Analysis: Fourteen-Part Message from Japan to the United States and Secretary Hull's Response
The "Fourteen-Part Message" from Japan to the United States, delivered by Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura in December 1941, represents a crucial moment in diplomatic history leading up to World War II. This message articulated Japan's grievances against the U.S., accusing it of supporting Japan's adversaries, particularly in China, and of conspiring with other nations like Great Britain against Japan's interests. It outlined Japan's desire for peace and proposed to negotiate an end to hostilities in exchange for certain concessions, including a promise to withdraw troops from French Indochina, contingent upon the resumption of U.S. oil exports. However, the U.S. response, articulated by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, rejected Japan's claims, labeling them as falsehoods and marking a definitive breakdown in diplomatic relations. The message and Hull’s reaction occurred just hours before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which catalyzed the U.S. entry into the war. This exchange highlights the complexities and tensions of international relations during a period of significant global upheaval, as both nations navigated competing interests and escalating conflict in East Asia.
Analysis: Fourteen-Part Message from Japan to the United States and Secretary Hull's Response
Date: December 7, 1941
Authors: Government of Japan; Cordell Hull
Genre: letter
Summary Overview
In 1941, the governments of the United States and Japan exchanged a series of messages that contained proposals for the cessation of hostilities in China, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific region. On December 7, 1941, Japan's ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura delivered this message to Secretary of State Cordell Hull. In the communication, Japan accused the United States of fueling conflict in the region by supporting Japan's enemies (specifically, the government of Chiang Kai-shek in China) and of intransigence in American policy. Furthermore, the Japanese accused the United States and its allies (particularly Great Britain) of conspiring against Japan. Therefore, the document concluded, the United States and Japan could no longer settle their differences through peaceful negotiations. At nearly the same time that Hull was entertaining the Japanese ambassador, Japanese fighter planes attacked the US naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, drawing the United States into World War II.
Defining Moment
The 1930s and early 1940s was a period of great global tumult. The Great Depression devastated the economies of the United States and Europe. In Germany, a new regime emerged under Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party, while Italy under Prime Minister Benito Mussolini invaded and occupied Ethiopia. Hitler's forces spread across Europe, while neither Russia nor the United States acted to prevent them.
In East Asia, a fully industrialized and militarized Japan took aim at China, its longtime rival. Although geographically expansive and filled with a wide range of natural resources, China was led by the polarizing Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang regime. In 1931, Japanese forces invaded Manchuria—citing the political disorder there as a threat to Japan's security interests—and set up a puppet government called Manchukuo. From this region, Japan expanded westward. Chiang had to battle two enemies—the Japanese and the growing Communist insurgency in China led by Mao Zedong. As China under the Kuomintang fractured, Japan moved inland, engaging the Kuomintang forces in a series of increasingly brutal battles.
Japan's expansion in East Asia was not confined to China. In 1940, Japanese troops attacked and occupied Dutch Indochina, increasing Emperor Hirohito's sphere of influence. Japan's moves in Southeast Asia changed the US government's approach from mostly rhetorical to geopolitically active, as President Franklin D. Roosevelt imposed a ban on oil exports to Japan. Without American petroleum, Japan could not continue its expansion. In September 1940, Japan entered into the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. Hirohito and General Hideki Tojo (who had become prime minister), prepared Japan's forces for war against the United States.
Meanwhile, US and Japanese diplomats hurried back and forth in a fruitless attempt to negotiate a settlement in the conflict. Consistent throughout the diplomatic exchange, the US position was that Japan must withdraw from China and halt its hostilities. According to many historians, the Japanese leadership (including Ambassador Nomura) was expecting some sort of compromise that would allow for Japan to maintain some presence in the territory it had acquired. Meanwhile, Roosevelt, along with Secretary of State Hull, was concerned that any compromise in negotiations would amount to appeasement. Eventually, special envoy Saburo Kurusu joined Nomura in an effort to earn a US compromise, but the US government rebuffed them when Japan refused to comply with US demands. On December 7, 1941, Nomura and Kurusu returned to Hull with a fourteen-point statement that essentially served as an ultimatum to the United States.
