Analysis: We Ought to Stay Out of the War
The discussion surrounding the United States' involvement in World War II is complex, particularly through the lens of influential figures like Joseph P. Kennedy Sr., who served as the US ambassador to Great Britain from 1938 to 1940. Kennedy's perspective emphasized the importance of maintaining US neutrality while supporting Great Britain materially, arguing that direct involvement in the war could jeopardize American interests. He expressed skepticism about Britain's chances of victory against Germany and suggested that the United States should prioritize its own defenses over entanglement in foreign conflicts. Kennedy's views were shaped by the historical context following World War I, where there was a strong desire to avoid another large-scale war, leading to policies like the Neutrality Acts. He believed that an exhausted Europe could lead to the rise of authoritarian regimes, questioning whether engagement in the conflict would ultimately serve the cause of democracy. Kennedy's stance reflects a broader debate within the US, where isolationist sentiments clashed with internationalist calls for support against totalitarian aggression. Understanding this historical context provides insight into the divided opinions on American foreign policy during a pivotal moment in world history.
Analysis: We Ought to Stay Out of the War
Date: January 18, 1941
Author: Joseph P. Kennedy
Genre: speech
Summary Overview
Joseph P. Kennedy Sr. was the US ambassador to Great Britain from 1938 through 1940. The first Irish American to serve in this capacity, he enjoyed the company of the British upper class, many of whom advocated a policy of appeasement toward Adolf Hitler's Germany. Kennedy believed compromise was possible with Germany, and that Jewish interests were driving the United States into war. As late as 1940, Kennedy attempted to meet and reason with Hitler, while his comments about the difficulties Great Britain faced in its efforts to defeat Germany made him extremely unpopular with the British and US governments. Amid a storm of criticism, Kennedy officially resigned in November of 1940. In this radio address, given upon his return to the United States in January of 1941, Kennedy explained why he believed that the United States should stay out of World War II. Although he was widely seen as a defeatist, the majority of Americans still opposed entering the war, and he appealed to them to support providing supplies to Great Britain—but only when it served US interests—and avoiding entering the war directly at almost any cost.
Defining Moment
American policy after World War I focused on ensuring that involvement in a world war would never happen again. In the decades between the end of World War I and the beginning of World War II, the world sought to establish structures and pursue strategies aimed at preventing another large-scale war.
Chief among the efforts to prevent another war was the League of Nations, established in the aftermath of World War I as a vehicle for international cooperation and mutual security. The United States, fearful of becoming embroiled in foreign disputes, did not join the League, but it did sign the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which outlawed war as national policy. In other words, it allowed for defensive war only. In the 1930s, however, rising aggression throughout the world was not halted by the League of Nations, which failed to stop Japanese attacks on China, Italian aggression in Africa, or Nazi Germany's rapid remilitarization.
Beginning in 1935, the United States, concerned with protecting its own interests in case of large-scale war, passed a series of Neutrality Acts, which prohibited the export of “arms, ammunition, and implements of war” from the United States to warring nations. Later acts included restrictions on loans, foreign shipping, and travel. The Neutrality Act of 1937 included a “cash and carry” provision, however, that allowed the president to authorize purchases of any material short of armaments—a provision that would allow for significant material support to Great Britain. In 1939, this stipulation was expanded to include arms sales.
Beginning in 1937, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain tried desperately to keep Great Britain out of another war while European leaders allowed Hitler to annex Austria and to take control of disputed territory in Czechoslovakia. Though Germany repeatedly violated agreements with Great Britain, Chamberlain believed that disarmament was still possible, and kept open communications with Germany up until the invasion of Poland in September of 1939. Once war was declared, Kennedy adopted the belief that Great Britain had virtually no chance of winning the war, and focused instead on how to prevent the United States from becoming directly involved.
In the United States, the question of participation in the war deeply divided the nation. Isolationists believed that the aid being given by the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt would inevitably draw the United States into the war, with disastrous consequences. Internationalists such as Roosevelt argued that a strongly supported Great Britain could defeat Germany, rendering US involvement unnecessary. Kennedy's position was somewhere in between. He argued that the United States should buy time to organize its defenses by propping up Great Britain, but he also seemed to accept the likelihood of a German victory, and urged the United States to avoid war at all costs.
