Analysis: Notes on a National Security Council Meeting
The National Security Council (NSC) meeting held on November 15, 1961, during President John F. Kennedy's administration, focused on assessing the escalating conflict in Vietnam and determining America's potential military involvement. This meeting followed multiple assessments of the situation in South Vietnam, including a recent recommendation from General Maxwell Taylor to deploy thousands of U.S. troops not only for advisory roles but also for combat. The backdrop of the Cold War, marked by significant tensions and recent events such as the Bay of Pigs invasion, created a complex environment for Kennedy's decision-making.
Kennedy was cautious about a large-scale escalation, reflecting a desire to avoid further failures in U.S. foreign policy. The discussions addressed the continued aid to South Vietnam while considering the implications of military intervention both domestically and internationally. Key among the topics were the necessary amount of aid and the potential repercussions of increased American involvement on regional stability and international relations. Though no definitive decisions were made at this meeting, it marked a pivotal point in U.S. policy towards Vietnam, setting the stage for a more pronounced military role in the years to come.
Analysis: Notes on a National Security Council Meeting
Date: November 15, 1961
Authors/Participants: John F. Kennedy and members of the National Security Council
Genre: discussion; meeting minutes
Summary Overview
During his first ten months in office, President John F. Kennedy had sent several individuals and groups to South Vietnam to assess the situation and recommend a course of action. The last group had arrived in mid-October, headed by General Maxwell Taylor. Taylor recommended that thousands of American soldiers be sent to Vietnam, not only to advise but to fight. Thus, when President Kennedy met with the National Security Council on November 15, 1961, it was to consider what steps to take in Vietnam. The decision that was to be made based upon this discussion would set the extent of American involvement in Vietnam and could affect the relations that the United States would have with many other countries. Kennedy had an agreement with Lyndon Johnson that the vice president review national security decisions. These notes were taken by one of Johnson's aides. While Kennedy did not make the final decision at this meeting, it can be seen from the text that he was not interested in a large-scale escalation of American forces.
Defining Moment
In 1961, the Cold War was at its height. Since the end of World War II, communism had spread from the Soviet Union to encompass all the Eastern European countries, as well as China and Cuba. Two governments had been established in Germany based upon the territory occupied by Soviet or Western troops. At the time of this meeting, tension, caused by the building of the Berlin Wall, had just eased. Soviet and American tank units had faced each other across the barbed wire barrier, and after negotiations, they slowly backed away from each other, preserving the peace. It had only been seven months since the failed US invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. Kennedy's record against the communists was one clear loss and one draw.
In this context, President Kennedy had to make a crucial decision regarding how heavily the United States should invest in supporting South Vietnam against communist incursions. The struggle in Vietnam, between the communist North and the pro-Western South, had been going on for seven years. Those who had studied the situation in Vietnam gave conflicting advice. Some were optimistic that victory would be easy, others thought it would be impossible. Some thought that simply by inserting American forces the balance of power would shift, while others believed that there needed to be a change in the governing style of President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam—or perhaps that he needed to be replaced. Since Kennedy's inauguration, there had been ongoing discussions of numerous matters, but now that other areas of the world had calmed down, Vietnam became the focus of anti-communist activity. Kennedy had always advocated stopping the spread of communism, but he was not eager to produce another failure. Thus, in the NSC meeting, Kennedy asked questions about the appropriateness of American involvement in the conflict, as well as some questions regarding possible steps that could be taken.
While the decisions made after this meeting were not monumental in terms of numbers of troops or advisers, or the scope of the mission, they did reflect a significant increase in the level of US involvement. Kennedy did not go as far as many had wished, or as the Department of Defense had expected, but his thinking in this discussion proved important in his decision to continue aid to South Vietnam, at an increased level. The stage became set for the eventual assignment of a combat role to American forces.
Author Biography
The National Security Council (NSC) was formally established in 1947. However, a group functioning in this manner has always been part of the executive branch. Under law, there are several positions that automatically are part of the NSC, such as the vice president, the secretaries of Defense and the Treasury, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, other individuals may be invited to attend some, or all, of the NSC meetings at the discretion of the president. There were twenty-six individuals noted as in attendance at this meeting, with Vice President Johnson the only regular member absent, owing to his travel schedule.
Document Analysis
Whether to continue assistance to South Vietnam, and if so how much, and how to justify it: these were questions about which the National Security Council needed advise the president. While ultimately Kennedy had to make the decision, the more information he could acquire, the better his decision would be. While the first question is dealt with relatively quickly in the meeting, the latter two seem to present more of a dilemma for the president and the NSC members. In addition, one always needed to have the support of Congress in order to fund any such proposed actions.
The continuation of aid to South Vietnam does not really seem to be an issue to be decided. Two days prior to this meeting, Kennedy indicated his understanding that a significant number of American troops might be needed in South Vietnam. On the day before this meeting, in response to the Draft Memorandum on South Vietnam mentioned in the meeting notes, Kennedy directed Dean Rusk of the Department of State and Robert McNamara from the Department of Defense to prepare an additional shipment of rifles for the South Vietnamese and to select a general to head up military operations in the country. Both of these directions seem to indicate continued assistance. After stating how easy it would be to make a “strong case against intervening,” Kennedy directs the group to focus on the next steps, rather than the question of whether to continue involvement.
The type and amount of aid is the major point upon which a decision needs to be made. The early statement by Rusk, hoping that American efforts will not be “hampered by lack of funds,” reflects a large deployment of military personnel and equipment, which is in the Draft Memorandum. In those previous discussions, the president had agreed that sending only a token force would not be helpful. The probable use of American air power raised the question of where to locate secure naval aircraft carriers or terrestrial air bases. Moreover, the expansion of the use of American air power would necessitate the expansion of allowable targets. In addition to South Vietnam, reference is made to targets in Laos and North Vietnam. Army deployments would be the basis for the “revival of Viet Nam morale” and, of course, direct combat action by the Americans—hence, Kennedy's point about needing the Democrats in Congress to stand with him.
The international repercussions of sending further military assistance to South Vietnam is the third area that was discussed. Which countries were capable and willing to be active allies in the fight against the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong? How would increased aid to South Vietnam affect neighboring countries? How can matters be finessed in order not to have it seem that the United States is blatantly disregarding the Geneva Accords? (The Jorden Report, documenting North Vietnamese aid to the Viet Cong, was a major help in efforts to strengthen the United States' position within the international community.) These types of concerns were at the heart of how the United States would respond to the needs of the South Vietnamese. If only Vietnam were considered, the members indicate, a large response would seem to be best. If, however, the international community is taking into consideration, the range of actions becomes more restricted. The meeting ends without a decision. Kennedy, however, does seem to have a good grasp of the situation and the various options available.
Bibliography and Additional Reading
Keefer, Edward C., ed. “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961.” Office of the Historian. US Department of State, 2015. Web. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04>.
Logevall, Fredrik. Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. Print.
Miller, Edward. Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013. Print.
Rusk, Dean. As I Saw It. Ed. Daniel S. Papp. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990. Print.
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. 1965. First Mariner Books Ed. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2002. Print.