Enver Paşa

Armed Forces Personnel

• Born: November 22, 1881
• Birthplace: Constantinople, Ottoman Empire (now Istanbul, Turkey)
• Died: August 4, 1922
• Place of death: Near Baldzhuan, Turkistan (now Tajikistan)

Turkish military and political leader

As a leader of the Young Turks Revolution, Enver undermined the authority of the sultan and, as a member of the triumvirate, ruled the Ottoman Empire from 1913 to 1918. His promotion of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism during this time led Turkey into World War I on the side of the Triple Alliance and, ultimately, into defeat. After 1918, Enver pursued his Pan-Turkist ideology in Central Asia, where he unified and led disparate Basmachi bands against the Soviets.

Areas of achievement Government and politics, warfare and conquest

Early Life

Enver Paşa (ehn-VEHR pah-SHAH) was born to a relatively humble family living in Monastir. His father, Ahmet, was either a railway official or a porter before his promotion to Bey and later, as a member of Sultan Abdülhamid II’s retinue, to Paşa. Little is known about Enver’s mother, Aisha, other than that she was Albanian and that she held the lowest occupation in the empire that of laying out the dead. The eldest of six children, Enver grew up in Istanbul and Monastir, living with his parents and his Circassian grandmother. On graduation from high school in Istanbul, he joined the Mekteb-I Harbiyya (military academy), both in the regular officers’ training corps and as a general staffer.

In 1902, at his graduation, Enver ranked second in a class of five. As a general staff captain, he was assigned to the Third Army in Thessaloníki, then a hotbed of revolutionary activity against Abdülhamid. While serving in Macedonia, Enver undertook several successful military operations against the guerrillas there and, in 1906, was promoted to major; he was assigned to the Third Army headquarters in Monastir. At Monastir, through Mahmud şevket Paşa, Enver joined the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti) and became an active member of the Young Turks movement. He remained in government service to propagate the ideals of Committee of Union and Progress and to recruit members.

Because of the abundance of rival committees striving separately for the same goal and because of the secrecy of their masonry lodge meetings, the history of the Young Turks movement is shrouded in mystery. Two phases, however, are distinguishable. The first, or the Young Ottomans, had started in the 1820’s as a reaction against the technological and sociological advances of the West. While holding to Turko-Islamic traditions, the Ottomans desperately sought to make Turkey acceptable to Europe as a major power. Their efforts forced the Tanzimat on the sultans. The Tanzimat, a series of reforms implemented between 1839 and 1876, were set into motion by two major edicts the Noble Edict of the Rose Chamber (1839) and the Imperial Edict of 1856. As a result of these reforms, the focus of education shifted from the mekteb and hoca to the Western modes of instruction. Many curricula, including those of the naval, military, engineering, and medical schools, were revamped and modernized. Similar reforms in the spheres of law and commerce attracted foreign investment without committing the empire to extraterritoriality.

These early reforms, introduced by a disgruntled sultan, were opposed by various groups, including those led by Namik Kemal and Midhat Paşa, on the grounds that they were anti-Islamic and elitist. To appease the opposition, in 1876 the court granted an elected parliament and a nominal constitution written by Midhat Paşa. The sultan, however, retained legislative power and the right to dissolve the parliament. Hardly a year passed before the sultan implemented the latter right. The dissolution of the parliament then led to the formation of new pockets of resistance and to a renewal of the struggle for democracy. Unlike the first, this phase of the struggle had its center in a cosmopolitan region of the empire, accessible to Western guidance and aid. Furthermore, it recruited volunteers from among the sultan’s own army, especially from the discontented and adventurous youths serving in the Third Army Corps in the far-off regions of Monastir and Salonika (now Thessaloníki). Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk) and Enver Bey (later Enver Paşa) were recruited in Macedonia at this time.

