Burmese-Chinese Wars
The Burmese-Chinese Wars were a series of military conflicts primarily between the Burmese kingdoms and the Chinese Ming Dynasty, spanning from the mid-15th to the late 18th centuries. These wars were largely influenced by the complex relationship between the Tai peoples, including the Shans of Burma, and the Chinese, who sought to assert control over the region, particularly the strategic Irrawaddy waterway. The first significant conflict began in 1438, driven by the ambitions of a Maw Shan chieftain, Thonganbwa, which led to a protracted struggle for dominance.
Throughout the following decades, the wars involved numerous battles, shifting allegiances, and periods of both conflict and uneasy peace. Notably, the conflict in the 1760s was sparked by Burmese incursions into Shan territories, prompting Chinese military responses that ultimately ended in failure. The conclusion of the last major conflict in 1769 resulted in the Kuangton Treaty, which fostered a temporary restoration of trade and diplomatic exchanges. Despite the underlying tensions, the treaty brought about a period of improved Sino-Burmese relations that persisted until the decline of the Manchu Dynasty. Overall, these wars significantly shaped the historical dynamics between Burma and China, influencing territorial control and regional politics for centuries.
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Burmese-Chinese Wars
At issue: Border ambiguity and control of Burma
Date: 1438–1769
Location: Across Burmese and Chinese border
Combatants: Burmese vs. Chinese
Principal commanders:Burmese, Thonganbwa (Ava, d. 1446), Narapati (Mohnyin), Pindale, Pye (d. 1672); Chinese, Wang Chi, Yongli (1623–1662)
Principal battles: Taguang, Wetwin, Kengtung, Kaungton
Result: Both sides tire of war, sign treaty, and resume peaceful trade
Background
The Shans (Burmese), the Laos, and the Siamese are all descended from a group cognate to the Chinese and known among themselves as the Tai. Early in the Christian era, the Tai came under Chinese suzerainty, but they were often in rebellion and ever anxious to assert their independence. With the passing of Kublai Khan’s dynasty in 1368, China lost control over the route across Asia to the West. In the search for new outlets for trade, the Ming Dynasty, with its eyes upon the Irrawaddy waterway, decided that the Maw Shans of Burma must be subdued. In addition, the Chinese were motivated by the attempt of an ambitious Maw Shan chieftain, Thonganbwa, to revive the old Nanchao empire. The result was a long struggle lasting from 1438 to 1465. After this time, the wars between Burma and China were recurrent, as the border between the two was indeterminate.
Action
By 1441, Wang Chi, the president of the Chinese board of war, was appointed to lead a strong army, which drove the Shans out of Luchuan. Some of them fled to Hsenwi, but the majority, under Thonganbwa, crossed the Irradaway and took refuge in Mohnyin. Wang Chi subsequently offered Thonganbwa’s land to whomever succeeded in arresting him; however, Thonganbwa had already been captured and presented to the king of Mohnyin, Narapati. Wang Chi’s forces, in due course, conquered Mohnyin, and he demanded the surrender of the fugitive. When Narapati refused, the Chinese proceeded to invade Burmese territory. A battle was fought near Taguang (1445) in which the Chinese general was killed and his army defeated. In the following year, the Chinese invaded in greater strength and stormed the walls of Ava. Narapati then acquiesced. Thonganbwa, however, committed suicide, and only his dead body could be surrendered. Narapati formally accepted Chinese overlordship. In return, the Chinese forces assisted him in subduing the rebellious chief of Yamethin. In 1451, he received from China a gold seal of appointment as “Comforter of Ava,” and three years later, he was given a piece of Mohnyin territory. Although the Shans were subordinate to China, a symbiotic relationship emerged and the Ava king maintained some semblance of authority.
Although relative peace transferred into the reign of the next ruler, Thihathura (r. 1469–1481), he was the last of the Ava kings to avoid omnipresent internal and external struggles. These struggles may have been prevented had China agreed to Thihathura’s request in 1472 for the cession of Mohnyin. Instead, however, China chose to rule from afar. Although China would intermittently administer doses of fear to scatter the Burmese provinces, it failed to effectively administer the Shans. The Chinese policy was designed to prevent the development of any powerful state within its territories, but once China’s control weakened, Upper Burma became enshrouded in chaos. By 1520, the situation forced the Chinese to push across the Salween and move their advanced bases farther in to Tenyueh; however, this had no effect. The next series of Ava kings also failed to stem the disorders, and in 1555, Ava was absorbed into the reunited kingdom of Burma.
By 1648, the new Burmese ruler, Pindale, was placed in the unfortunate position of being in China when the Manchus drove out the Mings. Yongli, also known as Zhu Youlang, the last of the Mings, had, in 1644, fled to Yunnan, where for a long time he defied the Manchus. His heavy demands upon Hsenwi and Maingmaw for men and supplies led Pindale to send a force to their assistance. When Yongli was finally pushed back into Bhamo along the old Burma Road, the following Manchus defeated a Burmese army at Wetwin (1648), and for three years, Upper Burma was ravaged up to the walls of Ava. Pindale, who was incapable of mitigating the damage, was replaced by his brother Pye. However, Pye was also too weak to hold the Manchu, and in 1662, the Manchu viceroy of Yunnan marched into Burma and demanded Yongli. Pye agreed, and Yongli was publicly strangled with a bowstring in the marketplace.
Burma then entered into a long period of stagnation. After the death of Pye in 1672, Minrekyawdin reigned for nearly twenty-six years but was little more than a figurehead. Although internal peace was maintained, there was no leadership and consequently no real vigor. The last three kings of the Shan dynasty, Sane, Taninganwe, and Mahadammayaza Dipati, also maintained peace largely through inactivity. When Hsinbyushin began his reign in 1763, he renewed the project of conquering Siam. The Burmese incursion into Laos territory caused such a ferment among the states bordering on Yunnan that the Chinese were forced to intervene.
The war began in 1766 with a punitive expedition directed by the Yunnan viceroy against Kengtung, the largest and most easterly of the Shan states subject to Burma. The Burmese drove out the Chinese, however, and the disaster forced the viceroy to follow the customary practice of defeated Chinese generals, which was to commit suicide. The subsequent campaigns also ended in failure—meaning more ritual suicides for the Chinese. In 1769, the Chinese made a final attempt to wipe out their failures. This time, their army attempted to reach Ava, as they had before, by the Bhamo route. Once more, they failed at Kaungton. When the Burmese drove them out, they asked for terms, and a peace treaty was signed on the spot in December, 1769.
Aftermath
The Kuangton Treaty called for a Chinese withdrawal, the restoration of trade, and decennial missions of exchange. Once more the large caravans with hundreds of pack animals began to traverse the Old Burma Road, and Sino-Burmese relations gained a new cordiality that lasted until the end of the Manchu Dynasty.
Bibliography
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Heidhues, Mary F. Somers. Southeast Asia: A Concise History. London: Thames & Hudson, 2000.
Stearn, Duncan. Chronology of South-East Asian History, 1400–1996. Dee Why, New South Wales, Australia: Mitraphab Centre, 1997.
Williams, Lea E. Southeast Asia: A History. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976.