Analysis: General Westmoreland on Military Operations
The military operations in Vietnam during the 1960s, particularly under the leadership of General William C. Westmoreland, are critical to understanding the complexities of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. As the chief commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command—Vietnam (MACV), Westmoreland's reports reflected a pivotal moment in the conflict, characterized by a significant increase in American ground troops and a shift in strategy from advisory roles to active combat. He anticipated a "new phase" in military operations, believing that enhanced troop levels and advanced military technology would lead to greater success against the communist forces, who he acknowledged remained resilient and determined.
Westmoreland's insights were framed within broader military and political contexts, including efforts to stabilize the Republic of Vietnam and support its government through socio-political initiatives like "revolutionary development." This dual focus on military action and nation-building aimed to win the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese people while countering enemy influence. However, despite some tactical successes, Westmoreland recognized that the situation was precarious, with public opinion in the U.S. becoming increasingly divided and calls for negotiation growing louder. His assessments provide a nuanced view of the challenges faced by military leaders during a tumultuous period in Vietnam's history, reflecting both optimism for progress and a sobering acknowledgment of the ongoing conflict's complexities.
Analysis: General Westmoreland on Military Operations
Date: August 26, 1966
Author: William C. Westmoreland
Genre: report
Summary Overview
General William C. Westmoreland wrote this report to be included as part of an extensive memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. As chief commander of the US Military Assistance Command—Vietnam (MACV), Westmoreland was the highest ranking military officer in Vietnam. In this report, he summarized the current strength of enemy forces, the status of US military operations, and his plans for going forward in the next several months. Westmoreland believed that US operations in Vietnam were on the verge of a “new phase,” where the buildup of US forces, combined with continued air support and the use of the best military technology, would lead to greater success than had been the case in the past. However, he was guarded in his optimism and admitted that the communist forces were a formidable enemy that was resolute and highly motivated to maintain their military resistance.
Defining Moment
Westmoreland became commander of MACV in June 1964. The first US ground combat troops came to Vietnam in the spring of 1965, followed by substantially larger forces the following summer. In this report, written a little over a year later, Westmoreland addressed what he believed had been accomplished and what the prospects for the immediate future might be.
The immediate context of this report involved a massive study undertaken by the Army on the course of the war. The chief of staff of the Army, General Harold K. Johnson, had ordered this study, which was completed in March 1966. The study, which ran to over 900 pages, was known as “A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam,” usually referred to by the acronym PROVN. Westmoreland's document, which was a top-secret cable sent from Vietnam, was an attachment to a summary of the PROVN study that was sent from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. In the introduction to the PROVN study, Army staffers had argued that the situation in South Vietnam had “seriously deteriorated” and that 1966 might be the last chance the US had to rectify the situation and achieve eventual success. Many of the military and political leaders of that time, in retrospect, saw this period in a similar light. The commitment of large numbers of US ground combat troops had changed the nature of the war; US troops were no longer simply advising and assisting South Vietnamese forces, but were now doing much of the fighting themselves.
Building up the logistical support for such a large number of troops had taken time, but by the summer of 1966, American forces were undertaking large-scale missions with some success. Westmoreland wrote that the war was entering a “new phase” and many at the time agreed. But in the long run, these signs of progress were misleading. As Westmoreland admitted in this document, the enemy's resolve did not seem to be weakening. As American troop levels were raised, the enemy matched the numbers. The attempts to build a stable government in the Republic of Vietnam that had the support of its own people proved futile. At home, public opinion became more sharply divided over the war, and the number of people who supported negotiations to end the war was growing. Even some members of Johnson's own administration were losing hope that the war could be brought to an acceptably positive conclusion any time soon.
Author Biography
William C. Westmoreland was born in Saxon, South Carolina, on March 26, 1914. After graduating from The Citadel, a state-supported military college in Charleston, South Carolina, he attended the US Military Academy at West Point. During World War II, he served in the campaigns for North Africa, Sicily, and Italy. During the Korean War, where he commanded an airborne unit, he was promoted to Brigadier General. He was the commandant of West Point from 1960 to 1963. In January 1964, he was sent to Vietnam to serve as a deputy under General Paul D. Harkins of Military Assistance Command (MACV), and subsequently, he succeeded Harkins in that position. He was promoted to General (four-star rank) on August 1, 1964. In the spring of 1968, Westmoreland was appointed chief of staff of the US Army. He retired from the Army in 1972. In 1982, he filed a libel suit against CBS concerning a documentary that charged that Westmoreland had deliberately understated enemy strength in Vietnam, but withdrew the suit when CBS agreed to issue a clarifying statement. Westmoreland died in a retirement home in Charleston, South Carolina, on July 18, 2005.
Document Analysis
In this memo, General Westmoreland reviewed the military situation in Vietnam as it related to the “overall effort” of US forces there. US goals in Vietnam were not strictly military; there were social and political missions as well—to help the Republic of Vietnam establish a stable internal government with the support of its own people. One of the methods used to pursue this goal was often labelled “revolutionary development and nation building.” These terms referred to efforts to pacify the civilian population of South Vietnam and to dissuade them from supporting the communist forces. These efforts also included constructing needed infrastructure so that the people could see benefits from supporting their government. Westmoreland believed these missions were important, but also noted that they could not succeed without sustained military progress. As more US and “Free World” forces entered the war, Westmoreland envisioned that ARVN forces (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) could shift to the work of revolutionary development. “Free World” forces refers to other nations involved in Vietnam, such as substantial numbers of troops from Australia and the Republic of Korea (South Korea).
Westmoreland described a number of tactical missions that US forces had been involved in and would continue throughout the rest of 1966 and into the following year. These tactics included a number of defensive and offensive measures. In the early days of the buildup of US forces, much effort was devoted to providing the logistical support needed for such a large number of troops and for the defense of US bases and of large civilian population centers. As the US forces were more firmly established, more offensive operations were undertaken, specifically, attacks on known enemy bases or large concentrations of troops. Involving both ground troops and large-scale air support, these “spoiling attacks” were designed to disrupt planned enemy offensives and represented efforts to deny the enemy access to key resources, such as rice. Westmoreland summarized the US efforts as consisting of two main tasks: defeating the enemy forces through offensive operations and supporting the government of the Republic of Vietnam in gaining the support of the population through programs such as revolutionary development. While Westmoreland's report exhibits an overall tone of can-do-it optimism, he also realistically assessed the enemy's tenacity and resolve to resist.
Attached to Westmoreland's report was a statement of support from Henry Cabot Lodge, the American ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam. Lodge seconded the connection between military operations and revolutionary development; offensive operations against the enemy would provide the security for revolutionary development programs to be pursued.
Bibliography and Additional Reading
Birtle, Andrew J. “PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal.” The Journal of Military History 72.4 (October 2008): 1213–1247.
Carland, John M. “Winning the Vietnam War: Westmoreland's Approach in Two Documents.” The Journal of Military History 68.2 (April 2004): 553–574.
Sorley, Lewis. Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011.
Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976.
Zaffiri, Samuel. Westmoreland: A Biography of General William C. Westmoreland. New York: William Morrow, 1994.