De facto segregation
De facto segregation refers to the separation of groups, particularly racial groups, that occurs as a result of social, economic, or cultural factors rather than legal requirements or government actions. Unlike de jure segregation, which is enforced by law, de facto segregation often arises from private actions and individual choices, making it a complex issue to address within the legal system. The distinction between de facto and de jure segregation can create challenges in identifying the responsibilities of the state versus those of private individuals, as both can contribute to systemic inequalities.
Legal cases, such as Keyes v. Denver School District No. 1 and Washington v. Davis, have highlighted the judiciary's struggle with this distinction. The Supreme Court has generally held that de facto segregation is not subject to constitutional remedy unless it can be shown that the state had a "racially discriminatory purpose." This narrow interpretation has implications for civil rights, as it limits avenues for challenging segregation that stems from societal practices rather than explicit laws. Overall, de facto segregation remains a critical topic in discussions about race, equality, and the role of government in addressing discrimination.
De facto segregation
Description: Separation of people by race or ethnicity through custom, tradition, or socioeconomic factors rather than by law. De facto segregation differs from de jure segregation, which is the separation of people mandated by the state.
Significance: The Supreme Court distinguished between the two types of segregation and declared de facto segregation to be constitutional.
The Supreme Court held that de facto segregation, which results from merely private action, without the involvement, authorization, or action of the state, is not subject to constitutional remedy. The Fourteenth Amendment protects against discriminatory conduct or actions on the part of the state, not against those of private individuals. The problems with the distinction between de facto and de jure segregation include determining where state or government conduct ends and individual conduct begins and defining action and conduct. Justices William O. Douglas and Lewis F. Powell, Jr., in Keyes v. Denver School District No. 1 (1973), urged the Court to abandon the distinction, which Douglas said was muddied by past state actions, restrictive covenants, and other public policies.
The Court varied the breadth of its interpretations of state responsibility but tended to apply a narrow state action doctrine in which all segregation that is not intentional, explicit, and officially sanctioned is defined as de facto and is, therefore, not subject to constitutional remedy. In Washington v. Davis (1976), the Court ruled that de facto segregation was not unconstitutional unless it resulted from the state’s having a “racially discriminatory purpose.”