Lennart Torstenson

Swedish military leader

• Born: August 17, 1603
• Birthplace: Forstena, Västergötland, Sweden
• Died: April 7, 1651
• Place of death: Stockholm, Sweden

Torstenson has been called the “father of field artillery.” He ably advanced the reforms in artillery introduced by King Gustavus II Adolphus and made standardized, mobile, rapid-firing field artillery the decisive factor in several Swedish victories of the Thirty Years’ War, thereby introducing these reforms to the rest of Europe.

Early Life

Lennart Torstenson (LEHN-nahrt TOHR-stehn-sohn) began his service to the Swedish crown as a page in 1618. From 1621 to 1623, he accompanied the king on the Livonian Campaign. During that service, he impressed the king sufficiently to be sent to study for two years in the Netherlands under Maurice of Nassau , prince of Orange. Maurice was one of the first to recognize fully the potential of artillery, and he was a pioneer in developing professional, regularly paid, and rigidly trained and disciplined armies. He developed a dependable supply system for the army, which provided well-stocked commissariats wherever the army moved. He introduced the concept of well-coordinated, combined use of infantry and cavalry, to which he now added artillery. He also began to standardize artillery calibers. Maurice, however, still envisioned a rather static role for artillery in siege work as well as on the battlefield. Students from all over Europe, especially from the Protestant countries, were introduced by him to these military reforms, and nowhere were these reforms more effectively adopted and advanced than in Sweden.

Following this training, the young Torstenson served in the campaign against Prussia during the early part of the Thirty Years’ War, a war that raged from 1618 to 1648. Gustavus II Adolphus, himself a pioneer in the modernization and standardization of field artillery, put Torstenson, age twenty-seven, in command of the first field artillery regiment organized in Europe. By that time, Gustavus had carried out impressive modifications of the formerly unwieldy and unreliable artillery. He had reduced the former sixteen types of guns to three—the 3-, 12-, and 24-pounders. The latter was now the heaviest gun, replacing the former 48-pounder. Only the 3-pounders (in British sources frequently referred to as 4-pounders) and 12-pounders, however, were classed as field artillery. The comparatively light 3-pounder (weighing five hundred pounds) could be moved and operated in the field by one or two horses and two or three men, thus making it possible to employ artillery in fluid battlefield situations.

For the first time, artillery was an effective antipersonnel weapon, usually firing canister or grapeshot, having almost the effect of an automatic weapon. These new guns could also provide more rapid fire than older guns, since the shot was attached by straps to the bag holding the powder charge, enabling rapid loading. Newer technology also made possible the construction of lighter and shorter gun barrels. The development of a more standard and safer gunpowder helped to maintain and even improve consistency in range and accuracy, despite the lighter weight and the shorter barrels. Science and technology were rapidly becoming integral elements of modern warfare. Another aspect of these reforms was the substantial increase in the number of artillery pieces in the Swedish army, made possible in part by Sweden’s ample supply of copper, until the ratio between guns and men was an unprecedented 9.4 guns for every one thousand men. Gustavus attached two of the light and mobile 3-pounder field guns to every infantry and cavalry regiment. Torstenson inherited these reforms and continued to build on them.

Life’s Work

Torstenson’s first major achievement came during the Swedish phase of the Thirty Years’ War, in the Battle of Breitenfeld near Leipzig (September, 1631), when his gunners were able to deliver a rate of fire three times that of their German imperial opponents. (The 3-pounders could also fire eight rounds for every six fired by the musketeers.) He was also able to exploit his artillery’s greater mobility and move the guns up with the advancing infantry during the decisive counterattack, thus cinching a clear Swedish victory, the Protestants’ first major success. While the Swedes lost 4,000 of the 40,000 men engaged, the imperial forces lost a total of 21,600 of the 32,000 men involved. Swedish artillery, which outnumbered imperial artillery fifty-four to twenty-six, played a major role in achieving this uneven casualty ratio.

This battle also marked the victory of Sweden’s new linear formations (originally introduced by Maurice of Nassau) over the old massive formations (the “Spanish square”), which, in one form or another, had dominated European military tactics for centuries. The Swedish linear formation was usually five men deep, thus putting every man in direct contact with the enemy during the melee. Mobility had won over mass. The best commentary on these new tactics is the fact that the imperial forces now attempted to imitate these methods, though they were initially not very successful. As a result of the Breitenfeld victory, Sweden was recognized as a major European military power, and northern Germany remained Protestant. Torstenson’s reward was a promotion to general in 1632. If Breitenfeld pointed to the end of the old “Spanish square,” the Battle of Rocroi in northeastern France in 1643 (won by the dynamic French commander the Great Condé over the Spanish) sealed its fate.

In April, 1632, Torstenson’s artillery again provided the decisive difference in the Battle of Lech, in which his artillery covered the Swedish army’s crossing of that river and enabled the Swedish forces to penetrate into Bavarian territory. Torstenson, however, was captured by imperial forces in the Battle of the Alte Feste later that year. Significantly, this battle, which turned into a Swedish defeat, was primarily lost because the terrain was so rough that the Swedes were unable to maneuver their field guns during the engagement. As a result of his capture, Torstenson was not present at the fateful Battle of Lützen (November 16, 1632), a victory that was diminished by the death of Gustavus. Torstenson was exchanged a year later.

