Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
"Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire" is a landmark Supreme Court case from 1942 that addressed the limits of free speech under the First Amendment. The case involved Walter Chaplinsky, who was convicted for using derogatory language towards a city marshal and other officials, sparking a legal debate over what constitutes protected speech. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision authored by Justice Frank Murphy, upheld a New Hampshire statute that prohibited public name-calling and derisive speech, thereby establishing a two-tiered approach to free speech protection. This framework identified certain categories of speech, including "fighting words," as lacking First Amendment protection since they do not contribute to the search for truth or social discourse.
The case set a precedent that continues to influence the legal landscape regarding speech limitations, notably in areas such as public swearing and commercial advertising. However, the scope of this decision has been significantly narrowed by subsequent rulings, most notably regarding libel and speech directed at law enforcement. As a result, while "Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire" remains a foundational case, its practical application has evolved, reflecting ongoing discussions about the balance between free expression and societal order.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
Date: March 9, 1942
Citation: 315 U.S. 568
Issue: Freedom of speech
Significance: The Supreme Court upheld a man’s conviction for derisive speech of name calling in public, reasoning that “fighting words” were not subject to First Amendment protection.
Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Frank Murphy upheld a state statute under which the defendant was convicted for calling a city marshal a “racketeer” and “fascist” and referring to other officials as “agents of fascists.” The relevant state law prohibited derisive speech or name calling in public. Murphy created a two-tier theory of free speech protection in which certain “well- defined and narrowly limited” types of speech do not have First Amendment protection. “Fighting words” as well as lewd, profane, obscene, and libelous words fell outside the boundaries of constitutional protection because they did not represent a free speech value such as the search for truth.
Although Chaplinsky was never overturned and the two-tier theory remains valid regarding business advertising, public swearing, and pornography, the thrust of this decision was considerably narrowed. Libelous publications are judged by the standards set in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), and verbal challenges to police officers enjoy constitutional protection, so Chaplinsky is only a shell of its former self.