Cambodia invasion and bombing
The Cambodia invasion and bombing refers to a series of military actions conducted by the United States during the Vietnam War, aimed at disrupting North Vietnamese operations that utilized Cambodian territory. Initiated under President Richard Nixon in 1969, the bombing campaign targeted suspected communist bases, beginning with Operation Breakfast, which involved B-52 strikes in Cambodia. The situation escalated in 1970 when the U.S. invaded Cambodia in response to political changes, including the ousting of King Norodom Sihanouk and the rise of General Lon Nol, who struggled against communist forces.
The invasion surprised both the American public and Cambodian leaders, leading to widespread protests in the U.S., notably the tragic Kent State shootings. Following significant public outcry and shifting political dynamics, the U.S. formally ended its ground operations in Cambodia by mid-1970, though bombing continued until 1973. This extensive bombing resulted in over half a million tons of explosives dropped, contributing to destabilization in Cambodia that facilitated the rise of the Khmer Rouge, a regime notorious for its genocidal policies. The legacy of these actions continues to be debated regarding their impact on Cambodia and the broader context of American involvement in Southeast Asia.
Subject Terms
Cambodia invasion and bombing
The Event During the Vietnam War, U.S. ground forces launched an attack into Cambodia, and the U.S. Air Force bombed communist positions there
Date Invasion occurred April 30-June 29, 1970; bombing occurred March 18, 1969-August 15, 1973
President Richard M. Nixon’s decision to authorize U.S. forces to enter Cambodia in order to destroy Vietnamese communist positions there furiously reignited the American antiwar movement. In May, 1970, about one-third of all American colleges closed in face of massive student unrest, and riots turned deadly on two campuses. Bombing communist positions in Cambodia was begun in secret and later met with harsh opposition in the U.S. Congress, which forced its ending.
When Richard Nixon became president of the United States in January, 1969, he owed part of his election to a vague promise to end the Vietnam War without abandoning South Vietnam to the communists. To force communist North Vietnam to accept such a peace, Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, decided to look for new ideas.
Following 1960, North Vietnam had used Laos and Cambodia to infiltrate South Vietnam. Along the Ho Chi Minh trail, it moved troops and supplies to within fifty miles of Saigon. When American combat troops entered South Vietnam in 1965, the North Vietnamese also built sanctuaries in eastern Cambodia. To disrupt them, Nixon approved Operation Breakfast for March 18, 1969. Sixty B-52 bombers struck North Vietnamese Base Area 353 in Cambodia, where American military intelligence erroneously located communist headquarters. Nixon decided to keep this mission secret, as well as the next bombing in April, 1969, which in turn was followed by more strikes one month later. Bombing continued in this form until May, 1970.
Invasion and Reaction
By early 1970, the American public believed Nixon was winding down U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. On April 19, 1970, the Vietnam Moratorium Committee announced that it was closing its Washington offices.
On March 18, 1970, General Lon Nol deposed King Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia and ordered communist Vietnamese troops to leave Cambodia. They refused and defeated his troops. In Beijing, Sihanouk allied himself with the communists, including the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia. Communist pressure on Lon Nol led the U.S. military to consider an alternative. On April 22, Nixon approved a South Vietnamese attack into the Parrot’s Beak, a Cambodian salient. On April 28, Nixon permitted U.S. ground forces to assault the sanctuaries of Base Areas 353 and 352 and advance up to thirty miles into Cambodia.
The invasion of Cambodia arguably had little military value, but it shocked American and world public opinion. On April 30, Nixon told a stunned American public on television that he had launched an attack into Cambodia. Immediately, the antiwar movement organized massive protests. Lon Nol, who had not been told of the invasion, was also shocked and surprised.
Nixon and Kissinger had seriously misread the country’s mood. Nixon’s critics, as well as a majority of American students, angrily denounced the action. About one-third of all American colleges closed as result of riots triggered by the invasion. On May 4, at Kent State University in Ohio, the confrontation turned lethal when state troops opened fire on student protesters, killing four. Outside the White House, more than 75,000 antiwar protesters gathered.
Nixon ultimately gave in. He announced that U.S. troops would withdraw by June 30. After a subdued press conference on May 8, Nixon visited student protesters at the Lincoln Memorial early the next morning, but the two sides did not connect. On June 29, U.S. troops left Cambodia.
Continued Bombing
The bombing in Cambodia assumed a new form. The Cooper-Church Amendment of December 22, 1970, forbade U.S. military action in Cambodia except to intercept communist forces bound for South Vietnam. Nixon and Kissinger exploited this loophole.
The U.S. Air Force continued tactical and B-52 air strikes in Cambodia; Lon Nol continued to lose. At the end of 1972, only massive U.S. B-52 strikes prevented total disaster after his failed Chenla II offensive.
The signing of the Paris Peace Accords on January 27, 1973, brought a temporary halt. Article 20 of the treaty called for an end to foreign military activity in Cambodia and for Cambodian peace negotiations, but without a deadline. On February 7, Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge, and their communist allies declared that they would continue to fight. American bombing started again on February 9.
In the spring of 1973, Congress objected to the bombing in Cambodia. American combat troops had left South Vietnam, and American prisoners of war (POWs) had been released by Hanoi. On May 10, 1973, the House of Representatives voted to block funding for the bombing. Congress passed an amendment to end the bombing on June 30, but Nixon successfully vetoed it. However, Nixon agreed to end the bombing on August 15, 1973, which he did.
The initial bombing did little to disrupt communist Vietnamese operations. Its secrecy came to an end in July, 1973, when the American public also began to learn of the Watergate scandal. An attempt to impeach Nixon for the secret bombing, too, was dropped by the Democratic leadership on July 30, 1974.
From 1970 on, the bombing escalated up to its end. In total, more than one-half million tons of bombs were dropped, almost half from February to August, 1973. Inexplicably, even when the Khmer Rouge learned of the war’s imminent end, they continued their offensive against the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh in June and July, 1973, which led to the death of about 25 percent of their troops from American air strikes.
Impact
After the bombing stopped, it took the Khmer Rouge until April 17, 1975, to capture Phnom Penh. Until the Vietnamese attacked in December, 1979, the Khmer Rouge ran a genocidal regime responsible for the “killing fields” where about 1.6 million Cambodians were murdered.
The role of the American bombing in the tragedy of Cambodia remains subject to public and academic debate. Some historians have argued that Cambodia became involved in the war just as the United States wanted to exit it and had to pay a terrible price. After 1980, many Cambodian refugees settled in the United States, further augmenting the Asian American population.
Bibliography
Chandler, David. A History of Cambodia. 2d ed. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992. Balanced view of the event that places it within the context of Cambodian history. Illustrated, notes, bibliography, index.
Kissinger, Henry. The White House Years, 1968-1972. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979. Argues the Nixon administration’s view of the event. Illustrations, notes, bibliography, index.
Kissinger, Henry. Years of Renewal. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999. Kissinger continues his review of U.S.-Cambodian policy from 1973 to 1975. Illustrations, notes, bibliography, index.
Shawcross, William. Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia. Rev. ed. London: Hogarth Press, 1986. The most detailed, if partisan, study of the event. Squarely blames Nixon and Kissinger for the event. Photos, notes, bibliography, index; reprints articles critical of the book.