Analysis: The Tet Offensive: A CIA Assessment
The Tet Offensive, initiated on January 30, 1968, was a pivotal military campaign during the Vietnam War, where Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces launched a surprise attack across South Vietnam. Although the offensive was ultimately unsuccessful in its objective to incite a local uprising and topple the South Vietnamese government, it had profound implications for American public opinion and military policy. The extensive media coverage of the offensive significantly eroded support for the war within the United States, challenging previously held perceptions of American military success.
Despite the heavy casualties inflicted on the attackers and the failure to achieve their strategic aims, the Tet Offensive marked a turning point in the war's narrative, leading to widespread skepticism about U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The response to the offensive included assessments from officials, which sought to frame the aftermath in a more favorable light for continued military engagement. These assessments highlighted the complexities of the conflict and the emotional impact on both American and Vietnamese populations, underscoring the offensive's role in shifting perspectives on the war. Overall, the Tet Offensive remains a critical moment, illustrating the intersection of military actions and public sentiment in the context of a contentious conflict.
Analysis: The Tet Offensive: A CIA Assessment
Date: February 12, 1968
Author: CIA official(s)
Genre: report
Summary Overview
On January 30, 1968, Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops launched a massive, coordinated offensive across South Vietnam. The offensive was beaten back, and the attackers faced heavy causalities. The mission summarily failed its purpose of raising a local uprising and overthrowing the South Vietnamese government. Nevertheless, the assault garnered national media attention in the United States and diminished the already wavering support for the war among the American public. This report shows signs that it is directly responding to this external perception of the assault. Written two weeks after the first onslaught, the author(s) detail the failures of the offensive and depict the state of affairs in terms that were as positive as possible for American prospects in Vietnam.
Defining Moment
From the end of 1964 to the end of 1966, the number of American troops on the ground in Vietnam ballooned tenfold. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara lost faith in American prospects in the region and tried to convince President Lyndon B. Johnson to reverse policy throughout 1967. He failed to do so and announced his resignation by the end of 1967. Although troop increases did not match the massive increases of 1965, and 1966, 100,000 additional American troops were on the ground in Vietnam by the end of 1967.
With such a surge in troops and the United States meeting with success, at least militarily, the Tet Offensive served as a blow to current American preconceptions. Breaking a temporary truce for the Tet holiday, Viet Cong and North Vietnamese made a massive, coordinated assault on local governments and allied forces throughout South Vietnam. By military standards, the onslaught was a failure. The South Vietnamese government did not fall; American troops were not forced out. Nevertheless, the offensive had a lasting effect on international perceptions of the war, particularly among the American public. Together with the later revelations concerning the My Lai slaughter, the Tet Offensive strained the American support for the war as no other event had.
The author of the CIA report attempted to curb the negative perception of the Tet Offensive. Written just two weeks after the launching of the assault, the report depicts the results of the assault and the greater circumstances of the war in terms favorable for the United States. Although the report appears to react to public opinion, it does not try to alter the views of the public directly. With US governmental officials as its targeted audience, the report aims to use a positive portrayal to argue for a continuance of American war efforts in the region. However, its success in that regard can be questioned, for, ultimately, it represented only one of many voices in the debate concerning troop levels and war objectives.
Author Biography
The names of the author or authors of this document have not been released. Given the nature of the document as a declassified CIA report, this should come as no surprise. The report was sent by Richard Helms, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to Walt Rostow, President Johnson's special assistant for national security affairs. Helms had risen through the ranks of the CIA since its inception in 1947; he served as director from 1966 to 1973. He then transitioned to ambassador to Iran, where he served until 1977.
Document Analysis
The director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms sent this report to Walt Rostow, President Johnson's special assistant for national security affairs, two weeks after the Tet Offensive began. Rostow then showed the report to President Johnson. In the cover memorandum to the president, Rostow called it “extremely well balanced,” adding, “We are unlikely to have anything better right away.” A month later, Rostow was among those who advised the president not to immediately fill General Westmoreland's request for more troops. It must be assumed that this document played a role in that advisement. The document presents a detailed account of the state of affairs in the aftermath of the offensive. It also showcases a discernible perspective and agenda at a time of broad uncertainty in American policy-making.
Although part of an occupying force, the authors position themselves as the ultimate insiders. They begin with a religious flourish: “The Year of the Monkey had an inauspicious beginning for the people of South Vietnam….” Throughout the document, they speak with confidence for the South Vietnamese people. For example, later in the document they again mention the Tet holiday: “The population is universally angry at the VC for violating both a sacred holiday and their own truce, and the blame for all of the ills is generally placed on the VC.” This role as supposed insider allows them to label the shocked international reaction as foreign (and, therefore, uninformed.) They argue that: “contrary to much foreign opinion,” the Tet Offensive was not a victory for the attacking VC and NVA forces. There is also a touch of racism in the report, when the authors remark on “the Oriental penchant for telling people what they want to hear.”
While surveying the aftermath of the offensive, the authors take account of both the allied and the enemy forces. They depict, in a fashion common at the time (and continuing into the present), the enemy in the masculine singular: “He is not on the verge of desperation. He has over half of his main forces basically intact… On the other hand, his logistics…” By representing the enemy in this way, “he” becomes more tangible, an individual man with strengths and weaknesses. This paints a different picture than representing the enemy as, say, a complex military and political organization centered in, but not restricted to, Hanoi or other circumstances.
While the authors open with “The Year of the Monkey” to assume the role of the local insider and, therefore, underscore the reliability of their information, they end with glimpses of their American patriotism, as well as peeks at their agenda. They mark American intervention in Vietnam as a turning point in the region: “The entire nature of the war, the entire environment of the struggle, changed with the massive U.S. involvement.” Likewise, their final sentence combines flag-waving American patriotism with a proclamation of the necessity to continue to commit to the region militarily: “There is a sobering thought for the future, however—if it were not for the presence of U.S. forces, the VC flag would be flying over much of South Vietnam today.” The authors thus offer an optimistic take on the Tet Offensive and its aftermath and credit American forces. This provides a perspective strikingly different from that of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara a year earlier.
Bibliography and Additional Reading
Ahern, Thomas, Jr.. Vietnam Declassified: The CIA and Counterinsurgency. Lexington, KY: U P of Kentucky, 2010. Print.
Allison, William Thomas. The Tet Offensive: A Brief History with Documents. New York: Taylor & Francis, 2008. Print.
Wirtz, James J. The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell U P, 1994. Print.