Durkheim's Collective Conscience

The French sociologist Émile Durkheim, a scholar of social order and integration, developed the concept of collective conscience. Collective conscience was defined by Durkheim as beliefs and sentiments universal to people within a society. Durkheim observed that the character and content of collective conscience “varied according to whether society was characterized by mechanical or organic solidarity [and that] collective conscience was extensive and strong, ranging far and wide into people's lives, controlling them in detail through various religious or other traditional means of sanction” (Marshall, 1994). In the latter, the character and content of collective conscience changes to a more abstract form, one that requires a system of law to ensure people comply with established legal codes. In mechanical solidarity, individualism becomes more important and society increasingly specialized and differentiated; thus, the form and content of collective conscience shifts toward the provision of principles and justifications (as a form of civil religion) rather than providing an integrated set of ideas and beliefs to which all members of society subscribe. While Durkheim's work has been criticized for being, with a small number of exceptions, largely theoretical, contemporary scholars have developed his approach to examine the character of contemporary collective conscience and how collective conscience is socially produced.

Keywords Anomie; Civil Religion; Collective Conscience; Division of Labor; Individualism; Mechanical Solidarity; Organic Solidarity; Specialization

Collective Conscience

Overview

The French sociologist Émile Durkheim, a scholar of social order and integration, developed the concept of collective conscience. Collective conscience was defined by Durkheim as beliefs and sentiments universal to people within a society. Durkheim observed that the character and content of collective conscience “varied according to whether society was characterized by mechanical or organic solidarity [and that] collective conscience was extensive and strong, ranging far and wide into people's lives, controlling them in detail through various religious or other traditional means of sanction” (Marshall, 1994). In the latter, the character and content of collective conscience changes to both a more abstract form and one that requires a system of law to ensure people comply with established legal codes.

In mechanical solidarity, individualism becomes more important and society increasingly specialized and differentiated; thus, the form and content of collective conscience shifts toward the provision of principles and justifications (as a form of civil religion) rather than providing an integrated set of ideas and beliefs to which all members of society subscribe. For Durkheim, just as human life is structured around biological processes that force us to eat or sleep, so too is human life structured around social rules that govern our lives as facts (Bilton et al., 1996). These rules constitute the collective conscience, which may be religious or secular in character. What is significant about Durkheim's idea of the collective conscience is that it exists not only in the minds of individuals, but stands apart from them as a distinct and discernible entity. While Durkheim's work has been criticized for being, with a small number of exceptions, largely theoretical, contemporary scholars have developed his approach to examine the character of contemporary collective conscience and how collective conscience is socially produced.

Durkheim's Approach to Social Order

Durkheim was primarily a student of social order and integration who saw sociology as having a role in the "moral reconstitution of society" (Bellah, 1973, p. xiii). He developed a structural-functionalist approach to understanding society that lies at the heart of discussions about the conscience collectif, and which is based on his belief that people flourish and live contentedly and productively when social life is well organized, harmonious, and orderly. Drawing on organic metaphor, and comparing society to the human body, Durkheim argued that social order exists as a reality in its own right, meaning that society exists as an entity that is external to human beings, just as the body exists at a level beyond its constituent components, such as cells (Straus, 2002). Society, in fact, transcends the individual. In defining society as a discrete, independent entity, Durkheim also identified its component parts (e.g., laws, customs, beliefs, and rituals) and argued that they be viewed as social facts that can be explained by social causes. He argued that social phenomena exist because they contribute to the survival and functioning of society in some discernible way.

Constraint, structure, and regulation are critical to Durkheim's understanding of social order and play a defining role in creating and sustaining social integration. In mechanical societies, characterized by a form of integration in which the values and symbols of the tribe or group are privileged, consensus and shared norms and values provide such structure. These shared norms, which have an objective, discernible character, form the basis of social life: for Durkheim, religious beliefs and practices are the source of the collective conscience in mechanical societies. Religious symbols represent the social group and worship of these symbols helps to not only reproduce the existence of the group, but also to remind its members of their debt to one another. That is, the fate of the group is bound to the fate of each member: the members depend on the group for survival and the group depends on members recognizing their membership (Bilton et al., 1996).

