from full support. “When we have a common position on our side,” says Thiêu, “we can have a united front.” Saigon could not be united if the US was not united: “the fear that the U.S. would withdraw support” caused consternation in Saigon. In order to prove to Thiêu that Vietnamization is not abandonment, Nixon quotes from General Pershing, an exemplary commander in the US military: “there are no tired divisions, only tired commanders.” Nixon's use of a paradigm of heroic leadership supports the premise that he considered the policy of de-escalation part of an honorable system of foreign policy.
Bibliography and Additional Reading
Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York: Penguin, 1991. Print.
Kimball, Jeffrey P. Nixon's Vietnam War. Lawrence, KS: U of Kansas, 1998. Print.
Kissinger, Henry. Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America's Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003. Print.
Nguyen, Phu Duc, & Arthur J. Dommen. The Viet-Nam Peace Negotiations: Saigon's Side of the Story. Christiansburg, VA: Dalley Book Service, 2005. Print.