Life’s Work

By 1908, Enver was fully in charge of the Committee of Union and Progress operations in his region. His widespread activities could no longer be masked from the sultan’s many spies. This was true to the point that when the sultan launched an investigation in Macedonia to determine the source of discontent, Enver eliminated the royal inspector to prevent damaging reports from reaching the Porte. Consequently, when promoted and transferred to Istanbul rather than to the capital, Enver headed for the hills. His rebellion captured the imagination of the people of the region and of the empire. A few days later, Major Niyazi Bey followed Enver’s example. He, however, took the company’s ammunition, cash, and a large number of troops along with him. After Niyazi, defection in the Third Army became the norm. Enver’s opportunity to attack the Porte was realized when the sultan forced the prime minister and the president of the chamber to resign. Accompanying şevket, Enver stormed Istanbul in 1909 and emerged as the foremost leader of the Young Turks Revolution. Midhat’s 1876 constitution was reinstated, and şevket became the grand vizier.

Between 1909 and 1911, Enver served as military attaché in Berlin, where he gained fluency in German and competence in military skills. He also became an advocate of the invincibility of the German might. In the Libyan campaign, which he joined on hearing about it in Germany, he distinguished himself as a hero and, in spite of Turkish losses, received a double promotion to lieutenant general and was appointed the governor of Benghazi (1912).

Enver returned from Benghazi in 1913 to overthrow the Liberal Party of Kamil Paşa and reinstate the Committee of Union and Progress. Subsequent events, including the assassinations of the grand vizier and the minister of war, Enver’s heroic recapturing of Edirne (1913) from the Bulgarians (who had already pulled out their forces), and a lack of leadership on the part of the sultan, necessitated the establishment of a triumvirate to rule the empire. This consisted of Enver (minister of war), Mehmed Talat Paşa (minister of the interior), and Ahmed Cemal Paşa (minister of the navy). The sultan was confined to a poorly budgeted palace, while Enver initiated clandestine negotiations with Germany in support of the alliance against Russia. Enver then eased Turkey into World War I in 1914 by officially attacking Odessa, using the German cruisers Goeben and Braslau.

Enver was a slender man with wide-set, fiery eyes and a well-groomed, upturned Kaiser Wilhelm mustache. At parties, he was suave, gentle, and charming. In battle he was daring and extremely courageous; he had an unlimited reserve of energy. He wore the Turkish officer’s khaki tunic, German lace-up field boots and Central Asian breeches and fur cap. In his pocket, Enver carried a copy of the Qur՚ān and at his side a revolver and a saber.

As minister of war, Enver was in charge of Turkey’s four fronts, in Europe, Syria-Palestine, Iraq, and the Caucasus. His record shows brilliant spots the capture of Edirne, for example and shortcomings in the administration of the war effort. Troops needed desperately in Azerbaijan were fruitlessly engaged in the European theater, forces in Arabia were totally neglected, and German consultants were allowed to countermand orders issued by Ottoman officers. He personally led the 150,000-strong Third Army against the smaller Russian Seventh Army in the Caucasus in the dead of winter (1914-1915). In Armenia, he fielded ninety thousand ill-equipped, hungry troops in a pincer formation that had been enlarged on the spur of the moment. Because the decision to enlarge the pincer altered the original timing, the attack had to be made piecemeal. Defeated, near Sarikamiş, one corps laid down its arms while the rest braved the icy passes to Erzurum. Twelve thousand survived while thirty thousand perished in blizzards. Until the fall of the Committee of Union and Progress, even mentioning Sarikamiş, Enver’s last command as the minister of war, was forbidden.

The Battle of the Caucasus was a turning point in the lives of two rivals: Enver, whose career took a downturn, and his archrival and former chief of staff, Atatürk, whose career rose steadily until he defeated the Allies at Gallipoli and blocked the Dardanelles in 1916. In the years that followed, Enver tried to erase the memory of Sarakamiş by achieving resounding successes, but even his brother Nuri Paşa’s temporary annexation of the industrial center of Baku failed to restore Enver’s fading prestige. After the fall of the empire, Enver was tried and, along with two close allies, was sentenced to death in absentia. He fled to Berlin (1918) and from there to the Soviet Union and Central Asia. In the Soviet Union, he participated in the famous Baku Conference and met with Vladimir Ilich Lenin in Moscow. Apparently, Lenin commissioned Enver to aid the Soviets against the British in India by rallying the Muslims of the East to the cause of the workingman and of Islam.

