Analysis: "No Attractive Course of Action"
The analysis of "No Attractive Course of Action" centers on a pivotal moment in the Vietnam War, reflecting Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s concerns about escalating American military involvement. In a memorandum addressed to President Lyndon B. Johnson, McNamara critiques requests from military commanders for troop increases, suggesting that such a surge would not change the grim realities on the ground. Despite acknowledging some military successes, he expresses skepticism about the effectiveness of additional troops in addressing the complex challenges posed by the conflict, particularly the resilience of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces.
McNamara contrasts the growing discontent among the American public regarding the war with the determined stance of North Vietnam, indicating that simply increasing troop numbers would not satisfy the populace's demand for a decisive outcome. His analysis reveals a duality in the conflict, distinguishing between the conventional "big war" against the North Vietnamese Army and the more insidious challenges posed by the Viet Cong. Ultimately, he warns that the war is gaining momentum, and merely adding troops would exacerbate the situation rather than yield a successful resolution. This analysis highlights the tensions between military strategy and public sentiment during a contentious period in U.S. history, making it a significant point of reference for understanding the complexities of the Vietnam War.
Analysis: "No Attractive Course of Action"
Date: May 19, 1967
Author: Robert S. McNamara
Genre: memorandum
Summary Overview
Six years into his tenure as secretary of defense, Robert McNamara, one of the main architects of the Vietnam War, sent this memorandum to President Lyndon B. Johnson. It details a request by US military commanders for more troops before it moves to an argument arguing such a proposal. While acknowledging recent military successes, the memo's author takes a pessimistic view with respect to a troop surge, holding that it will not have any real effect on American prospects in Vietnam. Ultimately, Johnson failed to heed his secretary of defense's advice, and McNamara went on to announce his resignation by the end of that year. The momentum of the war continued to rise, and the conflict, in the end, lasted for eight more years.
Defining Moment
In the spring of 1967, American's involvement in Vietnam was still on the ascent. The growth of a US military presence in the region began under the Kennedy administration and vastly escalated under Lyndon B. Johnson. On August 7, 1964, five days after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, awarding the president the military power “to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.” In early 1965, President Johnson began the long-term bombing campaign known as Operation Rolling Thunder. That year also saw the first purely offensive actions into enemy territory and the first major battle of the war. American troops continued to increase until reaching over 385,000 men on the ground by the end of 1966, more than ten times the amount at the end of 1964.
Even at this relatively early stage, the war was becoming unpopular among many in the American public. McNamara's enthusiasm likewise had begun to wane. As secretary of defense, he ushered in the escalation of the American engagement in Vietnam, and yet in this memorandum, we see evidence of his increasing skepticism. Later, in November 1967, he sent another memorandum calling for a more drastic (and more specific) reversal of military policy. Johnson rejected the proposals outright, and McNamara resigned shortly thereafter. As for the American public, by 1968 both the Tet Offensive (a major communist surge in South Vietnam) and the My Lai Massacre (the slaughter of civilians there) only increased antiwar sentiments.
Author Biography
Robert S. McNamara was born June 9, 1916 in San Francisco, California. He obtained a bachelor's degree in economics from the University of California in Berkeley in 1937 and a master's degree from the Harvard Business School in 1939. In early 1943, he entered the United State Air Force. Disqualified from combat duty owing to his poor eyesight, he served the majority of the war's remainder in the Office of Statistical Control. Ford Motor Company hired him as one of the so-called “whiz kids,” and he rose in the ranks until becoming president in 1960, the first president of the company from outside the Ford family. Shortly thereafter, John F. Kennedy appointed him as secretary of defense. He served seven years in that post, the longest tenure of any secretary of defense to date. He oversaw the escalation of America's military engagement in Vietnam before growing skeptical of the war, as attested to in this memorandum. At the end of 1967, following President Johnson's refusal of another memorandum, McNamara announced his resignation. He became president of the World Bank, a position that he held until 1981. He died in 2009 at the age of 93.
Document Analysis
McNamara begins with the requests of General Westmoreland and Admiral Sharp for more troops. Their requests stand as a foil against which he frames the rest of his argument. At the bottom of the first paragraph, McNamara offers his programmatic statement, observing that his purpose “is to examine the recommendations of our military commanders and to consider alternative courses of action.” He follows through on the first half of this statement, extensively scrutinizing the recommendations in their larger context. Tellingly, however, he does not fulfill the second half of this proposal, offering no feasible alternatives to the commanders' plans. Instead, in order to steer the president away from the commanders' proposal for a troop surge, he paints the circumstances in bleak terms. Two years earlier, in 1965, journalist David Halberstam famously called American involvement in Vietnam a quagmire. McNamara does not use that term in this memorandum, but the atmosphere that he details and the fact that he offers no feasible course of action implicitly lend weight to Halberstam's label.
As part of his pessimistic portrayal, McNamara contrasts the American public's growing distaste for the war with the resolve of the North Vietnamese. Yet his depiction of the American public proves more complex than a simple comparison would allow. Elaborating on their distaste for war, he goes as far as to say “All [Americans] want the war ended and expect their President to end it. Successfully. Or else.” This is unmistakably direct language, particularly considering that it is addressed to a sitting president. While outlining the different, unfavorable courses of action, he states that the “present moderate policy” would not change Hanoi's firm stance and, therefore, “is not enough to satisfy the American people.” This implies that the American people would be satisfied only with an outcome that altered North Vietnam's hardline approach (achieving, that is, a form of “success”). Seemingly speaking for all Americans, including those in the administration, he adds “we are not willing to yield.” But is that a good thing or a bad thing in the eyes of the writer? He seems, perhaps, ambivalent about it.
The bulk of McNamara's examination consists of his description of two different wars. The first he labels the “big war.” This is the more conventional war against the NVA, or North Vietnamese Army. According to McNamara, America has the upper-hand in this war. He is able to support this view with objective numbers. He quotes General Westmoreland, who says that they are fighting and winning a war of attrition. After detailing the positive state of this “big war,” McNamara ends on a positive note: “All things considered, there is consensus that we are no longer in danger of losing this war militarily.”
The “other war,” which is not being fought militarily and which America is in danger of losing, is against the more localized VC, or Viet Cong. The VC are sometimes backed by and/or fight alongside the NVA. However, they are autonomous from the North and are able to fight against the Americans and South Vietnamese government both militarily and in other ways. They are corrupting the infrastructure of the government. Although McNamara usually sticks to straightforward prose befitting a government document, he is not above the occasional dramatic flourish, as witnessed by the vivid metaphor: “There is rot in the fabric.” According to McNamara, this rot cannot be conquered by additional troops.
Although the programmatic statement near the beginning claims, with an air of neutrality, that the paper will “examine the recommendations of our military commanders,” McNamara's opposition to these recommendations is apparent throughout and increases over the course of his account. While outlining the recommendations themselves, he details the additional, major steps necessary for them to be met with success and identifies the reaction that these actions could provoke from the Soviet Union or China. His opposition becomes clearer with each unfavorable circumstance he details. By the final paragraph, he succinctly states that “The war in Vietnam is acquiring a momentum of its own that must be stopped.” The commanders' proposals, therefore, “are not necessary and are not the answer.” They would only add to the momentum.
Bibliography and Additional Reading
Barrett, David M. Uncertain Warriors: Lyndon Johnson and His Vietnam Advisors. Lawrence, KS: U of Kansas P, 1993. Print.
Halberstam, David & Daniel Joseph Singal. The Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam during the Kennedy Era. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008. Print.
McNamara, Robert S. The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. Print.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗. & Brian VanDeMark. In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. New York: Vintage Books, 1996. Print.