Analysis: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident was a pivotal event in the escalation of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam during the 1960s. Following the withdrawal of French colonial forces in 1954, the United States positioned itself as a protector of the pro-Western South Vietnamese government in the face of threats from communist North Vietnam and internal guerilla fighters known as the Viet Cong. The incident involved reported attacks on U.S. naval destroyers, USS Maddox and USS Turner Joy, by North Vietnamese forces in August 1964. President Lyndon B. Johnson, despite dubious evidence regarding the unprovoked nature of these attacks, swiftly sought congressional approval for military action, leading to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which empowered him to take necessary measures to defend American interests in Southeast Asia.
This resolution, which passed with overwhelming support, framed the conflict as part of a larger battle against communism during the Cold War. The aftermath of the incident marked a significant turning point, as it set the stage for increased American military presence and direct involvement in the Vietnam War. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident exemplifies how international relations and domestic politics can intertwine, influencing decisions that have far-reaching consequences. Understanding this event provides insight into the complexities of U.S. foreign policy and the historical context of the Vietnam War.
Analysis: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident
Date: August 4–7, 1964
Author/s: Lyndon B. Johnson and United States Congress
Genre: speech; address
Summary Overview
After the defeat of the French colonial forces in 1954, the United States became the guarantor of security for the pro-Western government of South Vietnam, which was threatened not only by the government and army of communist North Vietnam, but by pro-communist guerilla fighters among their own people. In August 1964, two American destroyers, USS Maddox and USS Turner Joy, were conducting intelligence-gathering operations off the coast of North Vietnam, in the Gulf of Tonkin, when they were reportedly attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. Though he claimed the American ships were in international waters rather than being close to the North Vietnamese coast, and though he was aware that the evidence for the attacks being unprovoked was dubious, President Lyndon B. Johnson wasted no time in presenting a resolution to Congress seeking to defend American interests in the region by any means the president deemed necessary and proper.
Defining Moment
After their defeat at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the French colonial army left Southeast Asia, and the Vietnamese nationalist and communist leader, Ho Chi Minh, declared an independent Vietnam. However, the peace conference held at Geneva, Switzerland, divided the country into two halves, with Ho Chi Minh's nationalists in the north and a corrupt, but pro-Western, government under President Ngo Dinh Diem in the south, with elections to reunify the country scheduled for 1956. Diem, however, refused to hold the elections, establishing a dictatorship in South Vietnam. The ensuing years saw the rapid growth of the Viet Cong: nationalists living in the south, but supportive of a unified Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh's leadership. By 1960, the Viet Cong had the official support of the government and armed forces of North Vietnam.
Diem's popularity among his own people (who were overwhelmingly Buddhist, while Diem was Catholic) faded during the early 1960s, and when a Buddhist monk set himself on fire in Saigon in June 1963, many South Vietnamese turned against him. A coup d'état, supported by the CIA, overthrew Diem on November 1, 1963, and he was assassinated the next day. With the upheaval in South Vietnam and the continued growth of the Viet Cong with material support from North Vietnam, the US government was more committed than ever to preventing the North Vietnamese from unifying the country under communist rule. As this was in the midst of the Cold War, American policy was heavily influenced by the so-called Domino Theory, which stated that if one country were to be allowed to fall to communism it would only lead to more and more communist uprisings throughout the region.
During the early 1960s, President John F. Kennedy began to increase American aid to South Vietnam, sending large amounts of military hardware and, beginning in 1961, American military advisors. By the end of 1962, the number of military advisors had increased to 12,000, and American helicopter crews began flying missions in the country. By the time of Kennedy's assassination in November 1963, about 16,700 American military advisors were in South Vietnam, though he remained opposed to direct American involvement in combat operations.
By the summer of 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson, who advocated a more proactive American role in protecting the independence of South Vietnam, was increasing American military presence both in South Vietnam and in the waters off the coast of both North and South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese military had proven no more able to stabilize the country than had Diem, and Johnson was convinced that only the American military and American intelligence efforts would be able to prevent the North Vietnamese from taking over.
Author Biography
President Lyndon B. Johnson and the vast majority of the members of the United States Congress shared a common vision of the world order in some of the tensest years of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States. Every conflict was viewed in the context of the geopolitical struggle between the superpowers, and Vietnam is perhaps the greatest example of this. Rather than seeing it as a fight between Vietnamese nationalists and French colonizers or pro-Western Vietnamese, the American government as a whole viewed the conflict as a simple matter of communism vs. anti-communism. Any actions taken by the United States in Vietnam were taken to prevent not only Vietnam from becoming a communist nation, and thus, a Soviet puppet state, but also to prevent all of Southeast Asia from falling to a series of communist uprisings.
Document Analysis
On August 2, 1962, the USS Maddox, an American naval destroyer, was reportedly attacked with torpedoes by a number of small North Vietnamese patrol boats in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of North Vietnam. A second encounter, including the Maddox and a second American destroyer, the USS Turner Joy, was reported two days later. On the date of the second attack President Lyndon B. Johnson went on television to inform the American public of the incidents and to recommend immediate reprisals, including a bombing campaign to be carried out by the Air Force.
Behind the actions in the Gulf of Tonkin, however, was a determination reached by the Johnson administration by August 1964 that the only way to prevent a North Vietnamese takeover of South Vietnam was direct American military action. American surveillance, such as that being carried out in North Vietnamese waters by ships like the Maddox and Turner Joy, revealed large amounts of supplies and personnel flowing from the north to the south. However, when the incidents on August 2 and August 4 were reported to the American public, no mention was made of this or the fact that the actions did not take place in international waters. As it turned out, the attack on the Turner Joy may have never taken place at all.
Johnson's response to the attacks was to inform the American public and immediately call for Congress to authorize the use of force to defend American military installations in Southeast Asia. This led to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which passed House of Representatives unanimously and the Senate with only two opposing votes.
Rather than viewing the conflict in Vietnam as an internal civil war, the resolution put the actions in stark, Cold War terms, declaring that “these attackers are part of deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom”. It authorized President Johnson “to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.” Johnson's television address had the desired effect, at least for the time being, in that it gave the American people and the Congress a tangible reason to support American military involvement in Vietnam.
Bibliography and Additional Reading
Caputo, Philip. A Rumor of War. New York: Holt, 1999.
MacLear, Michael. Vietnam: The Ten Thousand Day War. Toronto: Methuen, 1981. Print.
Sheehan, Neil. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New York: Vintage Books, 1988. Print.
Siff, Ezra Y. Why the Senate Slept: The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the Beginning of America's Vietnam War. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999. Print.