Thus, Durkheim sees society as a "religiously ordered system." But while in traditional societies, religion plays an integrative function through beliefs and practices, in more complex societies, the collective conscience becomes more abstract (Waters, 1994) and its moral contents harder to see. Nonetheless, when collective conscience is seen in this way, as a function of group membership and belonging, it can be used to explore not only religiousness, but also potentially any collective practices that have the function of symbolizing and reminding people of their group membership, and sustain social solidarity. Accordingly, collective conscience has been explored in relation to secular forms of ritual and belief, such as national and cultural identity, social and political movements, and association membership.

Social Transformation & Collective Conscience

However, the spread of Enlightenment thinking in the eighteenth century undermined religiously sustained collective conscience and replaced it with a less extensive, weaker, and secular form supported by the formation of sets of general rules as opposed to specific codes (Marshall et al., 1994). Young (2007) notes that as the unregulated market of advanced capitalist societies advances, restraints on individual desires (such as those placed, for instance, by religious ritual) lose their strength. The growth of cities, population expansion, and more intense social interaction may also undermine social trust. This condition threatens social cohesion because it is accompanied by increasing competitiveness. However, Durkheim observed that one solution to this problem is that the division of labor reduced competition by producing differentiation and interdependence, which contributed to a new version of collective conscience.

In mechanical societies, collective conscience is intense, well defined, and widespread. In organic societies, such as advanced modern societies, collective conscience is dependent on moral density and social volume. That is, in organic societies, the wider the spread of individuality, the stronger the potential for a new form of cohesion between people, because they increasingly rely on each other to meet their needs, which fosters interdependence and responsibility for each other. Contemporary collective conscience then, is developed and sustained not through religious ritual, but through forms of communication to which most people have access (television, cellular phones, the Internet), and travel, which creates, as Giddens (1990) puts it, "time-space distanciation" in which time and space are compressed, bringing people into closer proximity to each other.

There are ways of acting, thinking, and feeling that possess the remarkable property of existing outside the consciousness of the individual. Not only are these types of behavior and thinking external to the individual, but they are endued with a compelling and coercive power by virtue of which, whether he or she wishes it or not, they impose themselves upon the individual (Durkheim, 1982, p. 51).

Collective conscience, then, exists beyond the minds of individuals as a palpable presence of beliefs and ideas, even in secular, mechanical solidarity, which privileges individuality and relies on restitutive law to maintain the normal contact and social intercourse in society.

Further Insights

Individualism

Durkheim was anxious about the shift toward organic solidarity and the expansion of individualism that this shift fostered. He argued that that the moral character of society and the moral constraints that underpin social integration would change as society transitions to a more specialized division of labor. Notably, his concern focused on the growth of the "cult of the individual" on which the collective conscience would come to be based. The individualism he predicted was moral or rational individualism (Marske, 1987) and would need to be collectively shared. Marske (1987) argues that as the division of labor advances and mechanical solidarity begins to give way to organic solidarity, like-mindedness weakens and increasingly complicated systems of thought and experience emerge, which parallel the advancing complexity of modern society. Even with such diversity and complexity, common conscience does not totally disappear; rather, it progressively transitions into a general and indeterminate way of feeling and thinking that privileges the rights and dignity of the individual and the idea of individuality. Durkheim says:

… the collective conscience is becoming more and more a cult of the individual… we shall see that (this is) what characterizes the morality of organized societies, compared to that of segmental societies (Durkheim, 1964, p. 407).

Thus, individuals in organic solidarity are tied to society in new ways, not severed from it. For instance, an American sociologist, Robert Bellah (1968), developed the idea that collective conscience exists in a secular context as civil religion.

