Joseph Chamberlain

British politician

• Born: July 8, 1836
• Birthplace: London, England
• Died: July 2, 1914
• Place of death: Highbury, Birmingham, England

Perhaps the most important Victorian statesman who never became prime minister, Chamberlain was an influential politician who supported the British Empire and a strong economic union between its members.

Early Life

The son of a Unitarian shoemaker, Joseph Chamberlain received his early education in London at one of the most famous of the dissenting academies, University College School. After graduation he planned to attend University College, but his father opposed “that godless school.” In addition, his father refused to educate Chamberlain any more than he would be able to afford for his younger sons, and instead offered Chamberlain two hundred pounds to enter the ministry, which was refused.

At the age of eighteen Chamberlain was sent from London to Birmingham to represent his father’s interests in a family woodscrew-manufacturing firm that had been influenced by an American invention for screw manufacturing displayed at the Crystal Palace Exhibit of 1851. In Birmingham, Chamberlain prospered, retiring with a comfortable income after twenty successful years in business. Machine technology had made him rich, and he now turned his attention to social engineering. Chamberlain’s first foray into the political world involved his election to the Birmingham school board in 1870. Chamberlain strongly stressed the principle that education should be universal, compulsory, and free. His efforts on behalf of educational reform led him to higher office, first as city councillor, later as mayor.

Life’s Work

While mayor of Birmingham, Chamberlain established a reputation as a radical; he endeavored in particular to improve housing conditions and public education. Encouraged by his local political successes, in 1876 he entered Parliament as a Liberal member from Birmingham. Birmingham, one of the large industrial towns to benefit from the Reform Bill of 1867, was allotted three seats in the House of Commons, and all three were dominated by the Liberal Party.

By close association in the House with Sir Charles Dilke, Chamberlain was able to rise in party prominence until the 1880 elections, when he was invited by Prime Minister William Gladstone to serve in his cabinet as president of the Board of Trade. Although still a virtual newcomer after only four years in the Commons, Chamberlain benefited from a disagreement between Gladstone and Dilke on the choice of a government post. Dilke had contacted Gladstone about cabinet posts for himself and his friend Chamberlain. “I also think that we are far more powerful together than separated,” claimed Dilke; Gladstone’s compromise was to give a minor cabinet job to Chamberlain and the undersecretaryship to Dilke.

Although Chamberlain held radical views on questions of social reform, he was traditional in his sense of maintaining and expanding the British Empire. When Gladstone introduced an Irish home rule (political autonomy) bill in 1886, Chamberlain chose to resign from the cabinet rather than support the government’s policy. “I can never consent to regard Ireland as a separate people,” he claimed, “with the inherent rights of an absolutely independent community.” Chamberlain then founded the National Liberal Federation , which he hoped would become a national party in opposition to the Gladstonian Liberals; instead, his dissenting effort forged an influential role for himself in an ultimate union with the Conservative Party.

In 1895, the marquis of Salisbury formed a coalition government, a combination of traditional Conservatives and the followers of Chamberlain, called Liberal Unionists. Chamberlain could have named practically any cabinet position for himself but chose the Colonial Office as the agency with which to propel himself into national prominence for the next decade. For Chamberlain, the Colonial Office allowed him to fulfill an imperial vision he had long relished: “I said again I should prefer the Colonies—in the hope of furthering closer union between them and the United Kingdom.” While colonial secretary he maintained two objectives: cementing the ties between Great Britain and the colonies, and increasing the trade within the empire. The passive imperialism of the 1870’s had been replaced during the 1890’s with pride in Great Britain’s imperial possessions and a belief that Great Britain was becoming a world state, with its colonies an extension of itself. The word “imperialism” had come to defend proudly Great Britain’s civilizing mission along with the British system of peace and good government.

To help spread the concept of good government and preservation of peace, Chamberlain favored an imperial Zollverein, a union of freely trading partners within the empire. He thought that a commercial union would give an opportunity to call together representatives from various parts of the empire—a gathering that could lead to the creation of an imperial council, one step along the way toward an imperial federal parliament. An opportunity arose in 1897, the year of Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee celebrating her sixty-year reign; representatives from throughout the empire had gathered in London to mark the occasion. An informal conference with the colonial representatives was arranged, with Chamberlain presiding, but sentiments were mixed as to whether there was a need for an imperial parliament. The best Chamberlain could solicit was an agreement for periodic conferences for the discussion of “matters of common interest.” The subsequent colonial conferences became, therefore, the means by which colonial views came to be aired collectively. Those views, however, were never united.

