Indo-Pakistani Wars

At issue: Location of the border, ethnic differences

Date: April/September, 1965; December, 1971

Location: West Pakistan/India border, East Pakistan (Bangladesh)

Combatants: Indians vs. Pakistanis

Principal commanders:Indian, Prime Minister Lal Shastri (1904–1966); Pakistani, General Muhammed Ayub Khan (1907–1974)

Principal battles: Chhamb-Akhnour, Lahore, Dacca

Result: The 1965 war was a draw; the 1971 war gave East Pakistan independence as Bangladesh and increased Indian military prestige

Background

India and West Pakistan aggressively contested the border regions they shared, especially Kashmir. China’s 1962 attack on India’s east Kashmir territory complicated matters by revealing Indian military deficiencies and introducing a third nation into the Kashmir power struggle. In late 1964, India exerted more political control over its Kashmir holdings, upsetting Pakistan and inciting guerrilla attacks by Pakistani sympathizers, whom India claimed were Pakistani soldiers. Sure of China’s support and India’s apparent military problems, Pakistan forcefully responded to Indian provocations.

Action

In April, 1965, Pakistani forces fighting along the southern coastal borderland seized land. Kashmir unrest intensified as India took control of Pakistani outposts that summer. On September 1, Pakistani armored units attacked the Chhamb-Akhnour corridor that allowed India access to Kashmir. The assault stalled. On September 6, Indian forces moved against Lahore, Pakistan, but were stopped. Each side made further armored thrusts near these original attack zones, but all stalemated after costly struggle.

Each country launched wide-ranging air attacks, and Pakistan’s American-built jets and India’s British-supplied jets achieved an aerial draw. The Pakistani navy sank one Indian frigate and bombarded a shore base. After an international arms embargo created supply shortages for both sides, Pakistan and India agreed to a United Nations cease-fire on September 23, 1965. The two sides’ victory claims widely differed, but each country’s accepted loss figures included thousands of troops and at least one hundred tanks. Both sides made small territorial gains, but in their January, 1966, Tashkent, Soviet Union peace conference, Prime Minister Lal Shastri and General Muhammed Ayub Khan agreed to nullify these gains. Both sides lost prestige, especially Pakistani military leaders. They did not actively defend East Pakistan, relying instead on China to intimidate India. This contributed to East Pakistani discontent.

In 1971, Pakistan consisted of two territories separated by India. Though united by their Muslim faith, East and West Pakistanis differed in language and culture. Further, West Pakistanis dominated the country’s military government, which ignored the far more populous East Pakistanis. Military leaders authorized elections in 1970, expecting results to somehow negate East Pakistan’s numerical superiority. They rejected the resulting East Pakistani landslide and violently suppressed East Pakistani protests in March, 1971.

The ensuing refugee onslaught into India angered that country, which actively supported East Pakistan’s Mukti Bahini (People’s Force) guerrilla campaign. Confident in its improved military, India escalated East Pakistan border skirmishes. Expecting forceful West Pakistani retaliation, India prepared for war.

West Pakistan’s December 3, 1971, evening surprise air strike failed because it did not fully commit its air force. This problem persisted during the war because of apparent supply problems and internal political concerns. The Indians easily weathered the attack, and Pakistani caution allowed its air force, which had improved its air-ground coordination, to assist Indian armies decisively.

West Pakistan’s armored forces attacked all along the central and northern border. They were repulsed by India’s combined air-ground firepower. Though its counterattacks achieved little, India gained some territory in the Sindh southern border region.

The Indian navy controlled both West and East Pakistan’s sea approaches, as its ships and carrier planes stifled Pakistani army movements near the coasts. This especially helped in river-dominated East Pakistan, where water obstacles alone could impede any army advance. There, the Indian army quickly advanced from all borders, bypassing Pakistani strongholds and using aircraft for artillery support and cross-river transportation. A heliborne river crossing and paratroop assault east and north of East Pakistan’s capital, Dacca, blocked retreating Pakistani forces and enabled the city’s capture. The Pakistani army’s December 16, 1971, surrender in Dacca ended the war.

Aftermath

Pakistan’s casualties numbered 8,000 dead and 85,000 captured. It lost several ships and was forced to give up East Pakistan, which became Bangladesh. On the Indian side, about 3,000 troops were killed, and one ship sunk. The war enhanced India’s military reputation and allowed it to achieve moderate territorial gains on West Pakistan’s border. Air losses for both sides were even.

Bibliography

Burke, S. M. Pakistan’s Foreign Policy. London: Oxford University Press, 1973.

Chopra, Pran. India’s Second Liberation. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974.

Jackson, Robert. South Asian Crisis. New York: Praeger, 1975.

Marshall, Kathryn. Indira Gandhi. New York: Watford, 1997.

Nath, Birbal. Kashmir: The Nuclear Flashpoint. New Delhi: Manas Publications, 1998.