Analysis: The Paris Peace Accords

Date: January 27, 1973

Authors: Henry Kissinger, Le Duc Tho, et al.

Genre: treaty

Summary Overview

The signing of the Paris Accords in 1973 marked the end of almost a century of foreign intervention in Vietnam, going back to the beginning of French colonialism in the 1880s. It also marked an end to more than twenty-five years of intermittent warfare, both civil/sectarian and international, which began with the French re-entry into Vietnam in 1946 after losing the region to the Japanese in World War II. The growing antiwar segment of the American population was pleased that America's longest war to date was finally ending, and President Richard Nixon believed he was fulfilling his promises of exiting Indochina, while maintaining US global credibility.

The agreement itself deals with many of the usual issues involving the cessation of conflict between two belligerents, such as the end to bombing and the promise not to reintroduce troops. However, certain aspects of the document are unique to the American conflict in Vietnam. The latter includes issues pertaining to the continued presence of US military advisors, which had helped lead the United States into the conflict in the first place, and the very contentious issue of soldiers who had been captured or were missing in action. The document also relates, more generally, to the period's political debates over and later academic reflections on whether or not South Vietnam could have survived for long after the US exit in early 1973.

Defining Moment

Most centrally, and an issue that is somewhat debated by historians, the Paris Accords of 1973 represented the failure of the United States to solve the main dilemma faced by American presidents across three decades, from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Richard M. Nixon: how to create a viable, non-communist South Vietnam that could stand on its own. Technically, South Vietnam would survive for two more years, but the exit of the United States via the Paris Accords of 1973 signified the beginning of the end for a nation that had only officially existed for less than twenty years, since the Geneva Accords of 1954. For North Vietnam and communists in South Vietnam, the 1973 agreement was an enormous step toward final fulfillment of the 1954 Geneva Accords. The latter had provided for elections in 1956, but these never occurred because President Eisenhower and the South Vietnamese leader at that time, Ngo Dinh Diem, knew that the communists would triumph electorally and unite the country under a communist government. In fact, the first article of the Accords harkens back to the idea of a unified Vietnam as envisioned in the 1954 agreement.

For many in the United States, the final agreement to end American military involvement in Vietnam came as welcome news. The conflict was (and remains) one of the most contentious issues among Americans that occurred during the 1960s. It led to massive protests, especially during the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago; the 1969 antiwar demonstration in Washington, DC; and the protests in reaction to President Nixon's invasion of Cambodia in 1970, which led to the shootings of students at Kent State University in Ohio and Jackson State College in Mississippi. As for President Nixon himself, he was finally delivering on promises to get the United States out of Vietnam, which he had made during the 1968 presidential campaign. Still, exiting the conflict took him four years to accomplish, in part because he wanted to achieve, as he put it, “peace with honor,” by which he generally meant preserving America's international credibility throughout the exit process by leaving in place what appeared to be a functioning South Vietnam. In reality, most observers, and most historians since, did not believe that South Vietnam would last long after American forces left.

Author Biography

The main American negotiator was Nixon's national security advisor Henry Kissinger, who would also be the US secretary of state starting later in 1973. Kissinger's diplomatic activities were wide-ranging, including “shuttle diplomacy” in the Middle East and in southern Africa during the early and mid-1970s. President Nixon often worked closely with Kissinger, even bypassing the State Department, to conduct American foreign policy. Kissinger would continue as secretary of state during the administration of President Gerald Ford.

Le Duc Tho was the primary negotiator on the Vietnamese side. He was a member of the highest ruling group in the communist structure of the North Vietnamese government, the Politburo. It took years of negotiations to reach an agreement that was satisfactory, even on a temporary basis, to all the parties involved—the United States, North Vietnam, the communists in South Vietnam, and the non-communist South Vietnamese government.

As a result of the 1973 Paris Accords, both men received a Nobel Peace Prize, although Le Duc Tho refused to accept his, and critics have said that Kissinger did not deserve his based on his involvement in the war and other military actions.

Document Analysis

While every treaty to end a conflict contains agreements to end the fighting in various ways, the Paris Accords of 1973 included many items specific to the American war in Vietnam. Even though the United States never invaded North Vietnam and fought exclusively in South Vietnam (with a brief invasion of Cambodia in 1970 and occasional bombing of both Laos and Cambodia), US President Lyndon Johnson, and especially Nixon, had bombed North Vietnam—heavily at times—in attempts to limit the capacity of the North to aid the communist rebels in South Vietnam and sometimes, as Nixon did in December 1972, to try to jumpstart stalled negotiations. American forces had also mined one of the main harbors of North Vietnam (officially called the Democratic Republic of Vietnam) earlier in 1972, and therefore Article 2 contained language that the United States would henceforth cease this activity in addition to ending military operations in South Vietnam itself.

In addition, both sides knew that it had been the presence of US military advisors in South Vietnam, first under Eisenhower in the late 1950s and then increasing in number under President John Kennedy in the early 1960s, that had helped to lead the United States toward higher levels of American involvement, up to and including Johnson's escalation in mid-1965. Therefore, Article 5 contained clear language that not only would regular American military personnel leave Vietnam, but so too would “military advisers, and military personnel including technical military personnel and military personnel associated with the pacification program, armaments, munitions, and war material of the United States and those of the other foreign countries.” Likewise, “advisors…to all paramilitary organizations and the police force” would leave forthwith. The Accords were trying to close all loopholes that would allow any reintroduction of outside armed forces.

The references to the return of prisoners, found in numerous places, were especially important for the United States, as public clamor had grown for the government to achieve the return of US troops captured by communist forces. By the end of the war in early 1973, around six hundred Americans remained in enemy hands, including more than thirty who had recently been imprisoned when shot down during Nixon's December 1972 bombing campaign of North Vietnam. All of these prisoners were returned to the United States as American forces left in early 1973, but a similar issue would linger for decades in the form of searching for Americans who were still missing in action (MIA) in the Indochina region. At the end of the war, almost 2,400 US servicemen remained unaccounted for; as of 2015, the number remains over 1,600, although the investigative work continues. As historian Gary Hess points out, while US MIA rates in earlier twentieth century wars were actually higher than in Vietnam, the issue remained influential for more than two decades in the relations between the two countries. Overall, while the Paris Accords was, in some respects, a standard treaty that included the removal of military forces, the specifics of future political developments, and language of reconciliation, the document also dealt with specifics of the American war in Vietnam, including aerial bombing of North Vietnam, the role of military advisors during the build-up to full-fledged war, and the thorny issue of prisoners of war (POWs) and MIAs.

Bibliography and Additional Reading

Herring, George C. America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975, 3rd edition. New York: McGraw Hill, Inc., 1996. Print.

Hess, Gary. Vietnam and the United States: Origins and Legacy of War, rev. ed. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1998. Print.

Phillips, Jak. “Top 10 Nobel Prize Controversies: Nobel-Winner Wrangling, Henry Kissinger.” TIME. Time Inc., 7 Oct. 2011. Web. <http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2096389‗2096388‗2096386,00.html>.

US Department of Defense. “Soldier Missing from Vietnam War Accounted For (Newton).” Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency. Department of Defense, 8 Jun. 2015. Web. <http://www.dpaa.mil/NewsStories/NewsReleases/tabid/10159/Article/598458/soldier-missing-from-vietnam-war-accounted-for-newton.aspx>.