Of all Chamberlain’s imperial activities, he is most closely associated with those in Southern Africa, which was to serve as a proving ground for the Victorian mission of progress. Such lofty ideals, however, were quickly cast aside when gold and diamonds were discovered there during the 1870’s. Chamberlain’s policies in South Africa were influenced by the interests of Cecil Rhodes and his fellow mining magnates, who had practically overwhelmed the two small agrarian states of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Both were sparsely populated with Afrikaner (Boer) farmers descended from Dutch settlers, but had been inundated with outsiders (uitlanders) who poured into the mining areas during the gold and diamond rush.

Rhodes, having made a tremendous fortune, became convinced that all Southern Africa should come under British control. Resistance by the Afrikaners persuaded Rhodes and his friends that the only solution to this dilemma was a military one. As a result, they hatched a half-baked scheme for the invasion of the Afrikaner republics, which led to the ill-fated Jameson Raid of 1895-1896. Chamberlain seems to have had knowledge of the plan, as he informed the prime minister on December 26, 1895, that there would probably be an uprising in the Afrikaner republics within the next several days. During the subsequent debate in the Commons over responsibility for the raid, Chamberlain asserted that all parties other than Leander Starr Jameson were “equally ignorant” of the plans for the raid, and a parliamentary investigation cleared Chamberlain of any complicity. Following the raid, the Afrikaner republics began a frantic arms build-up that better prepared them for the war that began with Great Britain in 1899.

Scholars have debated the role of Chamberlain in fomenting the resultant South African (Boer) War of 1899-1902. Although he was exonerated by the House of Commons for complicity in the Jameson Raid, modern scholars have proved his strong interest in the need for British annexation of the Afrikaner republics and exposed his gift to Rhodes of a free hand in the attempted Jameson takeover. Before the war there was no strong public demand for war, but Chamberlain, increasingly influential in the Salisbury government, was able to win support from several members of the cabinet for strong ultimatums sent to the Afrikaner republics—ultimatums that could only be rejected by the Afrikaners.

Following the war, in 1903 Chamberlain resigned from the Conservative-Unionist government over the question of whether tariff barriers for the members of the empire should be reduced, thus creating an imperial customs union. He spent the remainder of his public life campaigning for his plan of “imperial preference,” which would create a commercial union to solidify the empire. In a speech in Birmingham on May 15, 1903, he made his formal declaration for imperial preference. This speech has been described as a turning point in Edwardian politics. The issue threatened to divide not only the cabinet but also the country and the empire.

Chamberlain began a whistle-stop tour in the autumn of 1903 to take his imperial preference plan to the people. His speeches were tailored to meet the interest of each audience, discussing mining in Cardiff, agriculture in the provinces, and industry in Birmingham. In several by-elections in December, 1903, the success of his efforts was demonstrated. Even Chamberlain commented on how impressive were the effects of his speeches in winning over two opposition seats to the side of the government. A powerful Tariff Reform League was established and headquartered in his home bastion of Birmingham. In spite of the growing influence of Chamberlain within the Unionist cabinet and the increasing monies spent on his crusade, Chamberlain’s hold on the country declined by early 1904, and he was never again able to ride such a political crest. The tariff reform campaign failed to persuade the British masses.

In addition to winning over the country, Chamberlain also had to deal with a deteriorating relationship with Lord Salisbury’s successor as prime minister, his nephew Arthur James Balfour. Balfour, far more philosophically conservative than Chamberlain, had to be won over to preferential tariffs and active social reform. By 1905, however, elections had to be called, and the coalition government of Chamberlain and Balfour was voted out of office by the Liberal Party.

In the short term Chamberlain won a personal victory over Balfour. In the long run, however, Chamberlain failed entirely in his imperial and tariff schemes. On July 10, 1906, he delivered an exhausting speech at Bingly Hall, Birmingham. The next day, after returning to London for a Tariff Commission meeting, he felt “a wreck.” On the evening of the eleventh he collapsed with a stroke that paralyzed his right side. Chamberlain would never again actively participate in politics. He was confined to a wheelchair until he died suddenly in Birmingham in July, 1914.