Collective Conscience & Civil Religion

Durkheim argued that as mechanical solidarity gave way to organic solidarity collective conscience would be changed in form and content and move away from its religious underpinnings. Bellah (1968) found support for the existence of civil religion as a form of collective conscience in the collective celebration of ceremonials, such as presidential inaugurations, Thanksgiving Day, and Mother's Day. In Great Britain, Edward Shils and Michael Young (1953) suggested that the monarchy plays a similar role, as an integrative entity that brings people together around a common set of beliefs and ideas about the moral shape of society.

The civil religion thesis argues that in advanced industrial societies, in which organized, formal religion was, in the 1960s, seen to be declining, civil ceremonies play a role in creating and sustaining social values. For some commentators, the emergence of civil religion was seen as a way of enacting "the metanarrative of America's God-given calling as redeemer nation, highlighting providential survival, sacred destiny, and sacrificial death" (Muller-Eahrenholz, 2007). Moreover, the persistent reenactment of such ceremonies contributes to social cohesion by enabling the public expression of emotion. This argument is clearly illustrated by the phenomenon of responses to the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, in 1997, after which the British, known for their emotional resilience (aka the "stiff upper lip"), participated in an outpouring of public grief and memorializing that included not only tears, but also flowers, cards, and candles placed in public places. As such, civil religion offers a functional equivalent or alternative to formal religion (Marshall, 1994) that contributes to collective conscience.

However, such an approach begs the question: if civil religion offers an instance of collective conscience, and if, as Durkheim suggests, collective conscience stands as independent of individuals, then what produces or creates contemporary collective conscience?

Viewpoints

Collective Conscience & Intersubjective Life

Scholars point to the way that Durkheim's emphasis on the collective conscience begs the question of how, in the absence of widespread shared beliefs that are routinely symbolized through rituals and practices, a collective sentiment can emerge and be widely held at all. Lawson (1999) argues that Durkheim hinted that social interaction can take on a life of its own that exists independently of the individuals doing the interaction: the collective process has a power that cannot be contained by individuals themselves. In a sense, as Lawson points out, it is this power that is invoked in George Herbert Mead's discussion of the role of language in the development of the self. The significance of the generalized other in internalizing the social, in the sense that the practices, ideas, language, and beliefs that individuals learn through processes of childhood socialization are inherently social, since these are collective social properties that must be internalized, privatized, and reproduced.

Lawson's study attempted to explain an instance of collective conscience in practice by observing consecutive prayer meetings. Lawson was interested in explaining the collective phenomenon known to charismatic Christians as the Holy Spirit, specifically a felt and observable presence (to those participating in the prayer meetings). Lawson posits that in the context of such meetings, individuals calibrate their own utterances (voiced prayers) to those of others by being attentive and cooperative. In doing so, participants seamlessly and unconsciously integrate themselves with a complex activity and enter what social psychologists have termed the "flow," a experiential condition in which the individual self feels at one with the external environment. These individuals may take this attitude of oneness into their personal prayer lives and in doing so create what Lawson calls a "charismatic ritual attitude" that can be understood as a manifestation of collective conscience. Thus, at least for Lawson, collective conscience is actively produced through intense, focused, and attentive social interactions.

Collective Conscience & the Law

Since morals and values may become blurred when society is made up of many groups, as in organic solidarity (Giddens, 1990), when conflict arises between groups, the law becomes an increasingly important mechanism for ensuring social and moral compliance. The law, in fact, represents common understandings of how various acts of social and moral transgression should be corrected. However, in advanced modern societies (organic solidarity) it can be difficult to discern the character of the collective conscience when it comes to such correction, since legal codes vary within and across societies.

