Analysis: A Recommendation for Troop Increases
The topic of troop increases in Vietnam during the 1960s centers on the strategic decisions made by U.S. leadership, particularly under Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. As a key architect of the Vietnam War, McNamara advocated for significant military escalation, believing that a robust deployment of American forces was essential to secure victory against North Vietnam and the Viet Cong. This perspective led to the introduction of over half a million American troops in South Vietnam, prompted by a series of unsuccessful military efforts by South Vietnamese forces and escalating attacks from the North.
McNamara's recommendations included intensifying bombing campaigns and increasing troop numbers to approximately 400,000 by the end of 1966, with further increases planned for the following year. His strategic vision was influenced by mathematical models that suggested inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy could lead to a swift resolution of the conflict. However, he acknowledged that troop increases would not guarantee success and warned of potential high casualty rates. The discussion around troop increases reflects broader themes of military strategy, public perception, and the challenges of addressing complex geopolitical conflicts. This historical analysis continues to prompt debate on the efficacy and ethical implications of military intervention.
Analysis: A Recommendation for Troop Increases
Date: November 30, 1965
Author: Robert McNamara
Genre: memorandum
Summary Overview
Although President Lyndon Baines Johnson shouldered much of the blame for the war in Vietnam, it was Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara who holds the most responsibility. A brilliant statistician and manager, McNamara has often been described as the architect of the Vietnam War. It was his insistence throughout the 1960s that escalation would bring about ultimate American victory, which led first to the sustained bombing campaign of the north and, later, to the deployment of over half a million troops in the south. Unlike many of the other hawks advising Johnson, McNamara was, at least for a time, a true believer in both his mission and his strategy. The United States would win, he insisted, if only enough American troops were sent into the fight. His strategy is best exemplified in a memo he penned in November 1965, which became the overall strategy for the first phase of the war in Vietnam.
Defining Moment
After initially refusing to commit American military forces to the growing conflict in Vietnam, in early 1965, President Johnson launched a series of bombing operations against the north. Following a strategy of “sustained retaliation” as outlined by National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, the United States Air Force began bombing North Vietnam, along with parts of Cambodia and Laos, as a means by which to demoralize the enemy and force them into surrender. As part of the strategy, bombing operations would halt for days or weeks at a time as a means to give the North Vietnamese time to negotiate (a fact that was not communicated to the North Vietnamese).
Soon after, as Viet Cong forces began launching attacks on American air force bases, Johnson sent 3,500 Marines to defend American personnel. This was the first time American troops were introduced into Vietnam in a non-advisory capacity. As throughout the summer of 1965, South Vietnamese forces were repeatedly defeated by military elements from the north, and with American ground forces already having been introduced in the south, the military leadership began to press the White House for ever larger troop commitments. The argument coming from most in the military, especially General William Westmoreland, commander of all American military forces in Vietnam, was that only through offensive measures could the United States hope to achieve victory in Southeast Asia. The American military, it was argued, could not sustain a solely defensive position for long. Westmoreland favored a strategy by which the United States would push the South Vietnamese back and take the lead in combat operations, thus putting the unmatched power of the United States directly against North Vietnamese forces. He was so convinced of the soundness of this strategy that he predicted total victory by the end of 1967.
Perhaps the biggest advocate of this approach within the cabinet was Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Long a proponent of using military strength as a means by which to defeat communism, McNamara used the same kind of statistical analysis in his approach to Vietnam, as he had used in his capacity to plan bombing operations against the Japanese in World War II. Creating several mathematical models, he concluded that if American forces were able to inflict a significant amount of casualties on the North Vietnamese, which he believed had a very limited number of troops, the war could be won in a matter of two to three years. To add weight to his argument, McNamara travelled to Southeast Asia in late 1965. Upon his return he set out his strategy in a memo to the president, which would, eventually, become the primary plan by which the United States would fight a ground war in Vietnam.
Author Biography
Robert S. McNamara was born in California in 1916. After attending the University of California at Berkeley, he went on to get an MBA from Harvard Business School. During World War II, he worked under Major General Curtis LeMay in the Office of Statistical Control, analyzing the effectiveness of Allied bombing on enemy cities. After the war, McNamara joined the Ford Motor Company as one of the ten so-called “whiz kids” and eventually rose to become the youngest CEO in the company's history. In 1960, he was appointed secretary of defense, first under Kennedy and then under Johnson, and made great efforts to restructure the military. McNamara was instrumental in some of the most important events of the Cold War, including the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and of course the Vietnam War, of which he was considered to be the chief architect. McNamara eventually resigned his post as the war soon proved unwinnable. In 1968, he was appointed to the World Bank, where he served as President until 1981. He died in 2009.
Document Analysis
McNamara begins by stating that American forces in South Vietnam are performing well. Operations conducted by the United States military have been successful. However, the South Vietnamese government and military apparatus are unequal to the task before them. McNamara cites several examples of poor decisions and poor performance. The South Vietnamese government, he informs Johnson, only has the support of some 25 percent of the population. The North Vietnamese, he reports, are launching successful attacks on the south and have greatly increased the size of their army. In addition, Viet Cong forces operating throughout the south have continued to grow. Unless the American presence in Vietnam is expanded, North Vietnam's power will continue to grow unchecked. McNamara makes it clear: if the North Vietnamese build-up is to be stopped, and if the United States is to hold the momentum, additional American troops must be sent to Vietnam at once.
His recommendation is for a substantial troop increase and an escalation of the bombing campaigns already underway. By the end of 1966, McNamara estimates, American ground troops should number 400,000, with an additional 200,000 to come the following year. Bombing should be escalated and additional targets, including civilian targets, should be identified. The United States Air Force would first halt all operations for a number of weeks, as a means to allow North Vietnam to possibly seek peace and for the American public to accept the escalation, followed by an intensification of attack.
Primary in all of this, McNamara emphasizes, is public opinion both at home and abroad. A pause would also give people the perception that the United States government was making a good faith effort toward peace. However, it is the last part of McNamara's memo that is most interesting. In his final evaluation, he states that extra deployments will not guarantee success and that American casualties might reach 1,000 a month. However, in the end, he reasons, there is no greater strategy for success. Will sending ground troops be risky? Yes. Will it guarantee victory? No. But, in McNamara's mind, the potential benefits outweigh the risks. The United States must win in Vietnam, and troop escalation is the only definite way to achieve it.
Bibliography and Additional Reading
Herring, George. America's Longest War. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996. Print.
McNamara, Robert & Brian VanDeMark. In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1995. Print.
VanDeMark, Brian. Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Print.