Formosa Resolution
The Formosa Resolution is a significant legislative act adopted by the U.S. Congress in January 1955 during the context of the first Taiwan Strait Crisis. This resolution authorized President Dwight D. Eisenhower to employ U.S. armed forces to defend Taiwan and associated islands against potential armed attacks, particularly from the People's Republic of China (PRC). The backdrop of the resolution involved PRC artillery bombardments of the Jinmen and Mazu islands, which were controlled by the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek.
The resolution was characterized by its flexible language, allowing for broader military action without explicitly naming specific territories. It aimed to deter both the PRC and the Soviet Union by expressing U.S. commitment to safeguarding its security interests in the region, especially while awaiting Senate ratification of a U.S.-China Mutual Defense Treaty. Despite some congressional dissent regarding the commitment to defend offshore islands, the resolution was overwhelmingly passed, reinforcing the U.S. political and military alliance with Taiwan. The Formosa Resolution set a precedent for American involvement in Taiwan's defense during subsequent crises, notably the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958.
Formosa Resolution
Identification Federal legislation regarding U.S. foreign and military policy in Asia
Date Signed on January 29, 1955
As a means to prevent communist expansion in East Asia, the Formosa Resolution became part of Cold War foreign policy and set a precedent by allowing congressional advance authorization for a president to deploy U.S. forces in overseas conflicts.
The U.S. Congress adopted the Formosa Resolution during the first Taiwan Strait Crisis, which began in September, 1954, when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) commenced the artillery bombardment of the islands of Jinmen and Mazu. The bill authorized President Dwight D. Eisenhower to utilize U.S. armed forces to defend Taiwan and nearby islands against armed attack. Eisenhower also received power to protect “such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands” as he determined was necessary or appropriate to secure their defense. Moreover, to secure U.S. interests in the region, the resolution identified the need for friendly governments to possess the Western Pacific island chain that included Taiwan.
In January, 1955, Eisenhower asked Congress to pass the Formosa Resolution after PRC forces threatened to seize several islands 200 miles north of Taiwan, which were under control of the Nationalist government ruled by Chiang Kai-shek . Drafters of the legislation purposely included elastic language in order to authorize U.S. action to defend Nationalist-held offshore islands without specifically naming them. Following a strategy of deterrence, Eisenhower wanted to signal to both the PRC and the Soviet Union that the United States would protect its vital security interests and defend the Republic of China on Taiwan, especially because the Senate had yet to ratify the U.S.-China Mutual Defense Treaty signed the prior December. Some Democrats in Congress doubted the wisdom of a U.S. commitment to defend the offshore islands, but the vote for passage was 410 to 3 in the House and 85 to 3 in the Senate.
Impact
The Formosa Resolution strengthened the United States’ political and military connection with the Republic of China on Taiwan. The Eisenhower administration later relied on it to justify protecting Jinmen and Mazu during the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958.
Bibliography
Accinelli, Robert D. Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy Toward Taiwan, 1950-1955. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996. A balanced and judicious study that demonstrates how the Formosa Resolution provided a way for the Eisenhower administration to assume a firm stand against communist expansion in East Asia but at the price of formalizing the previously avoided U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan.
Chang, Gordon. Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990. This thorough account of the early Cold War shows that the United States began to pursue a partnership with the Soviet Union against China long before the Nixon administration adopted the policy of détente.