Analysis: The President and His Advisors Review the Situation

Date: March 4-5, 1968

Author: Lyndon B. Johnson; Walt Rostow; Clark Clifford; Earle Wheeler; Paul Nitze; Dean Rusk

Genre: discussion; meeting minutes

Summary Overview

In early March 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson and his advisors faced a quandary. The war in Vietnam had ballooned under Johnson's administration. With upwards of 500,000 men already on the ground, the military commanders were calling for over 200,000 more men. A little over a month prior, the enemy's Tet Offensive had failed to gain a military victory, but further diminished support for the war among the American public. President Johnson tasked his advisors to assess the commanders' proposal. They returned with a report, which they summarized for him in the meetings recorded in this document. Their plan granted the field commanders only 22,000 more men, a little more than one tenth of the requested amount. The war would drag on for seven more years, and yet this meeting marked a shift in US tactics and a cap on American troop numbers. Beginning in 1969, under a new president, the troop total dropped every year.

Defining Moment

At the time of these meetings in early March of 1968, President Johnson had been in office for over five years. As president, he had overseen significant policy victories in the case of his Great Society domestic programs, including the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964. At the same time, US involvement in Vietnam had skyrocketed under his leadership. Around 20,000 American troops were on the ground in Vietnam when he was sworn in. Just five years later, the total stood at approximately 500,000, twenty-five times the original total.

Up until this time, the Johnson administration had been accustomed to fulfilling field commanders' requests for troops. This latest request was no small plea. General Westmoreland was asking for a 140 percent increase to an already massive force. A month before, the CIA had sent a report on the Tet Offensive, employing a sort of balanced optimism to underscore the continuing need for an American military presence in the region. In the year before that, Robert McNamara had advised President Johnson that American objectives could not be obtained militarily. At the time of the present meetings, McNamara's replacement, Clark Clifford, had been on the job for less than a week. Nevertheless, he performed the lion's share of the speaking, at least in the sections of the meeting recorded here.

The proposals that Clifford and the other advisors present here heed McNamara's previous calls for change. These meetings occurred at a watershed moment for troop numbers. Richard Nixon was elected to replace President Johnson later in 1968. Troop totals peaked and started to drop in 1969. These numbers corresponded to a deeper shift in American tactics in Vietnam. These meetings display the infancy of such later policies as the switch to South Vietnamese troops and the increased role of helicopters. The shift in tactics proved indecisive as the fighting continued for seven more years.

Author Biography

Several voices appear in these notes. Lyndon B. Johnson had been president for over five years; he did not seek reelection at the end of 1968. Walt Rostow was the special assistant for national security affairs from 1966 to 1969; a month before these meetings, he was the one who received the CIA report in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive. Clark Clifford had taken over as secretary of defense less than a week before these meetings, following Robert McNamara's departure. Earle Wheeler served as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1964 to 1970. Paul Nitze was the deputy secretary of defense from 1967 to 1969. Dean Rusk served as secretary of state from 1961 to 1969.

Document Analysis

This document records conversations between President Johnson and his advisors on March 4 and 5, 1968. During the first meeting on March 4, the advisors present the president with their written proposals. Evidence of this written document appears as Clark Clifford verbally summarizes the proposals: “We recommend in this paper that you meet the requirement for only those forces that may be needed to deal with any exigencies of the next 3–4 months” [emphasis added]. The advantages of using meeting notes as a primary document can be shown by looking at this document in contrast with the written document that the advisors handed their boss on March 4, 1968. The written document would offer the reader a more detailed and comprehensive look at the proposals. On the other hand, it is possible to glean from these meeting notes a summary of the proposals by their chief architects, multiple perspectives exposing the various roles of the different interlocutors, a close look at the functioning of the Johnson administration, and the president's role among his advisors.

The perspectives of the different presidential advisors formulating this proposal covered a wide spectrum. Clark Clifford expresses the differences among them: “Of course, if we had to vote on sending the straight 200,000 men or no men, we would come out all over the lot … we would be split all over the place.” Yet the document is far from a cacophony of varying opinions. Throughout the March 4 meeting (the bulk of the document,) President Johnson takes on the role of questioner. He is receiving the proposal for the first time and limits his contributions to several telling questions. As for the advisors, they were not forced to vote yes or no on sending the 200,000 men as in Clifford's hypothetical, and these meetings were not the time for airing their disagreements. (The speakers put on a united front while presenting their proposals to the president, almost exclusively adopting the pronoun “we” to express the proposal.)

Despite the united front, different roles for the different interlocutors can be discerned. On March 4, 1968, Clark Clifford had been on the job for less than a week, yet he speaks the majority of the dialogue. After Clifford summarizes the plan, the president asks some specific questions; given their technical nature, they are fielded by the military brass Earle Wheeler and Paul Nitze. In a respite after one of these answers, Secretary of State Dean Rusk speaks up. He begins by stating the gravity of the situation, citing the “implications for all of our society.” This may be a reference to President Johnson's domestic achievements and legacy. The shorter text from the March 5 meeting shows Rusk in a slightly different role. In this meeting, the president does the majority of the talking, and Rusk chimes in with an idea to help the president develop his thoughts.

Like Rusk, the President takes on two different roles in the two meetings. After introducing the March 4 meeting, he assumes the role of questioner. Yet the text of his questions exposes his position. His first question, “Westmoreland is asking for 200,000 men, and you are recommending 20,000 or so?” registers surprise. The later technical questions display his concern for details. In the March 5 meeting, he muses aloud about how to put the proposals into place. Secretary Rusk turns the president's sports analogy into a “massive helicopter program.” This suggestion and the president's response offer glimpses of future US policy, as well as other forces at work within this policymaking enterprise.

Bibliography and Additional Reading

Barrett, David M. Uncertain Warriors: Lyndon Johnson and His Vietnam Advisors. Lawrence, KS: U of Kansas P, 1993. Print.

Goodwin, Doris Kearns. Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991. Print.

Herring, George C. LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War. Austin, TX: U of Texas P, 1994. Print.

VanDeMark, Brian. Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. New York: Oxford U P, 1995. Print.