Analysis: A New Approach to Retaliation

Date: February 7, 1965

Author: McGeorge Bundy

Genre: memorandum

Summary Overview

Today we know that many of escalation's greatest champions within the United States government, secretly harbored doubts about America's chances at victory in Vietnam, chief among them McGeorge Bundy, national security advisor to both presidents Kennedy and Johnson. An influential policy maker, often referred to as one of the “wise men” of the White House, Bundy was one of the staunchest hawks in both administrations. He pushed relentlessly for greater action against North Vietnam, all the while realizing fully that greater engagement might mean disaster. For this reason, Bundy's memo of February 1965 is especially illuminating. Outlining a strategy of sustained military reprisals against North Vietnam, Bundy all but confirms that the war in Vietnam is not about Vietnam at all, but greater gains internationally and domestically. American lives could be and would be lost, but, on the whole, those losses were acceptable, even beneficial. The memorandum stands as a shocking indictment of not just the war, but the men who conceived it.

Defining Moment

By the latter half of 1964, thousands of American “military advisors” had already been deployed in South Vietnam, and the United States Navy patrolled the waters beyond. As violence in the south spread, spurred on by an ever more repressive government, and as tension with North Vietnam increased, policy makers within the White House, led primarily by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, were putting greater and greater pressure on President Lyndon Baines Johnson to act. The longtime Texas Democrat, although committed to keeping America's pledge to preserve a communist-free South Vietnam, was apprehensive about sending American troops into Southeast Asia. Johnson's fear was that, like the French, American forces would be unable to adequately fight against an entrenched guerrilla force, resulting in a prolonged quagmire and the loss of thousands of American lives. Then, in August 1964, the USS Maddox, on an intelligence mission in the Gulf of Tonkin, reportedly fired on North Vietnamese torpedo boats that had allegedly fired upon the Maddox first. A second report of attack and counterattack came in two days later. Although it became clear within military and intelligence circles that no outright North Vietnamese attack had occurred, the hawks in the Johnson administration used the event, which came to be known as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, to rally the nation to war.

Some evidence suggests that even Johnson himself was misled, although to what extent remains unclear. Nonetheless, within days, Congress passed a resolution empowering the president to conduct military operations in Southeast Asia. The authorization, left purposefully vague, allowed foreign policy planners to essentially wage war without a declaration of war. Within months, memos and policy statements started circulating throughout the White House, recommending various kinds of military operations, including a sharp increase in ground troops and a prolonged bombing campaign against the North. Among the memos that were produced that winter, was a call to action from National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy. Bundy argued for what he called sustained reprisals against the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces operating in the South. Memos such as this one not only helped to push Johnson to action, but also defined the uneven, at times counterproductive American policy. More importantly, these memos helped demonstrate that policy makers working within the White House were very willing to sacrifice American lives for the sake of political achievements.

Author Biography

McGeorge “Mac” Bundy was born in Boston in 1919. The second son of a wealthy and politically well-connected family, Bundy attended two prestigious prep schools before going on to Yale, where he received a degree in mathematics. After World War II, Bundy went to work for the Council of Foreign Relations, where he was involved in various intelligence related programs focused on anti-Soviet efforts. After a stint as dean at Harvard University, Bundy was appointed national security advisor by John F. Kennedy in 1961. In his role at the White House, Bundy was crucial to events such as the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and of course the Vietnam War. In 1966, Bundy became president of the Ford Foundation and, in 1979, returned to teaching at New York University. In his later years, Bundy became an influential in helping to mold American nuclear policy. He died in 1996.

Document Analysis

The main thrust of Bundy's memo is a strategy he outlines for “sustained reprisal against North Vietnam.” In some way loosely based on the perceived events surrounding the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, the notion is that American military forces will only respond to the hostile actions of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. This was in some ways also reflective of Johnson's insistence on achieving, rather paradoxically, peace through force. The policy as outlined would be adopted in cooperation with the government of South Vietnam. In practice, the sustained reprisal would essentially force American military planners to grade hostile incidents, thus determining which ones required a response and which ones did not. The assassination of a South Vietnamese official might garner retaliation, for example, while the indiscriminant killing of villagers might not. Propaganda would serve a necessary function, as every act of reprisal would have to be closely linked with an act of violence perpetrated by the North Vietnamese. The idea would be that the general public, both within and outside of Vietnam, would be able to perceive clear linkages between action and reaction.

Bundy points out that the best possible way to justify reprisal is to stress the strategy as one of last resort. It is the North Vietnamese who have forced the United States into this position. Reprisal would most often take the form of strategic bombing of the North, thus it is also vital to destroy whatever air combat capabilities the North Vietnamese might possess as quickly as possible. To work effectively, reprisal would need to go on without pause. Sustained, deliberate, military action must be maintained. The results of this policy? The immediate effect would be a shift in perception and loyalty toward the American side. The South Vietnamese people, having had few options outside the Viet Cong, would recognize that they now had a powerful ally on their side. For the United States, the payoff would be even greater. Win or lose, Bundy stresses, the effect for the United States would be ultimately positive, as America would demonstrate both its strength and resolve to the larger international community. Even if the military failed in pacifying the enemy, the political gains are simply too good to abandon. In the best case scenario, communist forces would become demoralized and eventually give up the fight, but again, this is a perk, rather than a clear objective. In the end, Bundy proposes nine action recommendations to be carried out immediately in order to begin implementation of the policy. Most of these, tellingly, emphasize the need to shape perception.

Bibliography and Additional Reading

Bird, Kai. McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy: Brothers in Arms. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999. Print.

Herring, George. America's Longest War. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996. Print.

McNamara, Robert & Brian VanDeMark. In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1995. Print.

VanDeMark, Brian. Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Print.