Significance

Joseph Chamberlain possessed great gifts of personality, oratory, and intellect. During his career he was an overwhelming success as businessperson, mayor, House of Commons member, and cabinet member. At various times he almost captured the leadership of both the Liberal and Conservative parties. He also almost brought about a colonial policy that would unite the empire economically. Ultimately, however, he failed. His failures have been blamed on a variety of causes. He was known to be excessively impulsive. “Pushful Joe,” as he was sometimes called, with his monocle in place, his orchid in his lapel, and his ostentatious home in Birmingham, was considered by a still strongly aristocratic political world to be “just a tradesman” overreaching his station.

On the other hand, there are perhaps more subtle accomplishments to the career of Joseph Chamberlain. Beginning with his political origins in Birmingham he was able to recognize the coming influence of the newly enfranchised masses. He was able to construct a political machine in Birmingham that expanded to a national scale during his early days in Parliament, and his organizational tactics were used by both Liberals and Conservatives, as well as much later, by the Labour Party. His business background also gave Chamberlain increased sensitivity to Great Britain’s industrial decline toward the end of the nineteenth century; he was far more in touch with business realities, for example, than either Salisbury or Balfour. Perhaps one reason for the failure of his dream of imperial preference was the too favorable position it provided for Great Britain; the colonies would gain little while Great Britain would benefit greatly.

There was one additional significant gift for Great Britain left by Joseph Chamberlain. His two sons were major figures in British political affairs well into the twentieth century. The elder son, Austen (1863-1937), held high cabinet office, was offered the prime ministry twice, and, in 1925, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his work on the Locarno peace pact. The younger son, Neville (1869-1940), held cabinet rank and was prime minister from 1937 to 1940. Joseph Chamberlain, therefore, founded a brief political dynasty unique in British history.

Bibliography

Chamberlain, Joseph L. Mr. Chamberlain’s Speeches. Edited by C. W. Boyd. 2 vols. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1914. A collection of some of the most representative of Chamberlain’s speeches.

‗‗‗‗‗‗‗. A Political Memoir, 1880-1892. Edited by C. H. D. Howard. London: Batchworth Press, 1953. An autobiographical fragment that unfortunately stops just at the climax of Chamberlain’s career. This account deals primarily with the making of a politician.

Drus, Ethel. “A Report on the Papers of Joseph Chamberlain Relating to the Jameson Raid and the Inquiry.” Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 25 (1952). One of several studies of Chamberlain’s role in the Jameson Raid. Although a parliamentary commission exonerated Chamberlain of playing any part, scholars such as Drus have been far more critical.

Fraser, Peter. Joseph Chamberlain. London: Cassell, 1966. Until recently, this was the standard biography. Although it is still quite reliable for general information, it does not contain the most recent interpretations.

Garvin, J. L., and Julian Amery. Life of Joseph Chamberlain. 6 vols. London: Macmillan, 1934-1969. This massive “official” biography is quite sympathetic to Chamberlain and reproduces numerous letters and documents.

Jay, Richard. Joseph Chamberlain: A Political Study. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1981. Perhaps the best interpretive study. This account incorporates the best scholarship then available and tries to set Chamberlain in his times.

Judd, Denis. Radical Joe: A Life of Joseph Chamberlain. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1977. One of the newer interpretive works. This biography provides a serviceable survey, although it fails to be entirely convincing in some of its attempts at breaking new ground.

Marsh, Peter T. Joseph Chamberlain: Entrepreneur in Politics. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994. More recent biography of Chamberlain, describing his initial career in private industry and dissecting his subsequent career in politics. The majority of the book focuses on his role as colonial secretary from 1895 through 1903.

Parsons, Neil. King Khama, Emperor Joe, and the Great White Queen: Victorian Britain Through African Eyes. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. In 1895, the Ngwato ruler Khama III and two other Tswana chiefs went to London to implore Queen Victoria not to cede Southern Africa’s Bechuanaland Protectorate (modern Botswana) to Cecil Rhodes’s British South Africa Company. Denied an audience with the queen, they pled their case directly to the public, gaining support for their cause and leading Chamberlain to draft a settlement allowing Bechuanaland to remain independent of Rhodesia (modern Zimbabwe). Parsons’s book describes the chiefs’ journey, providing an African perspective on British imperialism.

Tyler, J. E. The Struggle for Imperial Unity. London: Longmans, Green, 1938. A work that stresses the economic background of the imperial preference battle from the time before Chamberlain became involved until he was fully committed to the fray.