Analysis: No Sacrificing of Basic Principles for Expediency
The topic of "No Sacrificing of Basic Principles for Expediency" analyzes the post-World War II efforts aimed at establishing a stable and just international order, reflecting on the lessons learned from the failures of the Treaty of Versailles after World War I. This theme emphasizes the importance of maintaining foundational values in peace negotiations, particularly as the Allied Powers, including the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, sought to navigate the complexities of postwar agreements. The discussions during the Council of Foreign Ministers highlighted the challenges of aligning divergent national interests, especially in light of the Soviet Union's desire for dominance in Eastern Europe, which often conflicted with the ideals of self-determination and human rights championed by Western allies.
John Foster Dulles, a key figure in these negotiations, drew on historical precedents to advocate for a principled approach to international relations, underscoring the necessity of rejecting compromises that could undermine these principles. The discourse around this topic illustrates the intricate balance between pragmatic diplomacy and the pursuit of a just peace, revealing the tensions that can arise when expediency is prioritized over core values. This analysis serves as a reflection on the challenges of postwar diplomacy and the enduring relevance of upholding fundamental ideals in international policymaking.
Analysis: No Sacrificing of Basic Principles for Expediency
Date: October 6, 1945
Author: John Foster Dulles
Genre: speech
Summary Overview
After World War II ended with the defeat of Nazi Germany and Japan, key countries of the victorious Allied Powers, including the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, began constructing plans for the postwar world. John Foster Dulles, at the time the chief adviser to the secretary of state, acknowledged that this was no easy task, as the experience of the peace talks at the end of World War I had taught him. Rather than making the world “safe for democracy,” as American president Woodrow Wilson had put it, the Treaty of Versailles became a pretext and prelude to another war. It was much easier for allies to agree upon war strategy to defeat their common enemies than it was to determine the best course of action for the future of mankind in a time of hopeful peace. However, that is exactly what the Council of Foreign Ministers—the representatives of five major Allied countries—set out to do in their talks during October 1945.
Defining Moment
With the conclusion of World War II came a determination not to repeat the mistakes that had characterized the peace negotiations at the end of World War I. Although US president Woodrow Wilson had outlined an idealistic vision of the future and emphasized the role of the League of Nations in peacefully resolving differences between nations, the other allies that had borne the brunt of the fighting for the majority of the war—Great Britain, France, and Italy—were more concerned about punishing Germany for what they saw as its key role in starting the war. Emphasizing large reparations that would keep Germany impoverished, land concessions to each of the European nations to keep Germany small, and disarmament to keep Germany weak, the penalties imposed had the opposite effect, as Germany rearmed and became aggressive again after the rise of Adolf Hitler during the late 1920s and 1930s. Further, the League of Nations was less effective than it might have been because the United States did not participate.
During World War II, John Foster Dulles, a Republican, worked to create a new international organization that would take the place of the League of Nations once the war was over. He insisted that rather than shrinking from the world stage after the war, the United States must be prominently involved in what would become the United Nations. Only with the active leadership of the United States could the United Nations become the international advocate for peace. Dulles participated in the Dumbarton Oaks Conference—which outlined the future United Nations—that took place as Allied forces drove into Nazi Germany in late 1944. As the war drew to a conclusion, the Allied leaders, meeting at Potsdam in mid-1945, created the Council of Foreign Ministers, which met shortly after the conclusion of the Potsdam Conference to draw up the peace treaties with the Axis nations.
The Council of Foreign Ministers consisted of representatives from the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France, and China. Meeting first in London in September 1945, the council sought to begin the work of creating peace treaties between the Allies and Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy, and Romania, as well as laying the groundwork for a treaty with Germany by negotiating the territorial claims that the victorious nations might have against Germany. However, the council was not able to come to an agreement at the end of the London conference, largely because of the lack of cooperation on the part of the Soviet Union, which did not want peace treaties concluded until its dominant position in Eastern Europe was made permanent by the installation of Communist governments.
Author Biography
Grandson of Secretary of State John W. Foster and nephew of Secretary of State Robert Lansing, John Foster Dulles seemed destined for a career in international relations. At the Paris Peace Conference at the end of World War I, he was appointed by President Wilson to serve as legal counsel for Lansing. He opposed the reparations that the other Allies demanded from Germany, which played a large role in setting the stage for a second war. After serving as foreign policy advisor for Democratic presidential candidate Thomas E. Dewey in 1944, Dulles was appointed as an advisor to the Council of Foreign Ministers by President Harry S. Truman. Dulles became secretary of state in 1953, serving until April 1959, at which time he resigned because of his failing health. He died a month later.
Document Analysis
Speaking after the conclusion of the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Dulles looks both backward and forward. At the end of a four-year alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Soviet actions at the London conference represent a distinct change in orientation. Given that the common enemy has been vanquished, Dulles speaks to the issues emerging in the Allies' attempts to create a peaceful postwar world at a difficult time. The conclusion of a conference demonstrates that negotiations between the victorious nations might be more difficult in peacetime than they had been during the war.
Dulles begins by stating that the negotiations that took place at London were less about peace with the Axis powers than they were about the victorious nations learning how to work together. His experience at Versailles in 1919 taught him “how difficult it is for a war coalition to maintain unity after victory has been won,” and the negotiations at London had reinforced the point, as the council had ended the meeting without any agreements, or even a public statement of unity between the powers. Rather, the conference exposed the differences between the powers that Dulles argued had always been there, but had been ignored by all sides during the war.
He then moves on to discuss the “reasonable” proposals shared, for the most part, by the United States, Great Britain, China, and France, beginning with the idea that people of the conquered regions—whether other nations or former colonies—should have the right of self-determination after the war. Also, he summarizes the point that the defeated powers should be armed for self-defense, but only under the supervision of the Allies. Finally, he emphasizes the belief that peace treaties should only be negotiated with governments that guarantee human rights and freedoms to their citizens. The problem, he concludes, lies in the divergence of opinion on these matters by the Soviet Union.
The Allies had refused to craft a peace treaty with Romania because of its refusal to guarantee human rights. The Soviets wanted a peace treaty that guaranteed that they would play a dominant role in Romania, as well as in the rest of Eastern Europe, and to that end sought to eliminate France and China from the conference. As the Soviet Union had allowed those two nations to take part in the conference earlier in the proceedings, Dulles explains this turn of events as a hypocritical method for the Soviets to undermine the unsatisfactory trajectory of the discussions. However, Dulles paints this first disagreement between the Allies in a positive way, expressing hopes that the US refusal to acquiesce to Soviet demands would set an example and pay dividends by conveying the unswerving resolve of the United States to “give leadership in restoring principle as a guide to conduct.”
Glossary
violative: involving violation
Bibliography and Additional Reading
Immerman, Richard H. John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in US Foreign Policy. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1999. Print.
Mastny, Vojtech. The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years. New York: Oxford UP, 1996. Print.
Toulouse, Mark G. The Transformation of John Foster Dulles: From Prophet of Realism to Priest of Nationalism. Macon: Mercer UP, 1985. Print.