In 1921, after the assassination of Talat Paşa, an event that made him the undisputed leader of the Committee of Union and Progress in exile, Enver arrived in Bukhara. With the aid of the Turks of Central Asia, the goodwill of the subjects of the now defunct Ottoman Empire, and the young Soviet state, Enver hoped to depose Atatürk’s nascent administration in Turkey. Subsequent events, however, especially Atatürk’s victory at Sakarya and his signing of the Treaty of Kars (1921) with the Soviets, adversely affected Enver’s future plans. Desperate, Enver retired to eastern Bukhara and joined the Basmachi leaders. He stayed with the Basmachis, still hoping to realize his dream of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism. In spite of initial gains he succeeded in capturing Dushanbe he made little headway toward achieving his lofty goal. Furthermore, the Soviets could ill afford the international prestige being gained by the rebels, who now boasted of having attracted the support of the former emir of Bukhara, the goodwill of the king of Afghanistan, and the services of an exemplary Islamic mujāhid. They responded with the Red Army’s bullets and cannonballs. Enver’s saber proved of less value in this battle than it had in the more spectacular ones he had led against the Allies in Europe and North Africa.

Enver died on August 4, 1922, near Baldzhuan, of a wound sustained while leading a cavalry charge. The following day, he was buried by his men in the same field where he had fallen. Enver was survived by his wife, Emine Najiye Sultan, a niece of the reigning sultan. In 1914, his marriage had brought both Enver and his father the title of Paşa. He was also survived by two daughters and a son, Ali Enver.

Significance

Enver’s last years were busy and diverse. He was the minister of war of the Ottoman Empire, but after the fall of the empire he became a dispossessed ruler, like Bābur in search of a kingdom. His life was dedicated to the cause of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism. Nevertheless, self-aggrandizement ranked quite high on his roster of priorities, as did the well-being of the masses, proper administration of civil and military cadres, and the concerns of the court, although to a smaller degree. This attitude lifted Enver from a nonentity to the office of the minister of war of a major world empire within a short time. His lack of merit for the position then brought shame to him and resounding defeat to this empire. Ironically, the same pattern of success was repeated in Central Asia, only in reverse. There, other astute generals and statesmen used Enver’s prestige and renown to their advantage while Enver failed to use them in the same way.

Enver did not realize that centuries of contact with Europe had created a considerable ideological gap between the cosmopolitan Ottomans and their kin in Turkistan. The latter still gravitated around clan and lineage leadership whereby each kūrbāshi (Basmachi leader) sought the full control of his own jigits (young brave). The revival of empires was no longer a cause for which the youths of Kokand, Khiva, and Bukhara would go to war. In fact, soon after Enver’s death, the Soviets capitalized on the potential fragmentation of Turkistan and pacified rebels such as Madamin Bek and Irgash; they were made kūrbāshis with temporary and limited tribal rights. These rights, however, would not have been granted to the chiefs if the latter had not associated with Enver.

Perhaps the last Turkish general to attack artillery with a saber to prove his love of Turkism and Islam, Enver was more of a relic than a twentieth century statesman and commander. The demise of real empires around him, the British evacuation of Afghanistan, the fragmentation of the Middle East, and the motives behind the rise of the Young Turks, the Young Khivans, and the Young Bukharans all eluded him. He could have made a difference if as the minister of war he had not ignored the type of important political gains that made Atatürk famous. Yet, rather than working for independence and the rights of the Turks to a homeland, Enver placed his total trust in the shadowy concepts of Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turkism, and the sword.