Document Analysis
The message delivered by the Japanese ambassador to Secretary of State Hull made it clear that Japan considered the United States and Great Britain to be its enemies. The message accuses the United States of being inflexible and intransigent with regard to negotiations with Japan. The message also asserts that the United States has conspired against Japan with Chiang Kai-shek's government in China. Thus, the message states, Japan could no longer peaceably negotiate with the United States regarding the ongoing conflict in East Asia and the Pacific—comments that suggest Japan's intent to pursue its interests in Asia through military means. Meanwhile, Hull's brief response dismisses Japan's message as filled with “infamous falsehoods and distortions.”
Commonly referenced as the “Fourteen-Part Message,” the Japanese correspondence represents the final attempt by the Japanese to negotiate the cessation of hostilities and tensions in Asia. The memorandum begins by stating Japan's desire to work with the US government to ensure peace in the region. The document identifies Japan as a key figure in ensuring the stability of East Asia and promotes itself as an advocate for regional peace.
However, the document continues, the “China Affair”—which Japan argued was the fault of Chiang's government—has been exacerbated by the Chinese government and influenced by the US and British governments. The message acknowledges that Japan had signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, implying that the three countries collectively opposed the United States and its allies.
The message further states that the United States is engaged in a conspiracy (with Great Britain) to undermine Japan's efforts to “insure the stability of East Asia” and to interfere politically in China and the former Dutch and French West Indies. The Japanese argue that the United States and Great Britain have frozen exports to Japan in order to influence the region.
Despite such barriers to good will and peace, the Japanese letter reads, Japan still wants to negotiate. To this end, the memorandum states, Japan has put forth a series of mutually beneficial proposals. The latter of the proposal packages promises that Japan would remove its troops from French Indochina if the United States agrees to resume petroleum exports. However, the Japanese allege, every proposal offered to the United States has been rejected. The letter also argues that the United States has incited the world community by attempting to keep Japan out of the Tripartite Pact. With the United States both unwilling to negotiate with Japan and acting in direct opposition to Japan's interests, the document says, Japan can no longer proceed toward a diplomatic settlement.
Shortly after receiving this memorandum, Secretary of State Hull offered a brief and scathing oral response. He expresses dismay at the Japanese position. During the nine months of negotiations, Hull insists, he and other representatives of the US government have been transparent and honest. He decries the document as fraught with “infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them.” Hull's brief comment brought the diplomacy between the United States and Japan to an abrupt close and immediately preceded the beginning of armed conflict between the two countries.
Glossary
multilateral: having several sides; participated in by more than two nations, parties, etc.
Nine Power Treaty: a 1922 treaty, part of the Open Door Policy, which confirms China's sovereignty and territories; signed on February 6, 1922 by the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, the Republic of China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal.
Bibliography and Additional Reading
Friedrich, Otto, and Anne Hopkins. “Down but Not Out.” Time 2 Dec. 1991: 48–57. Print.
Iguchi, Takeo. “A Reinvestigation of Japan's Final Memorandum to the United States and the Decoding of Roosevelt's Message to the Emperor, December, 1941.” Journal of American–East Asian Relations 18.2 (2011): 117–41. Print.
Minohara, Tosh. “Japanese Black Chamber: The History of Prewar Japanese Cryptanalysis and Its Impact on Policy Decisions.” Conference Papers. Intl. Studies Assn., 2006. Web. 15 Oct. 2014.
“The US-Japan War Talks.” Japan Center for Asian Historical Records. Japan Center for Asian Hist. Records, 2005. Web. 15 Oct. 2014.
“World War II Time Line.” National Geographic. Natl. Geographic Society, 2001. Web. 15 Oct. 2014.
Wu, Lin-Chun. “One Drop of Oil, One Drop of Blood: The United States and the Petroleum Problem in Wartime China, 1937–1945.” Journal of American–East Asian Relations 19.1 (2012): 27–51. Print.