Analysis: President Ngo Dinh Diem: Address to US Congress

Date: May 9, 1957

Author: President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam

Genre: speech

Summary Overview

Ngo Dinh Diem had been president of South Vietnam (the Republic of Vietnam) for two years at the time of this speech. During the previous year, 1956, an election was to have been held to unify the nation—North and South—under one government, and virtually everyone expected the leader of North Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, to win that electoral contest. In line with US wishes, the election was cancelled, and communist leaders in the North therefore began agitating for change in the South. Since the United States had been the main supporter of South Vietnam, President Diem went to the US Congress to seek America's continued support. He knew that without the help of the United States, he would not stay in power, and most likely, the government of the North would take control of all of Vietnam. Using terms that he expected would resonate with members of Congress, Diem sought to cement the relationship between the two countries and solidify his position as an anticommunist leader in postcolonial Indochina.

Defining Moment

With the defeat of French forces by a communist-commanded army in 1954, negotiations led to the Geneva Accords of that year. The accords established a timeline for the withdrawal of French forces, temporarily divided of the country into two sections (North and South), and set elections for 1956 to bring about a united government at the national level. The French were able to install Emperor Bao Dai, with whom they had worked for decades, in the South, leaving the communists their stronghold in the North. When Diem challenged Bao Dai for power in the South in 1955, he was untainted by cooperation with the French and was also able to steer the election process and control the press. Winning the premiership with over 98 percent of the vote, and consequently refusing to hold the 1956 unification election, Diem had tested the limits of the political system and was in need of outside support. Viewing Vietnam as a strategic location in which to stop communist expansion, US president Dwight D. Eisenhower decided to support Diem by sending a small number of military advisers and significant amounts of financial aid. In order for this aid to continue, the US Congress would need to authorize funding for it. Thus, it was vital that Diem's speech before a joint session of Congress be well received.

Diem was not seeking active participation by American military forces, despite the fact that various small uprisings against his regime were then taking place in South Vietnam. While some of these uprisings were communist-inspired, most were the result of local disenchantment with Diem's policies. They did not present a unified front, as was essentially the case in later years. Knowing his American audience, however, Diem sought to garner support by presenting Vietnam as a focal point for US anticommunist efforts. He depicted his administration as similar to that of any Western democracy and as holding the same values as the United States. While a realistic examination of Diem's government and its activities would not uphold such claims, it was nevertheless clear that the South Vietnamese president was willing to confront the communists opposing him. For most members of Congress, that was enough. During the 1950s, few US allies were asked to document their efforts to uphold human rights. Diem sold his regime to Congress as staunchly anticommunist—a proven method of gaining American support.

Author Biography

Ngo Dinh Diem (1901–1963) was born into a Catholic family that was part of the nobility in north-central Vietnam. Completing his education in 1921, he was appointed a provincial governor. In 1933, he served briefly as minister of the interior for the Vietnamese emperor, Bao Dai, within a figurehead government installed by the French. During World War II, Diem participated in efforts toward independence. He rejected an offer from the French to participate in a postwar government and also rejected an offer from Ho Chi Minh. In 1954, he was appointed prime minister by the emperor (who ruled only South Vietnam). The two had disputes and Diem organized an election in 1955 designed to allow people to choose between himself and the emperor. Under questionable conditions, Diem won the election and named himself president. He ruled until November 1963, when he was killed during a coup that overthrew his government.

Document Analysis

When the communists took control of the Chinese mainland in 1949, Western nations were confronted with the possibility that communism might spread even further across the continent. Even though some communist organizations, such as those in Vietnam, predated the communist Chinese victory, this victory symbolized new possibilities for communism. With this as the background, Diem focuses his comments on Asia as well as on Vietnam. He wants support for his country, and in order to obtain it, he emphasizes the key role that Vietnam might play in Asia. He depicts the new Vietnamese republic as a twin of the United States, slightly different in external features, but the same at heart. Diem hoped to communicate that South Vietnam and the United States share a mutual desire to stop communism, noting the superiority of the democratic system, which he claims the two countries also share.

Diem states correctly that Asia is different from other parts of the world. However, like leaders of other emerging countries around the world, he blames all his country's economic and social ills upon the colonial system. This is the first reason he gives to support the idea that the United States should help South Vietnam; economic support would assist the country to overcome a variety of problems. Moving on to a topic of more direct concern to the United States, Diem discusses the idea of a planned economy—a codeword for communism. For Diem, extensive economic planning is bad and symptomatic of a totalitarian state. A freer economy, close to capitalism, Diem claims, meant that the country was a democracy. This latter description, Diem asserts, described South Vietnam and was exactly what America wanted. Thanking Congress for previous economic aid, while claiming to be very similar to the United States, Diem recognizes that South Vietnam has adopted “guide lines for action,” which he asserts were to “safeguard peace without sacrificing independence.” He states that the people of South Vietnam have “good reason for confidence and hope.” Diem is implying that it would not take long for South Vietnam to be stable and prosperous.

He closes with the reason for his speech, namely, the receiving of American foreign aid. Having cut ties with France, the United States was now the closest ally of South Vietnam. Diem makes reference to what support has been given to South Vietnam since 1954, going on to outline the benefits the United States had reaped from this. Economic stability in South Vietnam, keeping communists from making economic or political gains, and a strong partner among the nations of the “free world” are the past benefits. However, Diem notes that the struggle is not yet over, and he therefore states that his government needed “timely contributions” to continue the struggle. Having “identical” interests with the United States, Diem proposes that the two nations fight together against communism. He refers to South Vietnam's contribution to the cause, implying that the Americans would need to continue its support if it wanted to defeat the communists.

Bibliography and Additional Reading

Jacobs, Seth. Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America's War in Vietnam, 1950–1963. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006. Print.

Ladenburg, Thomas. “Sink or Swim, with Ngo Dinh Diem.” Digital History. University of Houston, 2007. Web.

Miller, Edward. Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013. Print.

“The United States and Ngo Dinh Diem, 1954–1963.” The Vietnam Era. Woodbridge, CT: Primary Source Media, 1999. Web.