Analysis: Memo from Ambassador Durbrow to Diem
The memo from Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow to South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1960 highlights the escalating challenges faced by Diem's government amid growing Viet Cong insurgency. As the Viet Cong began to assert control over significant territories, public dissatisfaction with Diem's leadership intensified, particularly due to his administration's failure to address the needs and concerns of the South Vietnamese populace. Durbrow sought to address these issues by proposing a series of reforms aimed at increasing the democratic nature of the government, improving agricultural policies, and reducing public discontent. His recommendations included restructuring government appointments to prioritize competence, allowing for greater press freedom, and enabling local elections, which could help bridge the gap between the government and the people. Durbrow's approach reflected the United States' broader strategy of containing communism through support for Diem while stressing that the latter's alienation of the populace undermined this goal. Ultimately, the memo illustrated the complexities of U.S.-Vietnam relations during a critical period, as Durbrow's candid suggestions met resistance and marked a turning point in diplomatic relations. The context sheds light on the broader implications of governance and public sentiment in the fight against communism during the Vietnam War era.
Analysis: Memo from Ambassador Durbrow to Diem
Date: October 14, 1960
Author: Elbridge Durbrow
Genre: report
Summary Overview
The year 1960 was a time of deteriorating conditions for South Vietnam and its president, Ngo Dinh Diem. It began with the first major successful attacks by the Viet Cong, or communist forces in the south, as they took control of extensive parts of the Mekong Delta. Although the South Vietnamese army eventually took back the territory, throughout that year, the Viet Cong would capture areas and then fade away rather than take large casualties. Publically, Diem gave optimistic reports of successful operations, generally with altered casualty reports.
Much of the non-communist population of South Vietnam was losing faith in Diem. In September, Durbrow had reported that this had created a two-fold threat against Diem, one communist and the other non-communists. As early as April 1960, Durbrow had asked permission to confront Diem regarding his treatment of the South Vietnamese people. Finally, in October, Durbrow was given permission to confront Diem with a series of suggestions that he and the Eisenhower administration hoped would create a better government, help unify the country, and strengthen its fight against the communists. Essentially, Durbrow was reminding Diem that, in 1954, Eisenhower had promised to support him (Diem) only if he worked to create a democracy in South Vietnam.
Defining Moment
Even though the Viet Cong did not organize nationally until December 1960, since the beginning of the year, regional groups had begun successfully pressing a guerilla-style military campaign against Diem's government. At that time, the Viet Cong never had more than 15,000 soldiers, compared to the South Vietnamese army of almost 150,000 regular and 100,000 reserve troops. Given this disparity, the Viet Cong were doing much better than would have been expected. Diem tried to reorganize his forces, including establishing his own commando units. However, officers were still appointed based on political rather than military considerations.
Similarly, Diem's administration was composed of relatives, friends, and allies, without regard to their skills in running a government. Domestically, Diem failed to understand the needs of the people. In trying to control rural areas, Diem alienated many people by forcing them to construct and move to “agrovilles”—hastily organized villages—with no compensation. This was supposed to be a means of protecting them, but in reality, it was primarily intended as a way to more effectively control the people. The operation proved so unpopular that Diem eventually was forced to discontinue it. Watching events unfold, President Eisenhower stated in May 1960 that Diem was “blind” to the needs of the people of South Vietnam. American aid was neither helping the general population nor being effectively used to combat the communists.
As the official witnessing this ongoing catastrophe, Ambassador Durbrow was greatly concerned. A career foreign service diplomat, he understood that criticizing the domestic policy of another country placed him on shaky ground. However, his concern for the people, as well as his desire not to waste American resources, drove him to request permission to confront Diem regarding the situation in South Vietnam. In mid-September, he requested permission to have a “frank and friendly” discussion with Diem regarding changes that needed to be made. The document reprinted here is the official message that Durbrow delivered to Diem. After this discussion, Durbrow reported to the State Department that Diem had listened intently, but made very few comments. Indeed, it seems that this initial confrontation caused alienation between the Diem regime and the United States. A few days later, in a meeting with Durbrow and visiting diplomats, Durbrow mentioned the “snide” comments that Diem had made on some of these issues. When some junior offices attempted a coup in November, Diem falsely accused Durbrow of supporting them. As a result of Durbrow's presenting his list of issues to Diem, what had been a close relationship came to an end.
