Analysis: "The Path of Revolution in the South"
"The Path of Revolution in the South" is an analytical exploration of the political climate in Vietnam during the mid-1950s, particularly concerning the growing tensions between North and South Vietnam. Written by Le Duan, a prominent leader of the Vietnamese Communist Party, the piece reflects a critical historical period when the prospects for peaceful negotiations for reunification appeared bleak. Le Duan argues that the fault for the impasse lies with the South Vietnamese government and its American supporters, framing them as obstacles to the desire for national unity.
The essay serves as both a call for a negotiated settlement and a rallying cry for armed struggle if necessary, emphasizing the urgency for North Vietnam to take decisive action against the perceived oppression by the Diem regime. Le Duan believes that a significant portion of the population is ready for change, fueled by dissatisfaction with the existing government and the influence of foreign powers. He posits that peace cannot be achieved without first dismantling the current regime, which he describes as dictatorial and oppressive.
This document encapsulates the ideological justifications for escalating conflict in Vietnam, marking a pivotal moment leading up to the larger military engagements that would follow. Readers interested in the historical context of the Vietnam War and the motivations behind the North's military strategies may find this analysis particularly insightful.
Analysis: "The Path of Revolution in the South"
Date: 1956
Author: Le Duan
Genre: essay
Summary Overview
In 1956, Le Duan was one of the top three leaders in the Vietnamese Communist Party and in North Vietnam. By the time he wrote this essay, it was clear that the election to unify North and South Vietnam was not going to occur. The essay had a two-fold purpose. While it was a call for a negotiated settlement, Le Duan clearly saw the reluctance of the South to negotiate and thus placed the blame for the impending conflict on South Vietnam and the United States (which was propping up the South Vietnamese government). Secondly, this was a call for support by the North Vietnamese leaders and people for the reunification of Vietnam, through an armed conflict if necessary. Although it was still a few years until large-scale military action between North and South Vietnam was undertaken, this document served as a foundation for the North's support of South Vietnamese insurgents as well as for the direct involvement of North Vietnamese forces.
Defining Moment
World War II brought about the end of colonization in many parts of the world, including Vietnam. Just as most of the French government cooperated with the Germans after the fall of Paris in 1940, so too most of the French colonial officers in Vietnam cooperated with the Japanese when the latter arrived in September of that same year. Once an Allied victory became all but assured in Europe, French nationalism began to increase among its colonial officials. Thus, in March 1945, the Japanese incarcerated the French and set up a puppet Vietnamese government. The Viet Minh, communist forces that had fought the Japanese throughout the war, were able to gain control of northern Vietnam by August and declared an independent state there. France returned after the conclusion of World War II and tried to re-establish a colony, ultimately losing in 1954 when the Geneva Accords were signed. In that agreement, two temporary states were established, a communist one in the North and a pro-Western one in the South.
When the provisions of the Geneva Accords fell apart in 1956, the communist leaders in the North had to decide whether to accept a divided country for the foreseeable future or to develop a new plan for Vietnam's unification as a communist state. There were moderates who were satisfied with the status quo, and others who wanted to try a new round of negotiations. Le Duan was the leader of the faction that wanted to reunify the country as soon as possible and by whatever means necessary. His “Path of Revolution” essay set forth the justification for military action because, to him, it was clear that peaceful negotiations were not going to occur. Having served the Communist Party in the South, Le Duan was certain that he understood the situation and what would be needed. As he lobbied other members of the Communist Party's Central Committee, he presented the idea that aggressive military action was the only alternative to negotiation.
At the 1956 meeting of North Vietnam's Central Committee, the discussions resulted in a decision as to which direction the committee would move to unify the country. As no negotiations were imminent, the committee chose the direction advocated by Le Duan. Le Duan was so successful in presenting his case, in fact, that he was elevated to membership in the secretariat at that meeting. In 1957, Le Duan was assigned the task of developing a full plan for the military struggle with the South, which was implemented in 1959. Although Ho Chi Minh was technically in charge until his death in 1969, Le Duan was the political leader of the military campaign in South Vietnam until the end of the war in 1975.