Some researchers have noted that in relation to the law, the collective conscience is both gendered and racialized. For instance, Hagan and Foster (2006) argue that whereas white American youth whose partying behavior includes the use of drugs tend to be seen as "normally" deviant, the drug activity associated with young African Americans tends to be criminalized. The former is viewed as a rite of passage that, while deviant, is also secretly sanctioned by society (sowing wild oats, having fun while you are young); the latter is seen as criminal activity. Therefore, while Durkheim saw an expanded role for restitutive law and viewed it as an expression of collective conscience in the context of organic solidarity, nonetheless, its form and content varies within and across modern societies.

However, Durkheim was not only concerned with the role of formal law but also the implications of informal lawlessness in the context of organic solidarity; that is, in conditions of social change that precipitate social breakdown and individual disintegration. This state of affairs is called anomie.

Anomie

Anomie stems from a lack of regulating norms and the promotion of unrestricted desires, and it emerges for Durkheim as the lack of a relationship between the individual and society, as the predominant social ill of modern society (Marske, 1987). The Greek word anomia implies "without law" and Durkheim uses it in both The Division of Labor in Society and Suicide to suggest moral decay and social breakdown. In his attempt to both understand and to help, Durkheim indicates that societies vary dramatically with respect to the level of moral regulation they display. Rapid and/or extensive social change can diminish the regulative power of society and eventually result in a pathological condition of anomie. This underscores the significance of meaningful attachments to social groups as an eternal aspect of social solidarity (Marske, 1987).

Anomie emerges as society makes the transition from mechanical to organic solidarity, when conditions of specialization and differentiation move faster than conditions for social integration. A space develops between what is desirable and what is possible. In relation to suicide, anomie develops when economic regulation is reduced, in both times of bust or boom. At such times, people become confused because their economic bearings are lost and their desires for goods may become limitless, contributing to a state of meaninglessness.

Contemporary Notions of Collective Conscience

The notion of collective conscience has taken on a wider meaning and may refer to a set of understandings and appreciations of a field or topic that is broadly shared by members of society. For instance, in public health, there is a perception that HIV/AIDS made an impact on public consciousness (or collective conscience) precisely because it emerged predominantly in key social groups that were already socially marginalized (gay men, Haitians, sex workers, and drug users). Similarly, there is a perception among public health researchers and practitioners that there is a discernible collective conscience in relation to fatness which, in Western societies, is equated with laziness, moral laxity, and greed. Murray (2008) argues that this example of collective conscience shapes fatness as not only a problem for physical health, but also as a moral problem that has the potential to weaken the moral fabric of society. To support her case, she suggests that representations and ideas about fatness can be readily discerned, such that there are a range of cultural meanings about fatness that most people would be able to recognize, if not necessarily accept. For example, she argues:

…the fat woman (is presumed to be) inactive, lazy, defiant: she is out of control, she is a moral failure, she is unhealthy, she is an affront to normative feminine bodily aesthetics, she is a food addict, she cannot manage her desires, her level of intelligence is below average (Murray, 2008, p. 8).

Drawing on discourse analysis, Murray shows how popular discourses of fatness actively produce obesity as a medically recognized condition, because they rely on building up a collective conscience—a public platform—in which bodily difference becomes the basis for moral anxiety and which functions to separate those deemed fat from those deemed not fat and in doing so, create a sense of moral superiority and solidarity.

The idea of collective conscience is used in other ways: for instance, some researchers have observed how collective conscience can be stimulated through other social interactions and practices in ways that help communities give meaning and shape to their existence. For instance, the emergence of ethnic and civic nationalism in many European spaces has been possible, in part, via the mobilization of a collective conscience around identity, based on stimulating kinship ties, language, visual and literary images, and cultural artifacts. In modern Scotland, for instance, conscience collective has been evoked through cultural processes that point to a shared experience of victimization by the English (through films such as Braveheart); through a shared experience of social class (from novels by writers like William McIlvanney to stage productions by political theater groups like 7:84); and through a sense of civil distinctiveness from the rest of the United Kingdom.

