Analysis: "Why We Are in Vietnam"
The topic "Why We Are in Vietnam" revolves around the rationale behind U.S. military involvement in Vietnam during the 1960s, particularly under President Lyndon B. Johnson. Johnson articulated his justification for escalating American engagement, emphasizing the importance of honoring treaty commitments to South Vietnam and the perceived threat of communist aggression in Southeast Asia. Drawing historical parallels, he warned against the consequences of appeasement, likening the situation to pre-World War II policies towards Hitler, which he believed had emboldened further aggression.
Initially, the U.S. role was limited to providing advisory support and resources to South Vietnamese forces; however, as the conflict intensified, Johnson decided to increase troop levels significantly. This marked a shift from a supportive to a more direct combat role for U.S. forces. Johnson faced the challenge of balancing military commitments with his domestic agenda, which was also influenced by the war. The context of this period reflects broader Cold War dynamics, where the U.S. sought to prevent the spread of communism, reinforcing the complexities of American foreign policy and military interventions. Understanding these motivations offers insight into the historical legacy and controversies surrounding the Vietnam War.
Analysis: "Why We Are in Vietnam"
Date: July 28, 1965
Author: Lyndon B. Johnson
Genre: Speech
Summary Overview
In this excerpt from Johnson's speech, with which he began a White House press conference, the president attempts to explain the reasons for the US involvement in the war in Vietnam. While he speaks of a reluctance to commit American forces and material support to a distant war, he also draws upon the perceived lessons of pre-World War II Europe—the belief that appeasement of Hitler's demands had led to further aggression and that this course should not be repeated in Southeast Asia in the face of perceived communist aggression. Johnson also puts major emphasis on treaty commitments that the US had made to the Republic of Vietnam. Over a period of eleven years, three presidents—Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson—had promised that the United States would aid in defending the South Vietnamese from internal communist insurgency and from attack by the forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam).
Defining Moment
When Lyndon Johnson acceded to the presidency upon the death of President John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963, the United States had approximately 16,000 servicemen serving in Vietnam. Johnson noted in his memoirs that of all the crises confronting him when he became president, Vietnam did not seem to be one that required a great deal of immediate attention. Over the course of the next two years, however, Vietnam demanded more and more attention from the president and his administration. As Johnson's cabinet and civilian advisors, as well as military leaders, debated the proper course of action, several proposals emerged. One was to seek negotiations immediately, in order to begin disengaging from the war. Another option was to maintain the status quo—using US military advisors to help the forces of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) and supplying money and supplies to help the South Vietnamese defend themselves; this plan called for only a small number of US troops, acting principally as advisors, helicopter pilots, and aircraft maintenance crews. By the spring and summer of 1965, however, Johnson had decided on a third option—to dramatically increase the number of US troops in Vietnam and to move toward an active combat mission rather than just an advisory or support operation.
The first step toward this escalation was the beginning of a sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam, named Operation Rolling Thunder. Another step was taken in March 1965, when a Marine expeditionary brigade (about 5,000 men) was sent to defend the air base at Da Nang, on the northeastern coast of South Vietnam. Then, in the summer of 1965, General William C. Westmoreland, the commander of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), requested that substantial US Army forces be committed to the war effort. In this speech, Johnson is reporting that he had approved Westmoreland's request and is seeking to explain and justify the reasons why Americans should be a part of the war effort in Vietnam. In the weeks prior to this announcement, most of Johnson's advisors and a significant number of US Senators had agreed that further escalation of American involvement was the only possible course of action. In this speech, Johnson stresses the perceived lessons of history, referring to the appeasement of Hitler's demands at the Munich Conference, and the necessity of honoring commitments that the United States had made to South Vietnam.
Author Biography
Lyndon Baines Johnson was born on August 27, 1908 on his family's ranch near Johnson City, Texas. After graduating from Southwest Texas State Teacher's College at San Marcos in 1934, he taught school briefly, but his interest soon turned to politics. Johnson was elected to the US House in 1937 and served six terms there. He was elected to the US Senate in 1948 and became the majority leader in 1954. In 1960, John F. Kennedy chose Johnson as his vice presidential candidate in an attempt to reassure conservative Southern Democrats. When Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963, Johnson became President. In 1964, he defeated the Republican challenger Barry Goldwater in a landslide victory. While Johnson's presidency was marked by the passage of significant civil rights and social welfare legislation, the Vietnam War increasingly alienated the public, and Johnson chose not to run for re-election in 1968. He retired to his ranch in Texas, where he died on January 22, 1973, shortly before a treaty to end US involvement in Vietnam was finalized.
Document Analysis
President Johnson begins this speech with a reference to a letter in which a woman had asked why it was necessary for her son to be serving in Vietnam. In response, Johnson says that he had tried to answer that question in many places and at many times. He admits that the answer is not an easy one, and that the war is difficult to understand. He refers to lessons he believes can be found in the nation's past. Three times in his own lifetime—World War I, World War II, and Korea—American forces had gone to “far lands to fight for freedom.” Johnson believed that these previous experiences had taught that aggression had to be met with force. Like many Cold War-era American politicians and policy makers, Johnson believed that the appeasement of Hitler's demands for territory in the years leading up to World War II had only led to further aggression. Now, Johnson believes that the People's Republic of China is intent on dominating Southeast Asia and is supporting the communist forces fighting in Vietnam. He believes that this attempted aggression should not be appeased and that the United States had to make a stand in Vietnam. Johnson also argues that the US had to honor commitments made to aid the Republic of Vietnam (the formal name of South Vietnam). If America did not keep these commitments, no other nation in the future would be able to have confidence in promises made by the US government.
Johnson admits that it is difficult to order young Americans into combat. He also feared that this foreign war could detract attention from his domestic reform agenda. Johnson promised to do all he could to see that this did not happen, but he also believed that the United States had to meet the communist threat in Vietnam. Later in this address, Johnson announces that he has approved the request of the American commander in Vietnam for additional US ground troops. While not noted in Johnson's speech, with this commitment of large-scale forces, the United States moved from the role of advising and assisting the Republic of Vietnam to a position of carrying out most of the fighting, as assisted by South Vietnamese forces. Once this fundamental change of policy had been made, the US presence in Vietnam grew dramatically. From the approximately 75,000 US personnel in Vietnam at the time of this speech, the number would increase to more than a half-million by the time Johnson left office in January 1969.
Bibliography and Additional Reading
Gardner, Lloyd C. Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995. Print.
Herring, George C. LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996. Print.
Johnson, Lyndon B. The Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency, 1963–1969. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971. Print.
Kaiser, David. American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000. Print.
VanDeMark, Brian. Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Print.