Author Biography
Le Duan (1907/08–1986) was born in the southern part of Vietnam while it was part of French Indochina. Having received a basic education, he worked as a clerk for the railroad system. While in this job, he became acquainted with Marxism. In 1928, he joined the Revolutionary Youth League and, two years later, was a founding member of the Indochina Communist Party. Within a few more years, he was a member of the Central Committee. As a result of this group's anti-French actions, Le Duan was twice imprisoned. Released from prison in 1945, he became an assistant to the communist leader Ho Chi Minh, focusing on activities in the south. In 1956, he was elevated to membership in the Secretariat of the Communist Party, becoming first secretary in 1959 and then head of the Communist Party in 1960. While officially sharing power with Ho Chi Minh, until Ho's death in 1969, when Ho's health declined in the mid-1960s Le Duan was clearly the party leader. Until his own death, he was first among equals in the political collective leadership of Vietnam.
Document Analysis
Le Duan issues a call for peace in this essay, while outlining the reasons that war is justified. He maintains that most people want peace, but he also claims that the people in both North and South Vietnam desire, even more so, to be unified. This attitude, according to Le Duan, was the result of the “imperialist warlike country” of the United States and the “fascist” government of Diem joining forces in the South. Thus, in a paradoxical way, Le Duan argues that the communists and others seeking peace must work to overthrow Diem at all costs in order to foster peace and unification. As he saw it, the time was ripe for revolution against these twin oppressors of the people (the Diem regime and his US backers).
When Le Duan circulated this essay among the party and governmental leaders of North Vietnam, he understood that a weariness regarding war had arisen owing to the long recent struggle against the French. He included material from the Communist Party's Twentieth Congress in the Soviet Union to demonstrate that he understood the rationale for not wanting immediately to push for change in South Vietnam, when one could perhaps gain the desired ends through political negotiations. However, from his perspective, the latter route was not likely to advance the goal of unifying the nation under communist rule. Thus, even though frequently he invokes the terms “peace” and “peaceful” in his essay, the central message is to unleash all “appropriate methods of struggle”—up to and including armed conflict—against the oppressors. The “imperialist, feudalist, dictatorial, fascist” regime of Diem, supported by the United States, would never allow a peaceful transition and unification.
Although the oppression Le Duan refers to was, at this time, directed mainly against Buddhist opposition elements in the south rather than against communist groups, the author is correct to note that the “masses” have not been included in the governing system of the south and therefore might be ready to follow a communist push for change. Time and again, Le Duan refers to the violence of the Diem regime. He seems certain that while violence might stop the actions of a few, it was not going to stop broader change, particularly when virtually the entire population desired it. As part of his work to move the leadership of the Communist Party to his position, Le Duan intentionally sets the peaceful communists in opposition to the violent Diem regime. He places the blame for his proposed policy of aggressive military response on the leaders of the South and on the United States. The “half-way attitude” by which Le Duan characterizes leaders of various cadres refers not only to those in the South, but also to too-moderate leaders in the North. Through emphasizing the so-called “peaceful struggle line,” the essayist attempts to justify “smashing” the Diem regime and obtaining the desired “unification and independence.”
Bibliography and Additional Reading
Ang, Cheng Guan. The Vietnam War From the Other Side: The Vietnamese Communists' Perspective. London: Routledge, 2002. Print.
Duiker, William. Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam. New York: McGraw Hill, 1994. Print.
Le, Quynh. “Vietnam Ambivalent on Le Duan's Legacy.” BBC News. BBC, 14 Jul. 2006. Web. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5180354.stm>.
Nguyen, Lien-Hang T. Hanoi's War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam. (The New Cold War History) Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2012. Print.
Tucker, Spencer C. The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History. 2nd ed. Santa Barbara: ABD-CLIO, 2011.