Author Biography
Elbridge Durbrow (1903–1997) was a career diplomat serving from 1930 to 1968. He was born in San Francisco, California, and earned his bachelor's degree at Yale University. He had further studies at five schools, two in the United States (Stanford University, University of Chicago), two in France, and one in the Netherlands. From 1930 until 1941, he served in Europe. From 1941 until 1946, he was in Washington in the Eastern European division. He then spent two years in Moscow and two years at the National War College before being posted to Italy. In March 1957, he was appointed ambassador to Vietnam, serving until April 1961. He then was appointed to serve with NATO, followed by a return to the National War College. After retirement, he served as chairman of the American Foreign Policy Institute and other organizations.
Document Analysis
Ever since Ngo Dinh Diem gained power in 1954, the United States had supported his leadership in South Vietnam. Durbrow begins by reminding Diem that the United States is responsible for providing his military strength. Then Durbrow talks about the failure of the Diem government to be truly open and at least somewhat democratic. His suggestions are an implicit criticism of Diem and his policies, but are presented as a means toward achieving the shared goal of stopping communist advances. Durbrow points out the need to have individuals in positions where they can do the most to help the people, rather than where they or Diem desire them to be. Durbrow discusses the agricultural policies of the South Vietnamese government, including the agroville policy that was widely despised by the rural population. Focusing on South Vietnamese domestic concerns rather than on anti-communist operations, Durbrow moves boldly into areas that the United States had previously been reticent to address. Durbrow believes that if Diem implements these suggestions, he will become a stronger leader and regain the support of the people in the battle against communism.
The containment of communism was the reason the United States was involved in Vietnam. It was a goal about which the government of South Vietnam and the United States were in complete agreement. In his presentation to Diem, however, Durbrow discusses this topic only passingly. His concern is that Diem is losing ground to the communists not just on the battlefield, but in the hearts of the people. By alienating the general population, Diem, says Durbrow, effectively encourages people to be receptive to communist leaders and their ideas. The ambassador points out several areas in which the government is not working effectively. He wants Diem to shuffle his cabinet to get rid of those who are not able to meet the demands of their offices and bring in others who can help key programs to succeed.
Related to creating a better government, Durbrow pushes for some basic democratic reforms. Allowing the newspapers some freedom is one suggestion. Having local leaders elected, rather than appointed by the central government, is an additional step. As a check on the possible abuse of power, he suggests that the legislature actually be given power, including the power to review the actions of the executive branch. Having those in government be open about their sources of income is one way Durbrow hopes to reduce corruption by those in office. While, if followed scrupulously, the suggestions that the ambassador makes would transform Diem's government, Durbrow is not pushing for South Vietnam to become a full-blown Western democracy; rather, he seeks only to see some movement in that direction.
Point 9 in Durbrow's memo represents an attempt to help Diem become more popular in the rural areas. This is where the Viet Cong made great inroads. When Diem first came to power, one of his earliest moves was to follow American advice to limit the rent that could be charged tenant farmers. The recommendations that Durbrow delivers to Diem include the idea of helping to improve the standard of living for farmers and others in rural areas. Fair wages for rural government workers, government assistance to those producing rice, and a futures system aimed at stabilizing crop prices are widely accepted ideas elsewhere. These types of policies would, according to Durbrow, increase rural support for Diem, making it harder for the communists to operate in those areas.
Bibliography and Additional Reading
“Interview with Eldridge Durbrow, 1979.” Open Vault. WGBH Educational Foundation, 2015. Web. <http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/vietnam-078fff-interview-with-eldridge-durbrow-1979-part-1-of-2>.
Jacobs, Seth. Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America's War in Vietnam, 1950–1963. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006. Print.
Ladenburg, Thomas. “Sink or Swim, with Ngo Dinh Diem.” Digital History. University of Houston, 2007. Web.
Miller, Edward. Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013.
US Department of State. “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I.” Office of the Historian. US Department of State, 2015. Web.