Author Biography
Joseph Patrick Kennedy was born in 1888 in East Boston, Massachusetts, an Irish Catholic enclave in which his father was a successful businessman and political figure. Kennedy attended the Boston Latin School and then Harvard University. He had nine children with his wife, Rose Fitzgerald, including future US president John Fitzgerald Kennedy. Making a fortune in the stock market, Joseph Kennedy also invested in commodities and real estate. In addition, he invested in several Hollywood studios and was involved in the importation of liquor after the end of Prohibition. In 1934, he was appointed chairman of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by President Roosevelt, whose campaign he had supported and helped to finance. In 1938, Kennedy became the US ambassador to Great Britain, a post he held until his resignation in 1940.
Following the war, Kennedy focused his energy on his business interests and the growing political careers of his children. After suffering a debilitating stroke in 1961, he never fully recovered. He died in 1969 at the family compound in Hyannis Port, Massachusetts.
Document Analysis
This speech, read over the radio, begins with Kennedy's response to what he believes are unjust accusations leveled against him because of his “views on foreign policy.” He believes that his position in favor of giving Great Britain aid while refraining from directly entering the war has been attacked because of a vocal minority that wants increased involvement in the war. He defends his pessimistic reports from England as simply realistic, and argues that it is his job as the ambassador to report the truth insofar as he is able. He argues that his reporting of “serious obstacles to British victory” should not have branded him a defeatist. Since the relative strength of Germany was not as well known, he claims, “One can recognize the enormous difficulties facing Britain without foreseeing its defeat.”
Kennedy vehemently denies that he is an appeaser seeking to strike deals with dictators. He does, however, profess his belief that the influence of the United States should be used to bring about “a just and lasting peace.” It is not clear how this will be achieved, however, since he acknowledges that “the word of these tyrants has been shown to be worthless.” Because there does not seem to be a pathway to peace, the United States should consider how to best protect its own interests. Abandoning Great Britain does not help the interests of the United States, he argues; if Great Britain collapses quickly, it will leave the United States exposed and vulnerable. Support of Great Britain will buy time for the United States to prepare its defenses, but the British should pay for as much of it as they can.
It is possible, Kennedy asserts, for the United States to provide Great Britain and its allies with supplies for war and still stay out of direct combat. Hitler is not going to declare war until it suits his interests, Kennedy argues, and even if Great Britain loses, the chances of Germany being able to then successfully attack the United States are slim. In Kennedy's opinion, those who had begun to feel that involvement in the war was inevitable were the real defeatists. He argues that the United States has little to fear from Germany, and he does not understand “why the tale of a great military machine 3,000 miles away should make us fear for our security.” It would be as difficult for the United States to make war in Europe as it would be for Germany to attack the United States.
Rather than preserving democracy in the face of totalitarianism, Kennedy adds that getting involved in the war would endanger democracy, and exhausted nations would turn to an “authoritarian regime of the right or of the left.” In other words, while democracies wore themselves out combating Germany, Russia would grow stronger, and even if Germany were defeated, Russia would be able to capitalize on the toll this war would take on the free world. If the United States went to war and won, then it would fall to the United States to reorganize and police Europe, a task which Kennedy sees as contrary to national interests.
Kennedy concludes that far from carrying the torch for the free world, Great Britain is simply fighting for survival—a survival that was far from assured. The United States must work for its national defense and prepare for any eventuality, but it also must avoid going to war.
Bibliography and Additional Reading
“Milestones: 1921–1936; The Neutrality Acts, 1930s.” Office of the Historian. US Dept. of State, n.d. Web. 3 Nov. 2014.
Nasaw, David. The Patriarch: The Remarkable Life and Turbulent Times of Joseph P. Kennedy. New York: Penguin, 2012. Print.
Swift, Will. The Kennedys amidst the Gathering Storm: A Thousand Days in London, 1938–1940. Washington DC: Smithsonian, 2008. Print.
Wapshott, Nicholas. The Sphinx: Franklin Roosevelt, the Isolationists, and the Road to World War II. New York: W. W. Norton, 2015. Print.