Analysis: The World Needs the Tonic of Universal Truth

Date: November 15, 1945

Author: Arthur H. Vandenberg

Genre: speech

Summary Overview

Less than three months after the official end of the World War II, the United States, its allies, and the United Nations began the work of reconstruction. During a Senate debate over an appropriation to the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), Michigan senator Arthur H. Vandenberg expressed his concerns over the “iron curtain” that repressed democracy and the free flow of information in the Soviet-occupied nations of central and Eastern Europe. Vandenberg also cautioned against the sharing of information about the American atomic energy program in light of the secretive behavior of the Soviets.

Defining Moment

During the 1930s, war raged in two separate theaters, causing the deaths of millions and seemingly incalculable amounts of destruction. In Europe, the rapid and seemingly unstoppable force of Adolf Hitler's Nazi military spread like wildfire, northward into Scandinavia, eastward into Poland, southward toward the Mediterranean, and westward toward Great Britain. In East Asia and the Pacific, Japanese emperor Hirohito sent his forces across the Korean Peninsula and into China, into the South China Sea and eastward toward US territory.

With virtually every corner of the world living under the specter of war, the people and leaders of the United States—geographically separated from either theater by thousands of miles—largely embraced the philosophies of neutrality and isolationism. Although President Franklin D. Roosevelt advocated for a larger American role in the conflicts—mainly through diplomatic channels and in financial support of US allies in both regions—such ideals were rebuffed by many in Congress, including the opposition Republican Party. This trend changed dramatically, however, when the Japanese launched its infamous attack on the US naval fleet on December 7, 1941. Suddenly, war had thrust itself into the American way of life—isolationism quickly became extinct.

The Allied effort—headed in Europe by the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union—ultimately turned Hitler's forces backward and into oblivion as Hitler committed suicide and his regime disintegrated. In the Pacific, the American-led campaign of “island-hopping” pushed the Japanese back toward their homeland before the atomic bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought about an unconditional Japanese surrender. The war was over, but there existed another daunting challenge: pacification and reconstruction.

At the end of the European conflict, the “Big Three”—US president Harry S. Truman, British prime minister Clement Attlee (who replaced Winston Churchill at the end of the war), and Soviet premier Joseph Stalin—met at Potsdam, Germany, to address this challenge as well as how to reestablish national borders. Germany was divided into two general zones—one occupied by the US, British and other Western powers, the other by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had also taken hold of Poland at the end of the war and had also occupied portions of Eastern Europe during its efforts against Germany. During the Potsdam Conference, these territorial gains were ceded to the Soviet Union with the expectation that Moscow would promote freedom and democracy during their reconstruction.

The use of the atomic bomb, coupled with a distrust of Soviet tactics in Europe, helped give rise to what would soon be known as the Cold War. The previously isolationist United States was now positioning itself as a world leader, hosting the United Nations General Assembly and continuing to build coalitions with like-minded nations in Western Europe and around the world in the face of the Soviet Union, which seemed to be pursuing a similar course of action in its postwar occupied territories. Shortly after the war came to an end, Churchill cautioned, in a letter to Truman, that an iron curtain had been drawn down in front of the Soviet-occupied territories, with any information about the goings-on behind that curtain carefully controlled by Moscow.

Author Biography

Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg was born on March 22, 1884, in Grand Rapids, Michigan. After a public school education, he studied law for one year at the University of Michigan. In 1901, he pursued a career as a journalist and, starting in 1906, as the editor of the Grand Rapids Herald. In March of 1928, Vandenberg, a Republican, was appointed to the US Senate seat vacated with the death of Woodbridge Ferris (Vandenberg would formally win election to the seat in November of that year). An isolationist prior to the war, Vandenberg became more of an internationalist after the attack on Pearl Harbor. He held several leadership positions during his twenty-three-year tenure as senator and served as a delegate to the UN General Assembly. He also helped garner bipartisan support of the Truman Doctrine and the formation of NATO. He died of cancer on April 18, 1951.