Similarly, invoking collective memory can stimulate collective conscience and contribute to group solidarity in contexts of social change. For instance, one study (Ireland & Ellis, 2005) suggests that photographic images produced to memorialize the historical significance of a particular Cornish town as a fishing village, and sold to visitors as tourism developed as a main dimension of the local economy, also contributed to the strengthening of a local collective conscience. In part, this occurred because the photographs provided a direct link with the past and as such helped to create continuity with an occupational way of life (fishing) that had been replaced by tourism. The photographs helped to define the "concrete reality" of the village and reaffirm a sentiment of what it meant to be "a Cover": in this case, extensive kinship ties over several generations, a lived sense of familiarity (with the landscape, cycle tides, and weather patterns), and a sense of opposition to tourism.

Conclusion

The idea of collective conscience often lies behind the study of collective behavior in general, which is seen as "spontaneous and goal-oriented activity performed by a large number of people who try to develop a common solution to unclear situations" (Tesar & Doppen, 2007, p. 258), such as social movements (like feminism or the ecology movement), collective bargaining (as in trade unionism), and political activity (as in the grassroots mobilization of voters seen in the 2008 presidential primaries). Seen in this way, in the absence of the institutions and rituals that Durkheim identified as crucial to mechanical solidarity, there are many ways that collective conscience is influenced, such as through the mass media, social interaction (for instance, as seen in the example of the Holy Spirit's presence in the prayer group), and through artifacts (as in the case of the black and white photographs and Cornish identity mobilization). Therefore, collective conscience is not necessarily weaker in modern society; rather, as some research has shown, collective conscience is different in form and content and is produced through a variety of social processes.

Terms & Concepts

Anomie: A sense of individual meaninglessness and social Dislocation, which is the outcome of a disjunction between the promotion of unrestricted desires and a lack of regulating norms.

Civil Religion: In modern societies, civil ceremonies play a role in creating and sustaining social values and thus, contribute to collective conscience.

Collective Conscience: A prerequisite for social integration, according to Émile Durkheim. Refers to shared norms and beliefs that underpin social solidarity and contribute to a sense of belonging and group continuity.

Division of Labor: The development of different, specialized, but integrated activities.

Individualism: Condition in which the importance of the individual is privileged over the importance of the social.

Mechanical Solidarity: Mechanism of social integration in traditional societies through commonly shared tribe or group values and symbols.

Organic Solidarity: Social integration occurs through emphasis on individuality, specialist talents, and differentiation of activities and occupations.

Specialization: The separation of tasks within a division of labor.

Bibliography

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Durkheim, E, (1982). The rules of the sociological method. New York: Free Press.

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Hagan, J. & Foster, H. (2006). Profiles of punishment and privilege: Secret and disputed deviance during the racialized transition to American adulthood. Crime, Law & Social Change, 46 (1/2), 65–85. Retrieved August 5, 2008 from EBSCO online database SocINDEX with Full Text: http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=23547615&site=ehost-live

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Muller-Eahrenholz, C. (2007). America's battle for God: A European Christian looks at civil religion. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing.

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Slaughter, C. (2010). "Headless Fatties": The anonymous fat body as left-sacred collective representation. Conference Papers—American Sociological Association, 619. Retrieved October 25, 2013 from EBSCO Online Database SocINDEX with Full Text. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=86646708&site=ehost-live

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Suggested Reading

Aldridge, A. (2007). Religion in the contemporary world. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Fenton, S. (1984). Durkheim and modern society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hart, A., & Hoppenthaler, J. One love: Collective consciousness in rap and poetry of the hip-hop generation. (2012). Greenville, NC: East Carolina University.

Newburn, T. (2007). Criminology. Devon: Willan Publishing.

Wallace, R., & Fullilove, M. (2011). Collective consciousness and its discontents: Institutional distributed cognition, racial policy, and public health in the United States. New York, NY: Springer.

Young, S. (2007). Collective conscience in contemporary society. Accessed August 6, 2008 from Socyberty.http://www.socyberty.com/Sociology/Collective-Conscience-in-Modern-Society.69775