After serving as chief of staff to Johan Banér in 1635 in eastern and central Germany, and after Banér’s death, he was put in command of the Swedish army in Germany, having been promoted to field marshal. Torstenson was still in Sweden at the time of his appointment and arrived in Germany to assume command in time to prevent a mutiny against the temporary commander, General Karl Gustav Wrangel. The troops had not been paid for some time and threatened to quit, leaving Sweden without an army in Germany. Torstenson proved his worth in this command position as well, turning an undisciplined rabble (to which most armies had deteriorated during the latter stage of the Thirty Years’ War) again into an effective field force, soon winning a series of victories. Torstenson regained control over the mutinous rabble by legalizing and formalizing the practice of looting occupied territory by which soldiers compensated themselves for their service. At the same time, Torstenson enforced a rigid and brutal discipline against all who went against his orders—against his own soldiers and the civilian population alike. Hangings of disobedient soldiers and uncooperative civilians were the order of the day. His men hated him, but he brought them victories and hence plunder. The unspeakable brutality of the soldiers during this final phase of the Thirty Years’ War, and especially of the Swedish troops, still haunts German folklore.

In 1642, Torstenson advanced the Swedish forces to within twenty-five miles of Vienna and later that year won another decisive victory in the Second Battle of Breitenfeld, which effectively eliminated the imperial army as a viable military force in Germany. In the 1645 campaign, Torstenson again drove deep into Habsburg territory and, in the Battle of Jankow (March 15, 1645), about forty miles south of Prague, won yet another brilliant Swedish victory. This victory was an outstanding and decisive example of Torstenson’s artillery’s mobility, which was shifted from sector to sector as needed, making Jankow the hitherto most dramatic example of artillery’s flexibility. Following this battle, the Swedes conquered all Moravia and again threatened Vienna.

Early in 1646, following repeated pleas by Torstenson, he was permitted to retire from military service because of ill health. Wrangel succeeded him. A year later, Torstenson was made count of Ortala. Torstenson had suffered from gout for some time, being restricted to a bed or a litter during much of the last campaign, his hands so gnarled that he was at times unable even to sign orders. His last service was that of general-governor of Sweden’s western border province of Westgotland.

Significance

Though the “military revolution” was already under way when Torstenson appeared on the scene, he can properly be called the father of field artillery. Building on the work of Maurice of Nassau and Gustavus, Torstenson converted the reforms of those two men to full reality on the battlefield.

Under the military reforms, the musketeers (firing ordered volleys, introduced by Gustavus, rather than scattered individual fire) had the task of opening a path for the pikemen, who were still the force to clinch the victory in the melee, or hand-to-hand combat. The light, mobile regimental artillery, able to move with the advancing infantry, assisted the musketeers in providing a breach in the enemy formation in a more massive and decisive fashion through its rapid, coordinated, and concentrated fire. That is also true of cavalry charges, which increased their shock effect through the use of their own regimental guns.

Though these reforms gradually spread to other countries, most armies during the Thirty Years’ War still employed artillery in a static role, even on the battlefield. In fact, during the period of pre-French revolutionary “neoclassical” warfare, European armies experienced regressive developments in artillery employment as well as in other reforms introduced during the early seventeenth century. In the French army, artillery officers did not hold military rank until 1732, and drivers in many armies continued to be civilians. The use of contract artillery with privately owned horses substantially reduced the potential of mobility on the battlefield, since the contractors removed their valuable horses from harm’s way during the battle, restricting the ability to move the guns to the limits of human muscle power. King Frederick the Great introduced the use of army horses in the Prussian army during the middle of the century.

The Battles of Breitenfeld and Jankow demonstrate Torstenson’s innovations most dramatically and completed the conversion of field artillery from a purely static function on the battlefield to its modern role as part of the combined arms of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. At least some of the credit that is frequently attributed to Gustavus has to be shared with Torstenson.

Bibliography

Bonney, Richard. The Thirty Years’ War, 1618-1648. Oxford, England: Osprey, 2002. A modern account of the war, containing information on Torstenson’s role in the conflict. Provides a concise summary, including discussion of the warring parties, battles, and portraits of soldiers and civilians.

Brzenski, Richard. The Army of Gustavus Adolphus: Cavalry. Men-at-Arms 262. Oxford, England: Osprey, 1993. This book is a history of Gustavus’s calvary, and includes information on its organization, arms, armor, tactics, and uniforms, as well as color illustrations.

‗‗‗‗‗‗‗. The Army of Gustavus Adolphus: Infantry. Men-at-Arms 235. Oxford, England: Osprey, 1991. The first of two books about Gustavus’s army, this book focuses on the history of the infantry. Includes information on the infantry’s organization, arms, armor, and uniforms, as well as color illustrations.

Montgomery of Alamein, Viscount. A History of Warfare. Cleveland, Ohio: World, 1968. A general history of warfare that places the Thirty Years’ War and Sweden’s role in a broader perspective.

Ogg, David. Europe in the Seventeenth Century. 6th ed. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1952. A general history that is still of great value. Has an extensive section on the Thirty Years’ War and Sweden’s role in the conflict.

Roberts, Michael. Essays in Swedish History. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1967. The essay “Gustav Adolf and the Art of War” is excellent on the overall and extensive military reforms of the early seventeenth century, with an emphasis on Gustavus’s contributions. Includes six pages of footnotes that provide excellent bibliographical information.

Scott, Franklin D. Sweden: The Nation’s History. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977. A general history of Sweden, with Chapter 7, “Sweden’s Age of Greatness,” devoted to the period from 1611 to 1654.

Wedgwood, C. V. The Thirty Years’ War. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1939. A standard work of the war with excellent overall discussions of Sweden’s role. Includes maps, illustrations, an index, and an extensive bibliography.