Bibliography

Barber, Noble. The Sultans. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1973. Concentrating on the years of decline of the Ottoman Empire, Barber discusses Enver’s involvement in the affairs of the empire between 1908 and 1918 in relation to the activities of Abdülhamid II and of Atatürk. As a narrative about the events as they could have happened, it is a good book to read. It is not, however, either an accurate or a reliable account. The book has a number of good maps and illustrations and includes a bibliography and an index.

Caroe, Olaf. Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism. 2d ed. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1967. Caroe discusses the ethnic and religious problems of the Soviet Republics in the context of their ancient and medieval history. Enver’s association with leaders of the Eastern Turks is of special interest. The book contains good maps, a bibliography, and a comprehensive index.

Hanioǧlu, M. Sükrü. Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Updated and comprehensive examination of the Young Turks Revolution of 1908-1909, including discussion of Enver.

Hopkirk, Peter. Setting the East Ablaze: Lenin’s Dream of an Empire in Asia. New York: W. W. Norton, 1984. Primarily a study of the causes of tension between Russia and Great Britain, this book places the latter part of Enver’s life in perspective. A thorough discussion of Manalpendra Nath Roy, the professional Indian revolutionary and Marxist theoretician, illustrates the caliber of people with whom Enver had to contend to gain permission to unite the Central Asians around the Bolshevik cause. This work is illustrated and contains two maps, a bibliography, and an index.

Hostler, Charles Warren. The Turks of Central Asia. 1957. Rev. ed. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993. This work deals with Pan-Turkism as the policy of the Young Turks during World War I and as promoted by Enver in Turkistan in 1921-1922. The study includes a brief biography of Enver. The book has a number of appendixes, including biographies of major figures, a bibliography, and an index.

Lewis, Bernard. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. 3d ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Lewis discusses successive Ottoman reforms from the onset of Westernization to the 1950’s. His treatment of Enver as the minister of war and as a member of the triumvirate in Turkey is sketchy and incomplete. No discussion of Enver’s later days in Central Asia, even though Central Asia served as the crucible for Enver’s character. Includes maps, a selected bibliography, and a comprehensive index.

Marwat, Fazal-ur-Rahim. The Basmachi Movement in Soviet Central Asia: A Study in Political Development. Peshawar: Emjay Books, 1985. This is a study of the Basmachi struggle from the 1917 revolution to the disintegration of the movement in the late 1920’s. It discusses the genesis of the struggle, the diverse motives of the participants, and the causes of its decline and fall. Enver’s life is dealt with in the context of the movement as well as in a separate biographical sketch. Illustrated, with appendixes, an extensive bibliography, and an index.

Ramsaur, Ernest Edmondson. The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908. 1957. Reprint. New York: Russell & Russell, 1970. This book investigates the genesis of the Young Turks movement from the onset of Western influence in the Ottoman Empire and the rise of the “Young Ottomans” to the reinstitution of the 1876 constitution by Abdülhamid II. Includes a bibliography and an index.

Vucinich, Wayne S. The Ottoman Empire: Its Record and Legacy. 1965. Reprint. Huntington, N.Y.: R. E. Krieger, 1979. Vucinich analyzes the Ottoman Empire into its many constituent structures and, with great precision and care, discusses aspects of development and change in each substructure. Although he does not deal with Enver at great length, he clearly juxtaposes the dynamics of Turkism and Pan-Islamism with Ottomanism and nationalism. The book has two parts; a discussion of the Ottoman legacy is followed by nineteen related reading passages. Includes a bibliography and an index.

Yale, William. The Near East: A Modern History. 1958. New ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968. This book surveys Ottoman history, concentrating on the Young Turks’ contribution to World War I. Ottoman involvement, including Enver’s war years, is examined in detail in relation to campaigns waged in Europe, Palestine, Iraq, and Azerbaijan. The chapters are divided into sections and subsections to allow thorough coverage of topics and events. The book has comprehensive notes, a number of maps, a list of suggested readings, and an index.

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