Document Analysis

Churchill's famous iron curtain reference (made shortly after the war's end but repeated in his iconic speech in Fulton, Missouri, in 1946) strongly influenced the growing number of American leaders who were concerned about the Soviet Union's growing power. Michigan Republican Arthur H. Vandenberg, during a speech on the US Senate floor in November 1945, echoes this term as he cautions fellow members of Congress on appropriating funds to support the reconstruction of postwar Europe. Vandenberg argues that the nobility of the proposed financial support to UNRRA is being undermined by the Soviet Union. Moscow, Vandenberg says, should openly communicate with the rest of the world and promote the freedom and liberties espoused by the UN.

Vandenberg embraces his newly found internationalism during this speech, emphasizing the significance of the international fraternity of nations in the postwar era. He adds that this fraternity depends on the open and free exchange of information among these nations. This point is particularly important in light of the enormous task of providing humanitarian support to war-torn Europe. Indeed, he argues, there exists a major crisis in this region—countless people are sick, homeless, starving and facing the coming winter. UNRRA, he says, has been created to deal with this moral imperative. It is designed to facilitate an integrated multinational response to this crisis, Vandenberg says.

However, Vandenberg adds, the Soviet Union stands in the way of UNRRA's potential efficacy. The Soviet Union is carefully controlling and withholding any information that comes from behind the aforementioned iron curtain. Western journalists, Vandenberg says, have even been refused access to Soviet-occupied areas. As a result, he argues, the extent of the crisis remains unknown. Such “black-outs,” Vandenberg suggests, only worsen the situation and run counter to the international community's efforts to relieve suffering.

Vandenberg addresses a Soviet argument that the idea of “international communication” should include the United States sharing information about its atomic energy program. Vandenberg cites the testimony of non-US world leaders and experts, all of whom argue that the atomic energy arena is still nascent. There are to date no uniform, international protocols or standards regarding safety and health, Vandenberg says. In the absence of such regulations and in light of the still-developing field, it is necessary to keep the American atomic energy program out of international communications discussions.

Meanwhile, he continues, the onus is on the Soviet Union to lift the iron curtain and promote openness, cooperation and democratic ideals in every nation under Moscow's control. Although reports show that the Soviet Union is relaxing some of its militaristic policies in the Balkan and Baltic states, he says, it is clear that the Soviet Union needs to do more to promote democracy in its occupied territories. Vandenberg reminds his colleagues that the Soviet Union pledged to do so at Yalta and again at Potsdam, but evidence shows that Moscow is not yet true to its word. The Soviet Union has security interests in the region, Vandenberg acknowledges, but those interests do not supersede the broader need for international cooperation, “universal truth,” and humanitarianism.

Glossary

axiom: a self-evident truth that requires no proof

boon: something to be thankful for; blessing; benefit; a favor sought

chancellery: the position of a chancellor; the office attached to an embassy or consulate

corollary: an immediate consequence or easily drawn conclusion; a natural consequence or result

prodigal: wastefully or recklessly extravagant; lavish; profuse

scuttled: abandoned; withdrawn from or caused to be abandoned or destroyed

unfettered: free from restraint; liberated

untrammeled: unhindered; opposite of trammels, which means a hindrance or impediment to free action

Bibliography and Additional Reading

Applebaum, Anne. Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe, 1944–1956. Toronto: McClelland, 2012. Print.

Brager, Bruce L. The Iron Curtain: The Cold War in Europe. New York: Infobase, 2004. Print.

“Finding Aid for Arthur H. Vandenberg Papers, 1884–1971.” Bentley Historical Lib. Bentley Hist. Lib, U of Michigan Digital Lib., n.d. Web. 16 Jan. 2015.

Giangreco, D. M., and Robert E. Griffin. “Background on Conflict with USSR.” Harry S. Truman Lib. and Museum. Natl. Archives and Records Admin., 13 Jan. 2015. Web. 16 Jan. 2015.

“Vandenberg, Arthur Hendrick, (1884–1951).” Biographical Directory of the United States Congress. US Congress, n.d. Web. 16 Jan. 2015.